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Sisson, Melanie W. (Ph.D., Political Science) 
Choosing to Lose:  How Ex-Ante Expectations Determine Asymmetric Conflict Outcomes 
Thesis directed by Professor Steve Chan 
This dissertation develops a theory that is explicitly cognitive in nature to explain why and when 
strong states retrench from ongoing conflicts with weaker opponents. The theory's fundamental 
premise is that states take seriously not only what they are fighting for, but also who they are 
fighting against. Specifically, the theory proposes that prior to militarized engagements states 
evaluate their power, measured primarily in terms of the number, sophistication, skill, and 
resilience of military assets, in relation to that of a prospective opponent  and, on this basis, 
establish an expectation of the losses it likely will incur in a fight.  The theory’s central 
contentions are that this expectation operates as a reference point, and that states therefore will 
make the choice to decrease their level of commitment by scaling back objectives, 
circumscribing operational activity, reducing troop levels, or even effecting a full and rapid 
withdrawal when this reference point is violated.  That is, strong-states will choose to lose 
asymmetric conflicts when the level of cost realized exceeds the level of cost anticipated ex-ante.   
These dynamics explain not only individual cases of strong-state loss, but also the upward trend 
in a particular type of strong-state loss -- great power loss -- over time.  Specifically, the theory 
suggests, rather counterintuitively, that great power loss should be both more frequent and more 
likely under low-polarity structures -- that is, during periods of bipolarity and unipolarity.  This 
proposition is tested using quantitative analysis, while the theory's hypotheses about the 
formation of the reference point and the salience of its violation are tested directly through the 
use of a survey-based experiment fielded to a sample population of roughly 400 U.S. elites. 
These methods, coupled with illustrative studies of three post-Cold War U.S. interventions, 
produce results that are largely supportive of the theory's central argument: that the fact and the 
timing of strong-state decisions to retrench are determined by the violation of ex-ante 
expectations of the costs of conflict.   
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CHAPTER I:  THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Why do the Strong Sometimes Lose to the Weak? 
 
 
*************** 
 
 
 One of the most accepted truisms of the last twenty years is the notion that the United 
States is the center of world power.  In 1991 columnist Charles Krauthammer first proclaimed 
the beginning of a “unipolar moment,” anointing the United States an “unrivaled superpower…at 
the apex of the industrial West." A veritable cottage industry of work emerged soon thereafter, 
with pundits and professors alike  concerned with understanding whether, and/or when and how 
the United States might come to be removed from -- or simply to fall off of -- this elevated perch, 
all with an eye toward avoiding, preventing, or otherwise delaying that eventuality’s arrival 
(Mastanduno 1997; Kupchan 1998; Copeland 2000; Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 2005, 2008; 
Wohlforth 2009; Krauthammer 2002/2003; Ferguson 2005; Walt 2005). Although some, most 
notably prominent historian Samuel Huntington (1999), quibbled with Krauthammer’s depiction 
of a unipolar world, even he acknowledged “The United States, of course, is the sole state with 
preeminence in every domain of power – economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, 
technological, and cultural--with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually 
every part of the world.” 
Huntington’s characterization of the United States provides perhaps the most concise 
rendering of the foundations for this seeming consensus about America’s uberpower status:  an 
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understanding of power as control over resources, defined by both material and ideational 
endowment.  With its “hard” variant captured in measurements of military expenditures, the size 
of armed forces, gross domestic product, geography and population
1, and its “soft” component -- 
human capital, technological achievement, and cultural appeal -- left more ephemeral but not 
omitted, this elements-of-power approach led inexorably to the identification of America as the 
elephant in the room.
2
   
Whether such an accounting continues to lead to this conclusion is the subject of rather 
heated debate, with a spirited back-and-forth about the rise of China
3
; the effects of the 2008 
financial crisis (Layne 2012; Wohlforth 2012); and the United States' most recent military 
outings in Iraq and in Afghanistan, which for many call to mind Paul Kennedy's well-known 
argument about imperial overstretch -- including for Paul Kennedy himself
4
 -- and, some argue, 
may long tarnish the United States' soft power.
5
  Not surprisingly given their courses, conduct, 
and outcomes, these engagements often are offered both as cause and as consequence of the 
waning of the United States' unipolar moment.  Claims of causation may prove true -- only time 
                                                     
1
 Barry Posen further refined our understanding of hard power in his well-known "Command of the 
Commons" (2003), in which he understands U.S. military primacy as its getting "vastly more military use 
out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and 
that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United 
States" (p. 8). 
2
 For a full definition and treatment of soft power see:  Nye, Joseph S. Jr., Soft Power: The Means 
to Success in World Politics, (New York:  Public Affairs Press), 2004 
3
 For a good overview of, and important new contribution to, this debate see:  Beckley, Michael, 
"China's Century?  Why America's Edge Will Endure", International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 
2011/12), pp. 41-78 
4
 "American Power is on the Wane", Paul Kennedy, The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2009, at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123189377673479433.html 
5
 On all of the above see:  Nye, Joseph S. Jr., "The Future of American Power:  Dominance and 
Decline in Perspective", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 6, November/December 2010. 
 [3] 
 
will reveal whether the United States really is in relative decline, and whether these wars were 
the culprit -- but even without the long view of history these events should raise anew an interest 
in explaining why it is that even the most powerful states in the system so often suffer loss at the 
hands of much lesser opponents.         
The question of why such outcomes occur and recur in a system in which power is 
posited to be the commodity of first resort has, of course, not been neglected.   To the contrary, a 
rather robust literature, to be discussed at length in Chapter II, has developed to explain these 
"unexpected" asymmetric conflict outcomes.  This literature has  focused primarily on the 
difficulties inherent in evaluation of state strength (Blainey, 1973), and on the identification of 
variables that might weaken, neutralize, or even render counterproductive an objectively stronger 
actor’s advantage:  resolve (Rosen 1972; Mack 1975), receipt of external aid (Record 2007), 
regime type (Merom 2003), and strategy (Summers 1982; Krepinevich 1986; Pape 1996; Biddle 
2004; Arreguin-Toft 2005; Nagl 2005; Sullivan 2007, 2008; Lyall and Wilson III 2009).    
These explanations, however, are unsatisfying.  Individually, many make arguments that 
are incomplete, or from which the posited implications do not follow logically; collectively, they 
all rely either explicitly or implicitly upon the expected utility model of decision-making. That is, 
what does the heavy lifting for these theories is the rational choice proposition that states make 
the political choice to retrench -- that is, they choose to lose -- when the actual costs of fighting 
have come to equal or to exceed the expected value of the benefits of winning.
 
 I believe the 
historical record offers reason to call this assumption into question. 
 This dissertation therefore parts company with much of the literature to date by rejecting 
the premise that the cost-benefit ratio is the sine qua non of asymmetric conflict outcomes.  In an 
argument developed fully in Chapter III, I accept  rational choice’s requirement that states have 
 [4] 
 
and act in accordance with a complete and transitive preference ordering but use a cognitive 
framework to argue that the political choice to retrench from an ongoing conflict is precipitated 
not by the cost/benefit ratio, but rather by a reference point: a status quo, expected, or even 
desired level of a valued asset (Levy 1997a; McDermott 2004b). I identify as this reference point 
the anticipated costs of conflict; specifically, I propose that prior to militarized engagements, 
states evaluate their power in relation to that of a prospective opponent and, on the basis of this 
power differential, establish an expectation of the losses likely to be incurred in a fight.   
 The theory’s central contention is that the state will choose to maintain or to escalate its 
level of commitment only so long as it is physically able and ex-ante expectations of the costs of 
conflict have not been violated. A successful outcome therefore depends upon the state's ability 
to achieve its original objectives prior to the crossing of the threshold between expected and 
realized losses.  Conversely, states will make the choice to decrease the level of commitment by 
scaling back objectives, circumscribing operational activity, reducing troop levels, or even 
effecting a full and rapid withdrawal when actual losses surpass the level of loss the power 
differential led it to believe would be required in order to win.
6
   These propositions are tested in 
Chapter IV, and their operation in the real world is illustrated in Chapter VI. 
The identification of the military balance as the source of the reference point, however, 
has implications that should be observable not only at the bilateral level, but also at the structural 
level.  The theory posits that states are sensitive to the extent of their power advantage over 
prospective opponents, and that this sensitivity is reflected in their understanding of the likely 
costs of war -- the greater the material advantage, the lower the anticipated costs of winning.  
                                                     
6
 Other theories have identified leadership expectations as explaining important IR outcomes - see, 
for example:  Copeland, Dale C., "Economic Interdependence and War:  A Theory of Trade 
Expectations", International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring, 1996), pp. 5-41. 
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This is a relative measure of power, having to do not with how much power the state has in 
absolute terms, but rather with how states believe their capabilities stack up against those of a 
potential adversary.  I argue that this bilateral comparison is causal in individual instances of 
strong-state loss; but I also argue that it happens within, and so is affected by, the larger context 
of the global distribution of power -- indeed, this is a foundational premise of the realist 
paradigm in international relations theory (e.g. Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Layne 1993; Copeland 
2000; Mearsheimer 2003).   
My theory therefore also proposes that because states are attuned to how much of the 
system's power they possess as compared to all other states, their likelihood of believing they can 
prosecute conflicts at low cost in general should vary with the distribution of power at the 
systemic level.  States, in other words, enter into bilateral evaluations with an understanding of 
where power resides in the system -- that is, with an understanding of whether it is concentrated 
or diffuse, and across which actors.  In particular, states understand whether they are, or are not, 
themselves a great power.  I argue that it is during periods in which the state is acknowledged to 
hold this status that its perceived power advantage over the majority of states in the system will 
be the most pronounced.   This effect, moreover, should increase as the number of recognized 
great powers in the system decreases; the fewer the number of peer competitors, the greater the 
proportion of global power the state will hold, and the more recognizable its power advantage 
will be.   
It is, then, states that find themselves to be great powers in low-polarity systems -- that is, 
in bipolar or unipolar systems -- that will be most prone to perceiving themselves to have a great 
power advantage over most or all other states in the system.  The logical, albeit counterintuitive, 
implication of the theory, then, is that states should lose asymmetric conflict more often  when 
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they are more dominant.  Stated another way, states should be most likely to lose their 
asymmetric conflicts when they are great powers operating in a low-polarity international 
environment.  These propositions, developed fully in Chapter III and tested in Chapter V, allow 
my theory to explain not only the occurrence of strong-state loss, but also variation in the 
frequency of a particular type of strong-state loss -- great power loss -- over time. 
The dissertation thus accesses a number of important and timely debates.  It contributes 
to the scholarly literature on the relationship between polarity and conflict in general, and on the 
advantages and durability of unipolarity in particular.  Unlike much of this literature, however, 
the theory is concerned not with explaining why it is that great powers undertake adventures in 
the so-called "periphery", but rather with explaining why it is that those adventures so often end 
up being attached to the terms "ill-fated".  The theory thus not only offers an explanation for 
unexpected asymmetric conflict outcomes, but also sounds a note of caution for the United States 
as it reflects upon past, and considers future, uses of force during its era of primacy.   
 The dissertation also engages the expected utility paradigm at its core -- as a theory of 
political choice -- and presents an alternative.  Importantly, it is an alternative that has the 
potential to be progressive:  because my argument defines cost-tolerance as the ratio between 
expected and realized costs, and not by the ratio between the actual costs of fighting and the 
anticipated benefits of winning, the theory makes room for the state to suffer losses in excess of 
the war’s potential spoils before quitting, or to withdraw despite a level of loss that remains 
significantly below the value of the benefits sought.  As a result, my theory is capable of 
explaining outcomes that are consistent with expected utility theories, and outcomes that are not 
-- those instance in which the paradigm’s assumptions classify the strong-state as having quit 
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prematurely (actual costs < expected benefits) or, conversely, as not having known when to walk 
away (actual costs > expected benefits).   
Moreover, where expected utility theories of asymmetric conflict termination have, to 
date, failed to be predictive -- that is, they have not offered a means by which to identify, ex-
ante, the value of the costs of fighting that equals the value of the anticipated benefits of winning 
-- my theory defines the reference point in terms of measurable and observable pre-war 
indicators.  In so doing, it not only contributes to the inter-paradigmatic debate, but also 
advances the prospect theory research agenda itself:  by testing the hypothesis that decisions are 
made around a reference point; by taking on the critical task of identifying that reference point; 
and by challenging predictions about decision-maker behavior in the so-called “domain of 
losses”.  And, it does so without emphasizing the innate qualities, attitudes, and values of 
individuals, or the role of institutional structures, that tend to dominate research in the subfield of 
foreign policy decision-making. Rather, it identifies and explains a systematic bias in human 
decision-making that can shed light on an important class of international political events.   
In this regard the dissertation should be of particular interest to practitioners of foreign 
policy.  It offers an explanation for international political behavior that focuses on how 
observable data about the international environment -- in this case the  power differential -- leads 
to the formation of a particular belief, and on how that belief leads in turn to real and meaningful  
political outcomes.
7
  In other words, it is a theory that accommodates, rather than assumes away, 
perceptions and beliefs about the world in which states make decisions.  As a result, it has the 
                                                     
7
 A cognitive approach posits that decision-makers are vulnerable to error, subject to influences 
other than cost minimization and benefit maximization, and that they tend to be somewhat "closed-
minded due to their beliefs and the way they process information [and so] tend to resist adapting to 
changes in the environment" (Rosati in Neack, 1995, p. 50). 
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potential to point policymakers toward a check on their assumptions that may help them in the 
future to avoid making the political choice to lose.    
 The theory's causal mechanism operates at the level of individual choice, and so an 
adequate test of the hypotheses it generates must access as directly as possible its propositions 
about  the formation of the reference point and about the effects of the violation thereof.  To 
achieve this, Chapter IV describes and presents the results of  a survey-based experiment fielded 
to a sample population of roughly 400 U.S. elites.  Although the use of experimentation in IR 
research is somewhat unusual, it is gaining traction (McDermott 2002; Hyde 2010), and it is  my 
view that the method will only become more common, and more relevant, as the field continues 
to see growth in research agendas that rely upon the behavioral assumptions of the expected 
utility paradigm. 
 Chapter V uses large-n analysis to test the theory's hypothesis about the relationship 
between state loss, great power status, and system polarity.  Two datasets are analyzed across 
four models to test for the posited relationship.  Chapter VI then uses the "straw in the wind" 
(Collier 2011) approach to focus attention on evidence from real conflict events that might 
increase or decrease the plausibility of the theory's expectation that a state will choose to 
maintain or to escalate its level of commitment to an ongoing conflict only so long as it is 
physically able and ex-ante cost-expectations have not been violated; and, conversely, that states 
will make the choice to decrease the level of commitment when actual losses surpass the level of 
loss expected.   This entails the use of process-tracing in three cases of U.S. interventions under 
low-polarity structures: in  Panama (1989); Somalia (1992-1993); and the former Yugoslavia 
(1995-present).   
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 The collective weight of the empirical evidence collected and analyzed in this study is 
encouraging for the theory, suggesting that it has the potential to make important advances in 
theorizing about conflict:  it forwards a novel explanation for asymmetric conflict outcome, one 
that captures events that are consistent with  expected utility theories and those that are 
anomalous for it (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970); advances the prospect paradigm by taking on 
successfully the "critical task" of determining "how actors identify their reference points" (Levy 
2003, p. 271) in an important class of international political events; and offers a means of 
operationalizing the nebulous concept of "cost tolerance".  
 So too does the theory have potential practical implications -- although they are 
implications that cut two ways.  In the first instance, the theory is cause for pessimism.  It 
suggests that decision-makers contemplating asymmetric engagements cannot help but telegraph 
their ex-ante expectations to a potential opponent.  The state's past performances provide 
identifiable benchmarks:  the power of the adversary; and the casualties accepted prior to 
retrenchment.  An attentive foe therefore need only locate itself on the relative power scale to 
arrive at an approximation of the strong-state's reference point, and so to understand roughly how 
much pain it must inflict in order to prevail.  This means that weak states can enter asymmetric 
conflicts with two sizable advantages:  their fight is over vital interests -- often existential 
interests -- that leave  them willing to accept high levels of cost over an indefinite period of time; 
and they have available to them information that can give them a sense of how much cost they 
must impose in order to compel their stronger adversary to choose to lose.  They can identify, in 
other words, a rough estimate of their opponent's cost-tolerance.  These advantages together 
allow weak opponents to select strategies that are focused not on achieving battlefield success, 
but rather that are focused simply on inflicting casualties while maintaining sufficient capability 
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to continue to do so until the strong-state's cost threshold is met.  This renders weak actors' 
threats to "outlast" their stronger opponent, and/or to "bleed it dry", wise strategic positioning -- 
not least for their plausibility.   
 In the second instance, however, there is reason for optimism, with the theory suggesting 
a means through which policymakers might avoid falling victim to this dynamic.  An 
appreciation of the distinction between expectations and value might increase the likelihood that 
policymakers will make choices based not on what they think winning should cost, but rather on 
what they think winning actually is worth.  That is, remaining cognizant of the difference 
between expectations and value may allow policymakers to recognize when the itch to retrench 
is premised on the former and not the latter, thus enabling them to overcome the impulse to pull 
back prematurely and increasing the likelihood that they will instead pursue the engagement 
through to success.   
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CHAPTER II:  THE LITERATURE 
 
Explaining Strong-State Asymmetric Conflict Loss:  
Miscalculation, Democracy,  and Strategy  
 
 
*************** 
 
 
There is a tendency among scholars and practitioners of international relations to accept 
the notion that those states with more capability are more likely to get their way than are those 
with less; that is, wars are expected to end when a stronger state succeeds in destroying the 
ability of a weaker opponent to fight – or at least succeeds in convincing its leaders that arrival at 
such point is imminent and/or inevitable.  And yet resource-based indices have in the past been, 
and seemingly continue to be, at odds with a not-insignificant number of outcomes in the 
international system; indeed, in roughly 40% of the cases of inter-, extra-, and intra-state war 
included in the Correlates of War database the expectation of the strong overcoming the weak is 
disappointed (34% losses, 8% stalemates), with the frequency of such outcomes increasing over 
time (Arreguin-Toft 2001).  These facts present a conundrum for scholars of international 
relations:  how to explain these seemingly odd international political outcomes, in which 
asymmetric wars end in ways material measures of power suggest they shouldn't?   And, how to 
explain this upward trend in strong-state failures over time? 
For asymmetric as with all wars, James Fearon's rendering of the central puzzle with 
which scholars must contend as the fact that "wars are costly but nonetheless wars recur" (1995, 
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p. 379) is apt. Explanations for this counterintuitive behavior, he continues, may be reduced to 
two:  either state leaders suffer from base irrationality, or their rational processes of cost-benefit 
calculation lead often to the conclusion that the latter exceed the former.  Given these 
alternatives it is hardly surprising that theories of war in the rationalist tradition are by far the 
more common.  Implicit in them all is the assumption that in all but perhaps a few exceptional 
cases, state leaders do not commit themselves to war based upon the belief that they will win 
simply because they want to win, because they believe a higher entity has ordained that they win, 
or because they believe dumb luck is sure to work in their favor.  Instead, theorists generally 
presume that states catalogue the resources they can bring to bear in a fight, compare this tally 
against that of their opponent, and estimate whose reserve is larger. This suggests that wars 
should be avoidable, and asymmetric wars particularly so; states should recognize which has 
more, which has less, and, understanding that this distribution will determine the outcome of 
their disagreement, settle the dispute without first having to resort to violence.  Where war does 
occur, moreover, the outcome should be consistent with the balance of power. Clearly, both 
propositions are faulty -- wars, even asymmetric ones, do occur and, as noted above, their results 
do not always affirm the utility of material power.  
That wars occur both between relatively evenly matched opponents and also between 
highly imbalanced opponents allows the categorization of any given conflict into one of two sets:  
one in which the stronger side can be said to have been defeated, and one in which the stronger 
side can be said to have lost.  The differentiation of these sets is important, for it enables 
distinction between strong side defeat produced by the destruction of capabilities, and strong side 
loss produced by the destruction of will.  Strong-side defeat can take one of two forms. First, 
through effective strategy, brute force, or some combination of the two, a materially weaker 
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opponent may maintain or seize control over contested territory or; second, it can effect the 
severe depletion of war-fighting resources (to include the death or capture of troops and the 
destruction of military assets and/or the domestic means of producing them) such that the 
stronger state’s leaders assess their likelihood of victory to be sufficiently low that they concede.   
Loss, by contrast, is the decision by strong-states to surrender or withdraw from war without 
having first involuntarily surrendered territory, suffered severe depletion of war-fighting 
resources, or even suffered battlefield defeats sufficient in quantity or quality to convince them 
that arrival at such a point is imminent or inevitable. Defeat is understood to pertain, in general, 
to conflicts characterized by power differentials that are not dramatically skewed, and loss to 
pertain, in general, to conflicts characterized by considerable power asymmetry.
8
   
Research into strong-state loss, to date, has generally focused on the difficulties inherent 
in evaluation of state strength, and on the identification of variables that might weaken, 
neutralize, or even render counterproductive an objectively stronger actor’s advantage.  These 
explanations fall generally into one of three categories, each of which is addressed below:  
miscalculation of one's own, or of one's opponent's, material capabilities and/or resolve (Blainey 
1973; Rosen 1972; Mack 1975); the constraints imposed by domestic constituencies, most 
particularly in democracies (Merom 2003; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2008); and strategies that 
are poorly defined, designed, executed, or are in some other way inappropriate to the context in 
which they are applied (Summers 1982; Krepinevich 1986; Pape 1996; Biddle 2004; Arreguin-
Toft 2005; Nagl 2005; Sullivan 2007, 2008; Lyall and Wilson III 2009).   
 
                                                     
8
 The field has not settled on a specific measure of the threshold between “conflicts” and 
“asymmetric conflicts”, but the latter are generally understood to be characterized by the interaction 
between at least two states, where only one possesses material capabilities sufficient to threaten the 
physical survival of the other.   
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Miscalculation: 
Over-confidence has a long and somewhat elevated standing in the conflict literature, 
having first taken pride of place in Geoffrey Blainey's explanation of the cause of war.  Blainey 
takes as his premise that states, for good reasons or bad, often overestimate their prospects of 
success as a result of an inflated view of their state's capabilities.  What is important, he asserts, 
is "not the actual distribution or balance of power which is vital:  it is rather the way in which 
national leaders think [emphasis in original] that power is distributed…” (Blainey, 1973 p. 114).  
Blainey goes on to argue that war becomes possible when, given these subjective measures of 
relative power, “both rivals [believe] that they [can] achieve more through war than peace” (p. 
127).  States, in other words, may have a greater degree of confidence in their material 
superiority, and so in the likelihood of victory, than a truly objective review of the relative 
distribution of resources would justify.   
Subsequent theorists and researchers have taken up the question of over-confidence and 
miscalculation, seeking to identify why -- other than sheer hubris -- leaders might have a 
mistakenly aggrandized view of their state's capabilities and/or a mistakenly low estimation of 
those of their opponent.  Most prominent among the theories that has emerged is the possibility 
that states do not recognize their own inability to make usable the resources under their control, 
whether as a result of a lack of skill or the inapplicability of a particular type of resource to a 
particular type of interaction (Baldwin 1979).
9
 The most obvious cases of unexpected conflict 
outcomes, however, including the U.S. engagements in Afghanistan and in Iraq, cast doubt upon 
                                                     
9
 The inapplicability argument is summarized by Baldwin as “he had a great bridge hand but 
happened to be playing poker.” Baldwin, David A., “Power Analysis and World Politics:  New Trends 
versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics, Vol 31, No. 2. (Jan., 1979), p. 163-164.   
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explanations that hinge on diagnosis of a skill deficit -- the size and sophistication of the U.S. 
military make it at least difficult to find this position compelling.   
The other source of miscalculation that figures prominently in the literature has to do not 
with how national leaders conceive of their own state, but rather with how they perceive the 
attributes and deficits of their opponent.  In particular, a number of well-known examinations of 
asymmetric conflict explore the importance of state willingness to suffer, and especially of an 
imbalance in that willingness to suffer.   
An early rendering of what has become termed "preference intensity" was provided by 
Andrew Mack in his study of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam (1975).  Mack reasoned that the 
distribution of capabilities in a conflict produces a concomitant but inverse distribution of 
interests that favors the weak actor; for the weak, that is, but not for the strong, the fight is 
existential, defined by the highly motivating desire to survive.  This disparity is reflected in the 
actors’ relative levels of resolve – it will be high where survival is at stake, and low where the 
interests being challenged are of lesser import.
10
  Mack identifies domestic society as the 
location of resolve, explaining that because the stronger state’s level of commitment to the 
conflict is limited rather than total there remains competition for resources, creating the potential 
for divisive public expressions of dissatisfaction with the war effort.  This potential is realized 
when “battle casualties rise and economic costs escalate” (p. 185).  For Mack, then, the key 
determinant of strong state loss is an increasing unwillingness of domestic society to provide the 
resources necessary to fight:  
 
“…if the war escalates dramatically…it makes a definite impact on the economic 
and political resources which might otherwise have been allocated to, say, public 
                                                     
10
 Mack understands “will” or “resolve” to be a state’s “political capability to wage war.” See 
Mack, 1975 pp. 177, 179. 
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welfare projects.  Tax increases may be necessary to cover the costs of the war, a 
draft system may have to be introduced, and inflation will be an almost certain 
by-product.  Such costs are seen as part of the ‘necessary price’ when the security 
of the nation is directly threatened.  When this is not the case, the basis for 
consensus disappears.  In a limited war, it is not at all clear to those groups 
whose interests are adversely affected why such sacrifices are necessary.” (pp. 
185-186).   
 
 
Although Mack’s proposition has an intuitive appeal, it is not clear that societies, and 
particularly the American society, makes tradeoff calculations in the way his theory seems to 
require; publics often either are unaware of or unconcerned with the accretion of national debt, 
for example, while the complexities and vagaries of agency – much less national – budgets make 
tabulation of expenditures in either/or terms difficult at best.  Mack's proposition, further, that 
strong-states by definition do not understand asymmetric conflicts to be existential in nature is 
problematic -- even very powerful states may understand an asymmetric conflict to be existential 
as a result of “domino logic”, in which “a series of individually insignificant interests are linked 
so that their cumulative loss constitutes a material threat to survival” (Arreguin-Toft 2005, p. 
14).  Indeed, this was a common refrain over the course of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam, and 
one invoked with regularity prior to and during the its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Bacevich 
2009). 
Steven Rosen’s slightly earlier (1972) work also focuses on disparities of resolve, but he 
focuses more closely on the operationalization of the concept in terms of punishment -- the costs 
a state is willing to incur.  Rosen develops a formal expression of resolve as a state’s willingness 
to absorb costs per unit of its adversary’s capabilities (State A Costs/State B Capabilities and 
vice versa), and power as the ratio between the two (p. 169).  In effect, Rosen is arguing that 
cost-acceptance is meaningless absent reference to the capabilities of an adversary -- how much 
cost a state is willing to bear matters only in relation to how much cost an opponent is able to 
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inflict.  It is, then, the balance between this cost-tolerance ratio and the anticipated benefits of 
war that establishes the threshold between a strong state’s decision to continue to fight and its 
decision to cede the war, and so to lose.  The implication of both Mack's and Rosen's analysis of 
resolve, then, is that it is the underappreciation of an opponent's willingness to suffer relative to 
one's own that causes strong-states to lose.  Both theories, too, also access the role domestic 
audiences play in determining conflict outcome, a constraint dealt with more explicitly by the 
treatments discussed below. 
 
Domestic Constraints: 
In most if not in all cases of asymmetric conflict it is true that the materially advantaged 
state has at its disposal capabilities -- troop increases, air strikes, and even nuclear weapons -- 
that can change the dynamic of even a war that is going very badly.  That these states choose not 
to employ such assets may say less about their applicability to specific contexts, and more about 
states’ unwillingness to use them.  Gil Merom (2003) forwards an explanation as to why this 
might be so, focusing specifically upon the interaction between regime type and social 
mobilization.  For Merom, democracies are at a disadvantage in asymmetric conflict relative to 
their autocratic counterparts, with the latter benefitting from the ability to maintain strict control 
over the information available to their populations and to silence dissent should any arise.  The 
extent of this control over society allows the state to mobilize its resources efficiently and 
minimizes the potential for, and consequences of, public disapproval of the rationale for war or 
of its execution.  Leaders of democratic states, by contrast, are argued by Merom to be 
constrained by their society’s judgment concerning the necessity of the war and the 
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appropriateness of its conduct, both of which are manifest in the population’s willingness both to 
bear costs, and to impose them.   
Merom develops a “tolerance curve” that represents the tradeoff a democratic society 
must make between the numbers of its own lives it is willing to lose in relation to the numbers of 
enemy lives it is willing to take, arguing that states  
 
“must secure their soldiers’ and citizens’ “acceptance” of the use of violence and 
the risk of being its victims.  In other words, in order to fight, let alone win wars, 
states need their soldiers to be ready to harm others and be killed or maimed, and 
their citizens to accept the army’s behavior and the risks their kin in arms face.  
Achieving a certain balance between these two requirements – the readiness to 
bear the cost of war and the readiness to exact a painful toll from others – is a 
precondition for succeeding in war” (p. 19).    
 
 
Where this balance is not met in small wars, he claims, democracies will lose. 
Despite having established this relational construct between home casualties and enemy 
casualties, Merom’s subsequent analysis and conclusions do not follow from it. Although he 
identifies manpower -- the lives to be put at risk -- as the essential, societally-provided resource 
upon which states depend, his explanation for state loss refers not to democracies’  unwillingness 
to field soldiers, but rather to their unwillingness to “escalate the level of violence and brutality 
to that which can secure victory” (Merom, 2003 p. 15).   That is, though he assumes that both 
types of tolerance are bounded, with fixed upper limits, he attributes state loss to an 
unwillingness to adjust only one of them.  Merom thus effects a sleight of hand; by stating the 
argument unidirectionally, he neglects its interactive dynamic: if the number of casualties a state 
must impose in order to win is contingent upon the number of casualties it is willing to incur, 
then state loss will be produced by an unwillingness to adjust either threshold upward.  The 
willingness to suffer costs, then, must matter at least as much as the willingness to impose them.      
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Perhaps the most prominent argument about domestic constraints is the "casualty phobia" 
proposition -- the assertion that domestic publics are disinclined to accept casualties, and 
particularly so in small-scale conflicts.  This hypothesis applies most directly to democracies -- 
although there are reasons to believe autocracies are not immune (Weeks 2008) -- positing that 
the pressures created for elected officials by an increase in casualties and a concomitant decrease 
in public support cause retrenchment.  A number of scholars, however, have challenged this 
proposition, and indeed have done so using data from the conflict considered by many to be the 
exemplar:  the U.S. engagement in Somalia, wherein retrenchment followed very quickly on the 
heels of the now infamous downing of a Black Hawk helicopter and the subsequent loss of  18 
troops in a pitched battle in Mogadishu.  James Burk has argued that "on balance it is difficult to 
find strong support for the casualties hypothesis in the data for Somalia.  That is striking, as this 
case is often supposed to provide clear-cut evidence in favor of the hypotheses...[but] it is 
difficult to conclude that changing public opinion had the predicted effect on political decisions 
to suspend the peacekeeping mission" (Burk 1998, pp. 68-69). Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. 
Feaver, and Jason Reifler (2005, 2009) have similarly questioned the hypothesis, also claiming 
that the timing of the drop in public support for the Somalia intervention does not fit:  
“Data…show that public support for the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia dropped from 74 
percent in December 1992, at the start of the humanitarian relief operation, to 43 percent in mid-
September, before the Black Hawk was downed  in October” (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009, p. 
38).  Gelpi, Fever, and Reifler are not arguing that domestic constraints do not determine conflict 
outcomes, they are simply arguing that it is not casualty phobia that is the constraint that matters.   
Instead, these scholars argue that it is the likelihood of victory that is the most salient 
influence on societal support for war.  Using proprietary survey and experimental data, Gelpi, 
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Feaver, and Reifler produce evidence they argue demonstrates that individual cost tolerance 
levels are arrived at via assessment of the justifiability of conflict -- whether going to war is the 
“right thing” -- and of the likelihood that the effort will be successful.  Casualty tolerance, in 
other words, is consistent with rationalist expectations: its maximum is the cost-equivalent of the 
anticipated benefits of conflict weighted by the probability that those benefits will be realized.  
This proposition predicts that support for war will not decrease as casualty levels increase unless 
the public also believes that the likelihood of victory has declined.  This emphasis on the 
probability of winning, however, is problematic -- Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler do not make clear 
why, given their material advantage, the highly predominant power in an asymmetric conflict 
would ever not anticipate having a very high likelihood of victory.  A more accurate 
characterization of this argument would seem then to be as follows:  support for war will not 
decrease as casualty levels increase unless the public also believes that the likelihood of victory 
at a fixed level of resource commitment has declined.    
 
Strategic Error: 
The third general category into which extant explanations for asymmetric war outcomes 
falls addresses the question of the matching of objectives to the means of achieving them.  
Among the most recent and the most intuitive strategy-based explanation for strong-state loss is 
that of Ivan Arreguin-Toft, whose work addresses explicitly the question of force fungibility -- 
the argument that emerged in the aftermath of the Vietnam war that it was the incompatibility 
between the composition, design, and use of the U.S. Armed Forces and the context within 
which they were being applied that caused failure (Summers, 1982; Krepinevich, 1986; Nagl 
2005).  Indeed, in his valuable 2005 book, How the Weak Win Wars, Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues 
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that it is precisely the way in which armed forces are used -- war fighting strategy -- that matters.  
More specifically, he contends that it is the interaction between the military strategy of the strong 
and that of the weak that is decisive.  According to Arreguin-Toft, conflict participants choose 
between two types of strategy:  direct and indirect.   Starting from the assumption that it is the 
materially preponderant power that has initiated the conflict and that the conflict is occurring on 
the territory of the weaker actor, Arreguin-Toft identifies the direct strategy option for the strong 
actor as the use of conventional attacks on its opponent’s armed forces, and barbarism – the 
“deliberate or systematic harm of noncombatants” – as the indirect strategy alternative.  For the 
weaker side the choice is comparable but not identical, with the participant selecting either direct 
conventional defense that is intended to blunt assaults on its cities, armed forces, and other 
military resources, or indirect guerrilla warfare that targets the enemy’s military assets, most 
especially its troops.
11
   
Arreguin-Toft does not contend that the balance of capabilities is irrelevant to this 
interaction; to the contrary, he hypothesizes that by merit of material advantage stronger 
combatants should win conflicts in which the parties’ choice of strategy is the same: direct 
offense vs. direct defense, and indirect offense vs. indirect defense.  Conversely, this material 
advantage is attenuated by opposite-strategy interactions, which Arreguin-Toft claims prolong 
the duration of conflict to the benefit of the weak.  As he explains it, the material balance leads to 
strong-state expectation of rapid and low-cost victory; thus, an unexpectedly protracted conflict 
is, by definition, an unexpectedly costly one (2005 p. 29).  Arreguin-Toft concludes, therefore, 
that the stronger actor should be more likely to lose direct-indirect and indirect-direct exchanges. 
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 Arreguin-Toft acknowledges that these are not the only choices available to the combatants, 
noting that a “hearts-and-minds” approach, nonviolent resistance, or terrorism might also be chosen.  For 
a full description of strategic options see pp. 29-33. 
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The logical progression of this argument is that strategic interaction causes conflict 
duration, which in turn affects conflict costs, which then cause conflict outcome. Yet Arreguin-
Toft’s testing of his theory conflates these processes, examining the relationship only between 
strategic interaction and conflict outcome – nowhere in his analysis does he include conflict 
duration, or conflict costs.  Even were Arreguin-Toft to produce significant correlations for the 
first two steps in the chain, he would still need to explain how, and why, costs cause conflict 
outcome.
12
   
In her own work on mismatched conflicts, Patricia Sullivan (2007, 2008) further refines 
the force fungibility argument, identifying as her decisive variables what she terms the strong 
state’s “war aims” and the extent to which achieving these depends upon the compliance of the 
target.
 13
  She creates a continuum of war aims that ranges from “brute force” political objectives 
to “coercive” political objectives, differentiating between such goals as territorial expansion or 
regime overthrow on the one hand, and policy change on the other.  Brute force objectives 
require little or no target compliance, and so material capability assures strong state victory.  The 
need for target compliance where war aims are coercive, by contrast, is high, and so in these 
situations material capability will matter less and resolve -- cost tolerance -- will matter more.  
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 In fact, testing the relationship between strategic interaction and conflict duration produces no 
significant correlation.  Results were generated using only Correlates of War conflicts; data therefore do 
not include wars involving Native Americans or those occurring after 1991.   For inter-state conflict 
duration is provided, for extra- and intra-state wars the average of the minimum and maximum durations 
indicated by COW were used.  Duration measured in days.    
13
 Sullivan’s study analyzes data for 122 interventions conducted by the permanent five members of 
the UN Security Council.  She defines interventions as “the foreign deployment of at least 500 combat-
ready, regular military troops (ground, air, or naval) with the intent to participate in hostile action against 
a target government or substate group for the purpose of achieving immediate-term political objectives” 
(p. 510).   
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The result is that the probability of strong-state losses will rise as  victory becomes increasingly 
dependent upon the target’s willingness to change its behavior.   
This construct offers a convincing explanation for why states might underestimate the 
likely costs of a given engagement, but it does not offer a new explanation for why those costs 
then lead the strong-state to retrench.   Rather, Sullivan's theory relies, as do all of the above 
approaches, on the same causal mechanism:  they all accept either explicitly or implicitly the 
proposition that states will choose to lose when the actual costs of fighting exceed the expected 
value of the benefits of winning.
14
  
 
Problems with the Use of the Expected Utility Proposition 
This balancing of the probability of achieving the benefits of victory against the costs of 
fighting is the well-known expected utility model.  Imported from economics, expected utility 
theories place in relation the probability with which possible outcomes will occur as a result of a 
given action with the costs and benefits they produce.  Though “an external re-creation of 
choices [and] not a representation of cognitive processes” (Morrow 1997, p. 15), the expected 
utility model thus offers a powerful framework for understanding why and when states might 
choose to opt out of an ongoing conflict.  In a very appealing way, it simplifies political choice to 
a basic decision function:  expected utility theories of asymmetric conflict termination are 
premised upon a discrete marker, cost  > benefit, arrival at which point sets in motion an almost 
reflexive “sell” response.   In essence, expected utility theories depict decision-makers as sober 
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 This construct is also pervasive in in treatments of the more general phenomena of conflict 
initiation and termination (Fox 1970; Wittman 1979; Mitchell and Nicholson 1983; Arquilla 1992; 
Goemans 2000b; Filson and Werner 2002; Reiter 2009), and conflict duration (Vuchinich and Teachman 
1993; Stam 1996; Bennett and Stam 1998; Goemans 2000a). 
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analysts of costs, benefits, and probabilities, who use these measures to time appropriately their 
exit from a conflict so that they do not lose more than they stand to gain.   
Yet the explanatory power of these propositions has been questioned both on the strength 
of experimental evidence, and because they simply do not square with some of the most 
prominent instances of strong-state loss.  Expected utility theories, for example, have a difficult 
time reconciling the United States' rhetoric about and behavior in Somalia in the early 1990s.  
Here, rationalist approaches would lead to the expectation that the United States would have 
suffered more costs before retrenching than it actually did.  The Clinton administration had made 
abundantly clear its belief that United States credibility, and a "new age" of human dignity were 
at stake, arguing that the success of the mission would solidify the United States' reputation for 
being willing to use force in response to humanitarian crises; affirm its commitment to 
multilateralism; promote democracy; and underscore American global leadership (Menkhaus and 
Ortmayer 1995, pp. 19-20).  These rather expansive descriptions of the value of the Somalia 
mission seem unlikely to be overmatched by the loss of 29 lives.   
Experimental evidence produced by researchers working from a cognitive perspective -- 
that is, from a perspective that understands decision-makers as being vulnerable to error, and 
subject to influences other than cost minimization and benefit maximization -- also offers reason 
to question the salience of expected utility theories.  First introduced in the economics literature 
before crossing over into political science, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory is a 
cognitive model that challenges a number of the expected utility model’s key propositions.  
Where expected utility theories posit that decision-makers act as a result of their ability to 
identify, through efficient calculation, when they have arrived at that point at which the gains 
expected from a given action are exceeded even slightly by realized losses, prospect theories 
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posit that this evaluative process is not unencumbered by psychological variables. Thus where 
expected utility theories contend that decision-makers engage in pure economic reasoning, 
focusing on gains or losses in net asset levels, prospect theories contend that decision-makers are 
subject to and act upon non-economic, cognitive influences.  Specifically, the prospect 
paradigm’s foundational premise is that decision-makers are sensitive not to absolute well-being, 
whether this is understood in terms of wealth, power, happiness, etc., but rather to changes in 
well-being relative to a reference point:  a status quo, expected, or even desired level of the asset 
in question (Levy 1997a; McDermott 2004b).   
What thus emerge from these two models are contradictory predictions about decision-
making in war.  For expected utility theories to be predictive they must identify ex-ante the value 
of the benefits at stake in terms of the costs caused by conflict; those emerging from the prospect 
paradigm must identify ex-ante decision-makers’ reference point.  To date, work in both research 
agendas has made little progress in theorizing about these conditions or in testing empirically the 
hypotheses to which they lead.  As described in the next chapter, I seek to address this 
shortcoming in the prospect model by presenting a theory of reference point establishment and 
by testing the hypotheses it generates about asymmetric conflict outcomes.    
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CHAPTER III:  THE THEORY 
 
Power, Cost-Expectations, and Asymmetric Conflict Loss 
 
 
*************** 
 
 
Wars occur between relatively evenly matched opponents and also between highly 
imbalanced opponents.  The theory presented here makes no distinction between the decision 
processes involved in either scenario, or between the decision processes as they occur for the 
stronger or for the weaker belligerent. Rather, its fundamental premise is that all states take 
seriously not only what they are fighting for, but also who they are fighting against; states, in 
other words, are attentive to the capabilities of their opponent because it is this measure that is 
believed to provide information about how much achieving one's desired objectives will cost.    
The costs states might bear during conflict are multiple, to include not only blood and 
treasure but also such ephemera as reputation, influence, moral standing, and the opportunity 
costs of using finite resources in one place rather than in another.  It is not only possible but 
indeed probable that states consider all of these potential costs when contemplating whether to 
undertake a militarized engagement, and whether and when to abandon one.  Nonetheless, I 
assume that states are not equally sensitive to the full universe of costs, but rather are most 
concerned with and responsive to their own loss of life.
15
  The theory thus defines cost-tolerance 
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 This sensitivity generally is presumed to be a product of leadership fear of the domestic 
consequences of high casualty rates.   This position has received substantial evidentiary support, with 
casualties having indeed been demonstrated to be predictive of U.S.  public opinion about war (Mueller, 
1973; Gartner and Segura, 1998), to affect leadership approval ratings (Gartner and Segura, 2000), and to 
influence congressional and presidential elections as well as incumbent tenure (Carson et al., 2001; Bueno 
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specifically in terms of casualties, here used to refer only to the number of troops killed and not, 
as is the military convention, the number killed and wounded.     
 
 The Bilateral Hypotheses 
The theory's central commitment is that states' cost-tolerance is the product of their power 
advantage relative to a potential foe, a proposition that leads to the development of two 
hypotheses at the interstate level.  I argue that strong states should enter asymmetric conflicts 
confident that they will win -- that is, sure of their ability to defeat their materially weaker 
adversary, and so to achieve their objectives.  This means that rather than consider the costs they 
are willing to bear in order to prevail -- the cost-equivalent of the benefits to be won -- these 
states will have the luxury of concerning themselves only with the costs that capability indices 
suggest they should be required to bear.  In other words, the question of cost tolerance for the 
strong becomes adjusted to ask not “how much are the benefits worth?” but rather “are the 
benefits worth at least as much as the power differential suggests it will cost to achieve them?”   
In practice, strong state assessment of the power of a weak opponent will begin, but not 
end, with evaluation of the size, sophistication -- to include nuclear capability -- and 
professionalism of its armed forces or elements (in the case of non-state actors), and the strength 
of the industrial sectors required to equip them.  Factored into this evaluation are the capabilities 
of allies and the likelihood of their direct involvement, as well as anticipated indirect support in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gartner et al, 2004; Voeten and Brewer 2006; Karol and Miguel, 2007).  The 
logic of domestic punishment has been theorized, moreover, not to be confined to liberal states but rather 
to be applicable across regime types (Desch, 2002; Arreguin-Toft 2005).  H.E. Goemans' War and 
Punishment (2000), for example, proposes and presents evidence in support of the idea that the leaders of 
liberal and illiberal regimes alike will terminate conflicts for fear overthrow -- or worse -- at the hands of 
dissatisfied internal constituencies.  Jessica Weeks (2008) similarly explores the generation of domestic 
audience costs in nondemocratic contexts, and concludes that they exist and operate for authoritarian 
leaders much as they do for their democratic counterparts.   
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the form of material flows from these allies or otherwise sympathetic third parties. Where such 
contingencies exist, they are internalized into the power differential, and so affect the strong 
state’s cost estimate.16   
These indicators are used by states to form an understanding of just what they are up 
against -- states, in other words, recognize that that a fight against the neighborhood bully will 
exact more in blood and treasure than will a fight against the neighborhood wimp, and form 
expectations accordingly. Where an objective might be valued at $1B, for example, and near that 
amount is likely actually to be required in order to defeat the bully, that same objective is likely 
to be achievable in a fight against the wimp for only $500M.  In other words, small power 
differentials will produce high estimates, high power differentials low estimates.  Note that the 
contention is not that states always estimate a discrete number, although sometimes they do, but 
rather that they at a minimum identify a rough order of magnitude.  This evaluation of relative 
capabilities, then, produces the reference point, and leads to the theory's first hypothesis:   
 
 
 
 
 
The consequences of the theory's framing of cost tolerance in this way are twofold.  First, 
this calculation, although rational, is nonetheless based upon states’ focus on and confidence in 
their material capabilities.  Thus strong-states' willingness to engage in conflicts of this nature 
often is characterized rightly as being the product of “wishful thinking”, the "exit plan" becomes 
coterminous with victory, and, when things go badly, the course of the conflict is attributed to 
poor planning.  
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 The idea that possession of military capabilities influences leaders' choices about conflict is not 
new to IR.  For a good review of literature on this proposition, as well as a test of it, see Fordham 2004.   
H1:  Ceteris paribus, decision-maker cost-expectations will decrease as the 
state's power advantage relative to an opponent increases.  
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The second consequence is that although the stronger state has the resource capacity to 
absorb costs in excess of the level anticipated, and though a rational-choice accounting of the 
balance between the value of winning and the costs already incurred may in some cases leave 
room to continue to fight, the state will be unprepared to do so.  Rather, states will choose to 
maintain or to escalate their level of commitment only so long as this is both physically possible 
and ex-ante expectations of the costs of conflict have not been violated.  The United States' 
ongoing combat presence in the former Yugoslavia illustrates this proposition.  The United 
States undertook the intervention in 1995 with the ex-ante expectation of losing as many as 50 
U.S. lives over the course of a limited 12-month commitment.  It in fact suffered zero casualties 
during this time, and subsequently extended the operation, maintaining a U.S. combat presence 
into the present day with the stated purpose of  achieving "long-standing U.S. goals" and in the 
interest of "finishing the job".
17
   
  A successful outcome therefore depends upon the state's ability to achieve its original 
objectives prior to the crossing of the threshold between expected and realized losses.  This, I 
argue, is what we see in the United States' 1989 intervention in Panama:  having expected dozens 
of casualties during the first phase of its invasion but having actually suffered nine, the Bush 
administration chose to continue over the course of two months to seek to achieve its full retinue 
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 Kim, Julie and Steven Woehrel, "Kosovo and U.S. Policy:  Background to Independence", CRS 
Report for Congress, RL31053, June 20 2008, pp. 2-3.  Troop levels subsequently declined concurrent 
with the U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but without the United States indicating its mission in the 
former Yugoslavia had been completed.  To the contrary, violent incidents in northern Kosovo in 2011 
have been cited as justification for a continued U.S. presence in pursuit of the objective established in 
1995 of establishing a stable and self-sustaining peace. See:  "Kosovo:  Current Issues and U.S. Policy", 
Steven Woehrel, Congressional Research Service, RS21721, March 13, 2012; "Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 
President's Budget:  Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency 
Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF)", Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2011.  The United 
States has not had troops in Bosnia since 2004.  "Bosnia:  Current Issues and U.S. Policy", Steven 
Woehrel, Congressional Research Service, R40479, February 29, 2012. 
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of conflict objectives, leaving only after dictator Manuel Noriega was in U.S. custody and 
President Bush able to declare that democracy had been restored.   
Conversely, the theory proposes that the state's level of commitment  to an ongoing 
conflict will persist only so long as the actual losses suffered remain below ex-ante expectations; 
once this expectation -- the reference point -- is violated, states will be inclined to start to cut 
ties:  to scale back objectives, circumscribe operational activity, reduce troop levels, or even 
effect a full and rapid withdrawal.  This is what the United States did, for example, in the early 
1990s in Somalia.  In this case, U.S. ex-ante cost estimates topped out at 20; when the now-
infamous downing of a Black Hawk helicopter pushed the actual casualty count to 29, the United 
States chose to retrench.     
Importantly, the theory focuses on the fact and the timing of the decision to retrench, and 
not the time at which this intention is made public or the time at which the conflict ends through 
an acceptance of terms, discontinuation of combat operations, or the withdrawal of forces.  In 
other words, what the theory seeks to explain is the fact and the timing of President Clinton's 
decision in October 1993 that the United States would end its engagement in Somalia, and not 
the timing of U.S. troops' physical withdrawal in March 1994.   The theory's implications about 
the timing of strong-state decisions to retrench are captured in Hypothesis 2:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Structural Hypothesis 
The theory's key proposition as developed above is that states are sensitive to the 
distribution of power:  they are proposed to undertake evaluations of potential opponents' 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, decision-makers will choose to reduce the state's level of 
commitment to an ongoing conflict when realized costs exceed expected costs. 
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capabilities; on this basis to establish expectations of just how costly it will be to best them in a 
fight; and to be responsive to the violation of these expectations.  I argue that these dynamics can 
explain not only individual instances of strong-state loss, but also the upward trend in a particular 
type of strong-state loss over time: great power loss.   
I contend that this  evaluative process that is the theory's jumping-off point does not 
happen in a vacuum; to the contrary, it happens within the broader context of the global 
distribution of power.  I contend, in other words, that states are aware not only of how well their 
state matches up against a particular opponent, but also of how well their state matches up 
against any opponent -- they are attuned to their state's standing in the global pecking order.  
Indeed, the long tradition of realist theorizing indentifies this type of relative evaluation as the 
prime mover in international politics (e.g. Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Layne 1993; Copeland 
2000; Mearsheimer 2003).   The logical corollary is that it is those states living at the top of the 
food chain -- the great powers -- for which the dynamics proposed by the theory should be most 
likely to obtain.    
This is so because of two offsetting dynamics:  the first is that the greater the state's 
power advantage, the lower its reference point is likely to be; the second is that, ceteris paribus, 
the lower the reference point, the more likely it is to be violated.  The theory is clear that a state's 
perception of its power advantage is shaped, first, by the bilateral comparison between its own 
capabilities and those of the prospective opponent.  This is a relative measure, having to do not 
with how much power the state has in absolute terms, but rather with how it believes its assets 
stack up against those of another. States, however, enter into these bilateral evaluations with an 
understanding of where power resides in the system -- that is, with an understanding of whether 
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it is concentrated or diffuse, and across which actors.  In particular, they understand whether they 
are, or are not, themselves a "great power".   
Importantly, my use of this term captures more than simply an accounting of material 
capabilities.  Rather, I conceive of this title as a matter of status, consistent with Modelski's 
(1958) notion:  "The status of Great Power is sometimes confused with the condition of being 
powerful.  The office, as it is known, did in fact evolve from the role played by the great military 
states in earlier periods...But the Great Power system institutionalizes the position of the 
powerful state in the web of rights and obligations" (p141).  Jack Levy (1982, p. 282) has offered 
further elaboration:   
 
A Great Power can be defined generally as a state which plays a major role in 
international politics with respect to security-related issues.  Operational 
indicators of Great Power status include the following:  possession of a high level 
of power capabilities, which provides for reasonable self-sufficiency in security 
matters and permits the conduct of offensive as well as defensive military 
operations; participation in international congresses and conferences; de facto 
identification as a Great Power by an international conference or organization; 
admission to a formal or informal organization of Powers; participation in Great 
Power guarantees, territorial compensation, or partitions; and, generally, 
treatment as a relative equal by other Great Powers (for example, protocol, 
alliances, negotiations, and so forth). 
 
Material capability, in other words, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
identification of a state as a great power; rather, these definitions identify as fundamental 
possession of what we now identify as the "soft"  variants of power, and most especially the 
matter of recognition.  It is during periods in which the state is widely acknowledged to hold this 
status, then, that its perceived power advantage -- the product of both material and non-material 
endowments -- over the majority of states in the system should be the most pronounced.   This 
effect, moreover, should increase as the number of recognized great powers in the system 
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decreases; the fewer the number of peer competitors, the greater the  "role in international 
politics with respect to security-related issues" the state will play.   
I use here the term "polarity" to capture the number of great powers during a given 
period, rather than the more specific accountings of "concentration" -- which measures both the 
number of great powers and the balance of power among them (Mansfield 1994) -- or 
"polarization", which accesses the extent to which states consolidate into blocs of  tight alliances 
(Bueno de Mesquita 1978).  These more nuanced concepts may be useful -- and indeed, some 
argue necessary -- for inquiry into the incidence of great power war, but they do not provide 
distinctions that are meaningful for the theory presented here.  Rather, because the study is 
interested in explaining the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts what is needed is simply the ability 
to distinguish great powers from minor powers, and to identify how many great powers exist in 
the global system at any point in time.   
It is, then, states that find themselves to be great powers in low-polarity systems -- that is, 
in bipolar or unipolar systems -- that should be most prone to perceiving themselves to have a 
great power advantage over most or all other states in the system.  States' cognizance of the 
system's polarity, then, may have an abstract, ambient effect on cost-expectations by inflating the 
great powers' confidence in their capabilities in general, but it most certainly will inform specific 
bilateral comparisons, in three ways.  First, when polarity is low -- when there are very few great 
powers -- by definition the gap between the haves and the have-nots will be larger than when 
there are many.  Second,  when polarity is low, any single great power will be in possession of 
more hard and soft power in absolute and in relative terms than it would be under a more diffuse 
distribution.   And, third, states will be able more easily to recognize these facts; a large literature 
identifies uncertainty about power as the feature that distinguishes multipolarity from lower-
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polarity structures (Waltz 1964; Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Bueno de Mesquita 1975; Midlarsky 
and Hopf 1993; Mansfield 1993).  Although these works focus their attentions primarily on the 
extent to which variation in polarity can explain the incidence or absence of great power war, the 
unifying premise nonetheless is that uncertainty about power is greater under multipolarity than 
under bipolarity and  unipolarity. As explained by Kenneth Waltz (2000, pp. 5-6): 
Significant changes take place when the number of great powers reduces to two 
or one...Competition in multipolar systems is more complicated than competition 
in bipolar ones because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states 
multiply as numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and 
strength of coalitions are hard to make.  
 
 
Bipolar and unipolar systems, in other words, are characterized by low levels of 
uncertainty about power differentials -- which, again, include, assessment of the capabilities of 
allies or otherwise sympathetic third parties and the likelihood of their direct or indirect 
involvement -- as compared to multipolar systems.  Within the context of asymmetric war, this 
means that the great powers' assessments of their capabilities advantage should be higher in 
general -- and so also in particular cases -- when the majority of the power in the system is in the 
hands of few than when it is in the hands of many.  Because the theory argues that the greater the 
power advantage the lower the reference point the implication, rather counterintuitively, is that 
sates should lose asymmetric conflict more often  when they are more dominant; stated another 
way loss should be both more frequent, and more likely for states that are great powers operating 
under low polarity structures -- bipolarity and unipolarity -- than under multipolarity.  This logic 
produces the structural hypothesis, Hypothesis 3:   
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 The theory elaborated above thus takes on two important conventional wisdoms.  The 
first is the rationalist bargaining theory of war; the second is the prospect theory's proposition 
about decision-maker willingness to gamble for resurrection.  There also outwardly seems to be 
no reason why its logic would not apply to the weak as well as to the strong, leaving open the 
question of whether it can explain instances of state loss in general, rather than be applied 
specifically to the sub-set of unexpected asymmetric conflict outcomes. Each of these conceptual 
issues is addressed below. 
 
The Reference Point Proposition vs. Bargaining Theory 
 Hypothesis 2 suggests that the expectations with which states enter a conflict are fixed, 
that they create a “sticky” reference point that does not shift through the course of the conflict as 
updated information is acquired about an adversary’s ability to impose costs.  This position is a 
decided departure from a growing and increasingly formal body of work that presents the 
initiation, conduct, and termination of war as components of a bargaining process (Fearon 1995; 
Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner 2002; Smith and Stam 2004). Of interest here are the 
bargaining propositions that wars begin because states lack sufficient information to predict 
accurately the outcome of war, and that wars end when this uncertainty is resolved; that is, when 
each party has acquired adequate knowledge of the other to agree upon the conflict’s likely 
outcome. Once this point is reached, both sides have incentive to avoid the costs of continued 
fighting by making that arrangement at the negotiating table today rather than arriving at it on the 
battlefield tomorrow.   
H3:   The likelihood of asymmetric conflict loss should be higher for states that are 
great powers operating in a unipolar or bipolar system than for states that are great 
powers operating in a multipolar system.     
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Yet even among those working within the bargaining paradigm there is debate about the 
extent to which conflict termination can be attributed to gains in information.  In a qualified 
defense of bargaining theory's ability to explain the War in Iraq -- "Two Cheers for Bargaining 
Theory" -- David A. Lake (2011) notes that "there are still puzzles about the Iraq War that 
challenge bargaining theory....Human folly is all too evident in this case.  A deeper investigation 
into systematic biases in human decision-making may shed additional light on this and other 
wars [emphasis added]" (p. 178).  And as Leventoglu and Slantchev (2007) point out, “…the 
information revelation mechanism cannot deal very well with long wars:  to think that it takes 
many years of near constant interaction for opponents to learn enough about each other is surely 
stretching the theory” (p. 756). Although Leventoglu and Slantchev argue for a more prominent 
role for the credible commitment problem, the theory presented here is no less plausible an 
alternative explanation for conflict duration and the timing of retrenchment. 
Robert Jervis (1973) offers another reason to doubt the learning mechanism offered by 
bargaining theory, one that emerges from cognitive theory.  Jervis takes up the question of why 
and how states might change their beliefs, and in particular why this often does not happen even 
in the face of evidence that, to outside observers or in hindsight, seems clearly to indicate that 
those beliefs either are in error or no longer are accurate: 
 
Actors can more easily assimilate into their established image of another actor 
information contradicting that image if the information is transmitted and 
considered bit by bit than if it comes all at once.  In the former case, each piece of 
discrepant data can be coped with as it arrives and each of the conflicts with the 
prevailing view will be small enough to go unnoticed, to be dismissed as 
unimportant, or to necessitate at most a slight modification of the image higher 
(p. 125).  
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This description should be troubling for advocates of bargaining theory, suggesting that 
in fact the acquisition of information piecemeal and over time -- that is, what they consider the 
learning process -- should militate against updating.  This dissonance is only more pronounced 
when considered in conjunction with a copious literature that documents the tendency of leaders 
to seek out, interpret, and remember information that is consistent with their pre-existing schema, 
and to discount information that challenges it -- the so-called schema-based errors of 
"selectivity"  and "confirmation bias" (Darley  Gross 1983; Snyder & Swann 1978; Gale and 
Linden 2002).  As suggested by Jervis, this proclivity can manifest itself in a number of ways -- 
actors might deny, avoid, or ignore pieces of information that challenge what they already 
believe about a given circumstance, and most especially information that causes anxiety or fear 
(Janis 1967).  Alternatively, actors might choose to interpret data in ways that defuse its 
negatives and/or emphasize its positives, "[altering] its implications through a process of wishful 
thinking" ( Stein 1988, p. 258).  These and other cognitive biases have been explored in the 
international relations literature as possible explanations for failures in strategic warning (Chan 
1979); failures in intelligence analysis (Betts 1978); perception of threat (Allision 1971; Betts 
1977); and as possible causes of conflict (Jervis 1976, 1985, Stein 1988).  These same biases 
might reasonably lead to states establishing and becoming committed to an ex-ante expectation. 
  
The Reference Point Proposition vs. Gambling for Resurrection 
 The sticky reference point proposition also confronts one of the most intriguing findings 
of prospect theory: that decision-makers are not necessarily inclined to cut their losses, but rather 
will persist in a given behavior in hopes of returning at least to their status quo asset endowment 
– even when doing so risks even greater loss.  This orientation has been characterized as “risk-
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acceptance in the domain of losses”, and in addition to experimental findings (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991) many colorful illustrative examples of this phenomenon can be found.  Robert 
Jervis (1994) for example offers the observation that people tend to gamble heavily on the last 
horserace of the day: “People who have lost money throughout the afternoon place heavy bets on 
the final race; they are willing to risk more money in order to gain a chance of recouping their 
earlier losses” (p. 25).   
Both the experimental work and Jervis’ more relatable real-world example, however, deal 
exclusively with monetary gains and losses, and usually in the context of gambling either for 
recreation or for insurance – realms in which costs are concrete and so lend themselves easily to 
accounting, and in which the potential for recovery is known to exist.  The dynamics that operate 
under these circumstances might reasonably transfer into some areas of international politics in 
the sense that states purchase things – e.g. bombers, missiles, and submarines – that can be 
measured against the number of these same things that other states possess.  Arms races, where 
the costs of seeking to close an asset gap far outweigh any potential gain, might therefore be 
instances in which states behave in line with Jervis’ description of throwing good money after 
bad.  It is less clear, however, that these findings are equally transferrable to decision-making 
during war.    
Though states do spend considerable sums of money in the conduct of conflict scholars 
have long debated the extent to which conquest pays, leaving unclear whether the costs of 
fighting really can be recouped through victory; indeed, there is some reason to believe that the 
aftermath of victory often can impose additional costs of its own (Liberman 1993; Brooks 1999, 
2005).
18
  At the same time, it is even less intuitive that state leaders would treat costs in terms of 
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 Adam Smith was an early skeptic of the notion that colonization paid, while in the modern era, 
most arguments asserting the value of conquest have focused on centers of productivity – areas in which 
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lives in the same way -- where one dollar can be recovered by its replacement with another and 
nothing is lost, the acquisition of regime change does not replace lost life in a similar way.  The 
life is still gone, and will remain so regardless of “how much” regime change one achieves. 
Similarly for the less tangible costs of conflict: the reputational losses of seeming ineptitude or 
incompetence usually persist regardless of the final outcome, and loss of moral standing often is 
a product not of the outcome of war but rather of the rationale for its initiation and the mode of 
its conduct.    
Most importantly, however, the domain of losses proposition does not offer explanation 
for when a decision-maker would cease her risk-acceptant behavior short of the point at which 
she has so few resources left that she is unable to continue to gamble.  As noted previously, 
however, history offers numerous examples in which a state maintained the material ability to 
continue to prosecute a conflict, but chose not to. Thus though Jervis’s assertion that prospect 
theory suggests that people will “persevere in losing ventures much longer than standard 
rationality would lead one to expect” is apt (1994, p.26), within the context of conflict this 
behavior might be explained not by the urge to gamble for resurrection, but rather by the location 
of the reference point.   
 
What about the Weak? 
Within the context of a conflict of interests between the very strong and the very weak, 
the willingness of the strong to rely upon the specter of force and, where this fails, actually to use 
it, is not wholly counterintuitive; even where they assess their potential opponent as being highly 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the potential for industrial power was appreciated and/or had already been realized.  See discussion in 
Liberman, pp. 129 – 133. 
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resolved, the strong might conclude reasonably that the power differential is such that the 
adversary simply can be overpowered regardless of their level of commitment. The same cannot 
be said for the willingness of the weak to assume and maintain a contrary position when doing so 
may very well lead to a war in which they are overmatched. Scholars addressing this puzzle have 
presented a number of explanations for why weak states might nonetheless stand firm: though 
the strong do not, the weak might still believe that the imbalance of interests compensates for the 
imbalance of capabilities (Mack 1975);  they might believe that the strong state is bluffing 
(Fearon 1995; Schultz 2001); the leaders of weak states may feel they personally have more to 
lose by conceding than they do by fighting (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1986; Goemans 
2000b); or the weak may be unable to provide sufficient information to the strong during the 
bargaining process for an efficient outcome to prevail (Sescher 2010).  
The theory makes no effort to arbitrate among these arguments, focusing as it does not on 
how and why conflicts begin but rather on how and why they end.  In this regard the theory’s 
propositions hold for the weak just as they do for the strong. For the weak, however, the state’s 
material disadvantage not only renders the probability of victory low, but also the costs to which 
they will most certainly be subjected in a fight exceedingly high.  Because, however, the power 
differential is so stark, the costs they anticipate having to pay in order to win -- which, in these 
cases often means in order to survive -- and those they are able to pay become equivalent, or at 
least very nearly so.  As a result, the violation of the weak-state’s reference point is much less 
likely to occur prior to physical defeat than is the case for strong-states (Figure 1):  
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Figure 1: 
 Relation of Physical Defeat to the Reference Point 
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Thus although the theory should apply to the weak as well as to the strong, the above 
dynamic means its implications will be difficult to observe; the same is true for conflicts between 
evenly matched belligerents, in which cases material defeat and the reference point should be in 
close proximity for both parties.  In other words, it is in asymmetric conflicts that the theory 
posits a large gap between the reference point and the point of material defeat, and so it is in 
these instances that its propositions should be both most likely to obtain, and most observable. 
 
Summary 
 The theory elaborated above argues that a strong state will enter an asymmetric conflict 
confident that it will win -- that is, sure of its ability to defeat a materially weaker adversary -- 
and having used the power differential to establish an expectation of the level of casualties it will 
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be required to sustain in order to do so.  This expectation will be higher when facing a more 
capable opponent, and lower when facing a less capable opponent.  This proposition is captured 
in Hypothesis 1:   
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 establishes this expectation as the state's reference point, positing that the 
political choice to pull back from an ongoing conflict will occur when these ex-ante expectations 
are violated:    
 
 
 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 address explicitly perceptions and behaviors, and so are tested 
together through the use of a survey-based experiment, the design and findings of which are the 
subject of Chapter IV.   
 The remaining hypothesis operates at the systemic level, and so is tested through large-n 
analysis in Chapter V: 
 
   
 
 
 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, decision-makers’ cost-expectations will decrease as their 
state's power advantage relative to an opponent increases.  
H2:  Ceteris paribus, decision-makers will choose to reduce the state's level of 
commitment to an ongoing conflict when realized costs exceed expected costs. 
 
H3:   The likelihood of asymmetric conflict loss should be higher for states that are 
great powers operating in a unipolar or bipolar system than for states that are great 
powers operating in a multipolar system. 
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CHAPTER IV:  TESTING THE BILATERAL HYPOTHESES  
 
Experimental Test of the Effects of  
Power and Cost-Expectations on the Decision to Retrench 
 
 
*************** 
 
 
 The preceding chapter developed two hypotheses that operate at the bilateral level -- that 
is, they make claims about how states behave in individual instances of asymmetric conflict: 
 
 
 
 
 
 Notably, these hypotheses make no claims about the individuals making these 
evaluations, or the institutional or political contexts  within or conditions under which they make 
them.  This agnosticism is a decided departure from much of the work done in the subfield of 
foreign policy decision-making, which emphasizes the characteristics, attitudes, and  values of 
individuals (George and George 1964; Steinbruner 1974; Larson 1994; Walker 1995; Dyson and 
Preston 2006, Barber 2008); the role of institutional structures (Allison 1969; Power 2001; Yetiv 
2003); and the circumstances under which decisions are made (Farnham 2004, Mintz 2004).  
These explanations are generally considered to be non-rational -- that is, they do not begin with 
the assumptions that define the so-called rational choice, or expected utility, paradigm:  that 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, decision-makers’ cost-expectations will decrease as their 
state's power advantage relative to an opponent increases. 
 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, decision-makers will choose to reduce the state's level of 
commitment to an ongoing conflict when realized costs exceed expected costs. 
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actors are unitary; that they have a complete and transitive preference ordering; and that this 
ordering is defined by the mathematical product of the probability with which each outcome will 
occur and the summation of its associated costs and benefits.
19
 
 Strictly speaking, my theory too must be considered a counter to conventional 
understandings of rational choice, to the extent that it does not give causal weight to expected 
utility.  It does not, however, dispense with all of the above assumptions; rather, it accepts the 
presumption of the unitary actor, and the notion that actors have, and behave in ways consistent 
with, a complete and transitive preference ordering.  Given these positions, it seems reasonable 
to characterize the theory as one that conceives of decision-making about war as a rational 
process, albeit one that does not fit comfortably within the confines of the expected utility 
paradigm.   
 As do all theories that emerge from the expected utility and prospect paradigms, the 
theory offers a model of individual choice, and as such is equally vulnerable to the "levels of 
analysis" objection -- that is, to skepticism about the extent to which it can be applied at the 
group-level. In this instance, however, the choice under study has an identifiable decision-maker 
in the national executive, who alone decides whether to continue on in conflict or to retrench. 
Even where this decision is made in close consultation with advisers, moreover, existing research 
demonstrates that "Group leaders often define reference points that anchor the group's evaluation 
of policy options" (Berejikian 2002, p. 783), and of course the phenomenon of "group think" 
(Janis 1972) is now well-established in the literature. This chapter therefore offers no new 
justification for the transfer of individual behavior to the group level, but rather attends to the 
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 Completeness refers to the ranking of actions in order from most to least preferred, inclusive of 
indifference; transitivity is the requirement that if Action A is preferred to Action B, and Action B is 
preferred to Action C, then Action A is preferred to Action C:  A > B; B > C; A > C.   
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task of testing the individual model proposed by the theory. In what follows, I explain the choice 
of an experimental design; describe the experiment; and present and interpret its results.    
     
 
Selecting an Appropriate Test  
 
 As described in the previous chapter, the theory's causal mechanism is the formation and 
subsequent violation of a reference point.  This reference point, moreover, is ex-ante 
expectations of the likely costs of conflict, as measured through casualties, an estimate that is the 
product of  a bilateral comparison of capabilities -- small power differentials are posited to 
produce high estimates, high power differentials low estimates.  Because of the theory's 
emphases on the power differential and on casualties, one's first instinct very reasonably might 
be to test these propositions by using COW data to estimate a model with the intention of 
revealing the presence or absence of a relationship between the two.  Such a test, however, 
would not be meaningful for two reasons.  First, the outcome to be explained is the fact and the 
timing of the decision to retrench, not the timing or the fact of actual retrenchment; COW data 
capture the latter, but not the former.  The second reason is that although they have different 
reasons for doing so, the causal mechanism of both my theory and of the body of theories 
emerging from the expected utility paradigm can be argued to predict the same result.   
 By way of illustration, the hypothesis above states that where strong states lose -- that is, 
fail to achieve their full set of stated conflict objectives -- the casualties incurred should vary 
inversely with the power differential.   A quick test of this proposition using the measure of state 
capabilities and the number of state deaths provided by COW  reveals this in fact to be the 
pattern that we see in cases of interstate asymmetric conflict:  bivariate regression of the power 
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differential on casualties produces a negative and significant relationship (-0.687, p < 0.028).
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As the power differential increases, in other words, the number of casualties suffered prior to the 
intervention's termination decreases (Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2: 
 Regressing power differential on casualties
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 N= 44. The Military Intervention by Powerful States project (MIPS Version 2.0, Sullivan and 
Koch, 2008) provides data on military interventions that enable simple testing for the presence of this 
relationship.  The data capture interventions by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, 
and Russia from 1946-2003 in which more than 500 troops were engaged, and includes  the forces 
committed to each intervention, the number of casualties suffered by the major powers during the course 
of each intervention, and an outcome measure based upon the intervener’s success in achieving its 
objectives.  Eliminating cases for which no determinate outcome is coded, cases for which no ground 
troops were committed, and cases for which data on major power casualties are missing produces a total 
of 55 incidents of strong-state failure.
 
Failure is defined as any resolution short of the major power 
achieving its primary political objective: codings of 1, 2, or 4: “Withdrew: Intervening state withdrew its 
military forces unilaterally without attaining its primary political objective”; “Completed:  Intervening 
state completed a mission with a pre-determined end date without attaining an immediate, observable 
political objective”; “Negotiated:  Intervening state negotiated a settlement that did not result in full 
attainment of the state’s primary political objective”.  I add to this a measure of the power differential, 
calculated as the ratio between the belligerents' national capabilities indicator (CINC score), provided by 
Correlates of War interstate dataset (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004).       
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 I use the natural log of the Casualties  and Power differential data.  This transformation corrects 
for heteroskedasticity (chi2 = 9.00, p < 0.0027) and is consistent with the convention of using the 
logarithmic measure of casualties first introduced by John Mueller (1973).     
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  This is the same pattern, however, that one could argue is predicted by the expected 
utility proposition:  the interests at stake when fighting a weak opponent are likely to be less in 
value than those at stake when fighting a stronger opponent; fewer costs must therefore accrue 
before the cost-benefit ratio tips in the wrong direction; and so the state will accept fewer 
casualties prior to retrenching when fighting a relatively weak opponent than when fighting a 
relatively strong one. 
 It is only a test that accesses the decision-making process itself, then, that can offer an 
appropriate, and an appropriately hard, test of the theory's casual mechanism, and/or provide a 
means of arbitrating between the theory's individual model of choice and that offered by 
alternative theories. To achieve this, I fielded a survey-based experiment that is designed to 
access variables posited by theory, as well as those posited by theories emerging from the 
expected utility paradigm; excluding these would be to introduce into the analysis omitted 
variable bias.  The specifics of this design and discussion of its results are the subject of this 
chapter.   Before attending to these matters, however, first a  note on the limitations and 
advantages  of the experimental method in general, and of the dissertation's use of it in particular.   
 
Experimentation in International Relations Research 
 The use of experimentation in the study of international politics is relatively uncommon, 
largely because it is unsuited to the study of many of the topics that are of interest to IR 
researchers: the causes and consequences of war, of the creation and destruction of international 
institutions, of global financial crises, and so forth.  These subjects are of grand scale and scope, 
and are subject to the "tape of history" (Tetlock 1998) -- that is, researchers cannot generate 
them, control them, replicate them, or otherwise manipulate their occurrence. Experimental 
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designs are by comparison more compatible with examination of events that are of a more 
contained scale, and that can be at least approximated in the "laboratory"; for example, 
individual crisis situations and, as in the case of this dissertation, specific foreign policy 
decisions and decision-making processes.   
 Even these applications, however, have important limitations, most especially their 
inability effectively to capture the detail and complexity of the events under study, and its 
"atmospherics" -- the stresses, tensions, and pressures of real life.  This unavoidable limitation 
means that experimenters must rely upon their subjects to be able and willing to suspend some 
measure of disbelief; that is, to accept the situations they are given, as they are given, and to 
react to them in isolation of other considerations as much as is possible. The artificial nature of 
experimental constructs, and the necessity of the suspension of disbelief, together mean that no 
matter how well-designed the experiment, or how ingenuous its subjects, there always will be 
grounds for questioning external validity:  the extent to which the study's results are 
generalizable across populations, settings, conditions, or variables.   
 Experimental designs also are vulnerable to measurement error -- that is, to the extent to 
which the researcher may be confident that the effects observed in the laboratory were in fact 
caused by the variables of the experimental manipulation and not by something else.  This is not 
a characteristic unique to experimental designs, of course; as for all quantitative analyses, the 
most difficult of these threats to mitigate is that of unreliable measures: the possibility that the 
data collected are capturing not what the researcher intended to capture, or thinks he is capturing, 
but rather something else, and in a nonrandom manner that produces bias.      
 These challenges are not without counterweight, however, and experimental research 
offers some decided advantages as well. Most importantly, the ability to control the recruitment 
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of subjects, to standardize measures, and to construct and randomize conditions enables 
researchers to access their posited causal mechanisms in ways not enabled by other methods:  
large N analysis can provide highly suggestive correlations; case studies  can produce 
compelling qualitative evidence; but only experimentation offers a means of testing directly 
subjects' reasons for political behavior (McDermott 2002).  It is for this ability of 
experimentation to access a theory's microfoundations that it was selected for use here.    
 As a result, the study both benefits from the strengths of the experimental method and 
suffers from its weaknesses. The experiment entailed exposing subjects to one of four conditions 
-- conflict scenarios -- and an associated survey designed specifically to test the theory's 
hypotheses about elite decision-making against the alternative hypotheses of the expected utility 
paradigm. It was fielded to a representative population, and subject exposure to experimental 
conditions was randomized properly.  .  
   
 
The Experiment 
 
 The dissertation's survey-based experiment was fielded online between April 10, 2012 
and May 17, 2012, using Qualtrics software.
22
  Because the theory is concerned with decisions 
about war and peace -- decisions made at the highest levels of government -- the pool of 
potential subjects was limited to elites, defined as individuals in possession of at least a four-year 
college degree. The method of subject recruitment was chain-referral sampling, with the survey 
sent to employees of the RAND Corporation; to students and alumni of the Columbia University 
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 Internet-based experimentation has a number of advantages, including facilitating access to 
"specific participant populations" (Schmidt, 1997.  For a nice overview of the use of web-based 
experimentation in the social sciences see:  Reips, Ulf-Dietrich, "Standards for Internet-Based 
Experimenting", Experimental Psychology, Vol. 49, pp. 243-256, 2002.  Additional information about the 
web host used for this study can be found at: www.qualtrics.com 
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School of International Affairs (SIPA); and to a small number of graduate students in the 
Department of Political Science at CU Boulder with prior experience working in, and therefore 
connections to individuals currently working in, the national security/defense apparatus.  These 
potential subjects were also asked to forward the survey to similarly qualified colleagues, 
friends, and acquaintances.
23
 This method produced a total of 405 responses.  84 of these 
subjects had completed a 4-year college degree; 230 had completed or were working toward a 
Master's degree; 59 had completed or were working toward a PhD; and 32 had completed or 
were working toward a professional degree (i.e., MD, JD).
24
  239 (60%) were male, 166 female.  
At the time of their participation 24% either were employed by the Federal government, or had 
been previously, and 11% were at the time or had been previously members of the U.S. military. 
Appendix A presents a complete description of the sample.  
 Subjects were exposed randomly to one of four conflict scenarios; all four scenarios in 
full and the survey instrument are provided in Appendix B.   Each scenario asked the respondent 
to imagine she was the President of the United States, and provided information about the nature 
of a potential military intervention, including the issue at stake, the relative military strength of 
the adversary, and non-specific indicators about the expected duration and cost  in U.S. lives of 
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 Chain Referral Sampling is a non-probability sampling technique, wherein the researcher 
identifies and recruits one or more members of the desired population, and subsequently asks those 
subjects to recruit friends, colleagues, and acquaintances as additional subjects.  This technique is most 
often used to access at-risk and other difficult to access populations.  See;  Biernacki, Patrick and Dan 
Waldorf, "Snowball Sampling:  Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling", Sociological 
Method & Research, Vol. 10, 1981, pp. 141-163. 
24
 An "other" option, allowing subjects to provide a response in their own words, was offered in a 
number of the survey's queries; where the "other" response could be categorized reasonably as one of the 
four provided responses it was coded accordingly -- e.g., where "U.S. credibility" was offered a reason for 
not withdrawing, it was coded as "the benefits exceed the costs".  Only 4 such recodings are included in 
the final data, however, as most of the "other" responses revealed one of the biases described above.   
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achieving the identified objective.  Respondents were not given the opportunity to select out of 
conflict, but rather received the prompt: "You have decided to proceed with the military 
operation as described by the Secretary [of Defense]."  Respondents were then presented with a 
short series of questions to establish their expectations about the course and costs of conflict 
before receiving an update that indicated the United States had not yet succeeded in achieving its 
objective, and that provided information about the intervention's duration and the loss of U.S. 
lives to date. Subjects were at that time given the option to retrench or to continue, and were 
asked their reasons for doing one or the other; those who did not retrench received a second 
update -- indicating again the duration of the conflict and an increase in realized costs -- and a 
second round of questions about their reasons for staying in or getting out (Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3:  
 The Experiment 
 
Decision Point 1 Retrench
Phase 2
Casualties Inflicted
Objectives Not Achieved
Decision Point 2 Retrench
Maintain or Escalate
Phase 1
Casualties Inflicted
Objectives Not Achieved
Maintain or Escalate
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Results and Interpretation:  Hypothesis 1 
 The four scenarios varied along two dimensions:  the stakes (Nuclear vs. Humanitarian); 
and the strength of the opponent (Strong vs. Weak) (Table 1).  Variation in the strength of the 
opponent enables the testing of Hypothesis 1, the proposition that subjects' cost-expectations 
should be greater when facing a strong opponent than when facing a weak.  As predicted, the 
mean value of subjects' cost-expectations when responding to a weak opponent were lower than 
they were for subjects responding to a strong one (z = 7.38, p < 0.000)
25
.  
 
Table 1:  
 Experimental Conditions in Brief 
 
 
  STAKES  
    
  NUCLEAR 
(N = 183) 
 
HUMANITARIAN 
(N= 175) 
POWER 
DIFFERENTIAL 
STRONG 
OPPONENT 
(N = 178) 
Objective:  Destroy 
foreign country's nuclear 
program (N=87) 
Objective:  Defend civilian 
ethnic uprising against 
attacks by government 
forces (N=91) 
WEAK 
OPPONENT 
(N = 180) 
 
Objective:  Destroy 
foreign country's nuclear 
program (N = 96) 
 
 
Objective:  Defend civilian 
ethnic uprising against 
attacks by government 
forces (N=84) 
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Because the DV is not normally distributed, I used the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for mean 
comparison.  The results indicate not only that the difference between means in the Strong and Weak 
groups is statistically significant, but also that mean costs anticipated in the Weak Scenarios are smaller 
than those ascribed to the stakes in the Strong Scenarios.  This finding is confirmed through bivariate 
regression analysis of the dichotomous variable Strong -- which differentiates scenarios where the 
opponent is strong from those where it is weak -- on cost-expectations.  The relationship is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level: 0.23 (0.27). 
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Results and Interpretation:  Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2, by comparison, receives much more equivocal support.  Here, the 
proposition is that there should be an inverse relationship between respondents' likelihood of 
retrenching and their ex-ante cost-expectations -- the greater these expectations, the less 
likely retrenchment should be. The experimental data enable testing of this hypothesis in 
three ways.   
 The first is to test for significant differences across treatment groups.  Recall that 
Hypothesis 1 posits that subjects should establish higher cost-expectations when facing a 
strong opponent than a weak one, and that the data reveal this to be the case.  Because cost-
expectations in the strong scenarios are higher than in the weak, if Hypothesis 2 is correct 
then so too should there be a difference in the average incidence of retrenchment, at all 
decision points, across groups.  That is, if Hypothesis 2 is correct, then subjects in the strong 
scenarios should on average retrench later and less than those facing a weak opponent.   
Analysis reveals this not to be the case; there is no evidence of a significant difference 
between subjects responding to a strong rather than to a weak opponent (Table 2)
26
.   
 
Table 2:  
 Mean Likelihood of Retrenchment Across Strong/Weak Treatment Groups 
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 These are the results of comparison across all conditions -- that is, comparing responses to the 
Strong Humanitarian and Strong Nuclear vs. the Weak Humanitarian and Weak Nuclear.  Intra- and 
cross-stakes  tests (e.g., Strong Nuclear vs. Weak Nuclear; Strong Nuclear vs. Weak Humanitarian) also 
produce insignificant results. 
   
 z p 
Retrench at first option 1.099 <0.272 
Retrench at second option 0.195 <0.845 
Retrench at all 0.796 <0.426 
   
 [54] 
 
 The second means of testing Hypothesis 2 is through regression analysis, with the 
incidence of retrenchment as the dependent variable.  Because this is a dichotomous measure -- a 
respondent either chose to scale back the state's commitment or she didn't -- I estimate  logit 
models to test for the posited relationship.  Included are ordinal measures of respondents' ex-ante 
cost (Cost) and time (Time) expectations, and the value subjects assigned to the benefits of 
achieving the stated conflict objectives (Benefits) (Table 3).  
Table 3: 
Logit Regression Results 
 
 
Likelihood of Retrenchment 
          
  
Model 1
27
 
 
Model 2 
 
Model  3 
 
Benefits --- --- 
 
-6.76 (0.89)*** 
 
-6.77 (0.93)*** 
 
Ex-ante cost --- --- 
 
-0.74 (0.58) 
 
-0.86 (0.60) 
 
Ex-ante time --- --- 
 
1.34 (0.59)** 
 
1.39 (0.60)** 
 
Strong human. -0.79 (0.36)** 
 
--- --- 
 
-0.21 (0.42) 
 
Strong nuclear -1.00 (0.35)*** 
 
--- --- 
 
0.17 (0.45) 
 
Weak nuclear -1.23 (0.34)*** 
 
--- --- 
 
-0.23 (0.41) 
          
 
_cons 1.76 (0.28) 
 
4.20 (0.69) 
 
4.31 (0.71) 
     
N = 405 
** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
Robust standard errors reported 
 
 
 
 Three findings emerge.  First, and most importantly for Hypothesis 2, it is clear that 
there is no significant  relationship between ex-ante cost-expectations and the likelihood of 
retrenchment.
28
  Second, there is a significant and positive relationship between respondents' 
ex-ante expectations of conflict duration and the likelihood of the choice to retrench -- the 
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 The four treatment conditions differ significantly from one another.  Model 1 provides this result 
for the Weak Humanitarian scenario; Wald tests indicate the same for each combination of the other 
three. 
   
28
 These models were run for each  point at which subjects had the option to retrench; in all cases, 
the relationship was insignificant.  Run with robust standard errors. 
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longer the conflict is anticipated to take, in other words, the more likely subjects are to 
choose to pull back.  This result is somewhat confounding; a literal interpretation is that 
subjects' value, and form expectations about, time per se, but it is equally possible -- and, 
arguably, more likely -- that time matters not in and of itself, but rather because duration is 
associated with cost:  as the term of conflict lengthens, the costs incurred are presumed to 
increase.  Indeed, as discussed in Chapter III, this is the premise that does much of the 
theoretical heavy lifting in other explanations of asymmetric conflict outcome.  Given the 
data collected here, however, the most that can be said is that ex-ante expectations of conflict 
duration do seem to affect subjects' likelihood of retrenching, but the reasons for this are 
indiscernible.     
 Finally, there is a significant and negative relationship between subjects' perceptions 
of the value of the benefits at stake and the likelihood of retrenchment; in other words, 
consistent with the expected utility proposition, the higher the value ascribed to the benefits 
of achieving the stated conflict objective, the lower the probability of retrenchment.   
 This latter finding also is evident in a test for significant differences across treatment 
groups; in this case, the relevant treatment is variation in the stakes of conflict.   Two of the 
experimental scenarios can be classified as falling under the rubric of national security, 
identifying as the objective destroying a foreign country's nuclear program (Nuclear 
Scenarios).  The other two scenarios involved an issue that is generally understood to fall 
outside the scope of traditional national security interests; here, the objective was identified 
as defending a civilian ethnic uprising against attacks by government forces (Humanitarian 
Scenarios).  The intention in applying this dichotomy was to provide a basis for perceived 
difference between the benefits of succeeding; this treatment was effective, with the mean 
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value of subjects' identification of the benefits of achieving conflict objectives being 
significantly greater in the Nuclear than in the Humanitarian Scenarios (z = -4.36, 
p<0.0000).
29
     
 If the expected utility proposition that the decision to retrench is determined by the 
ratio between realized costs and anticipated benefits, then we should expect that subjects 
receiving the Nuclear Scenarios will on average tolerate higher levels of cost before 
retrenching, if they retrench at all, than their counterparts receiving a Humanitarian Scenario.  
Indeed, this is what we see occurring:  there is a statistically significant difference between 
the mean likelihood of retrenching across treatment groups at each decision point, and 
overall (Table 4).  In both cases, the mean for retrenchment is higher for the Humanitarian 
Scenarios, indicating that respondents receiving these scenarios were more likely to retrench 
than were respondents receiving the Nuclear Scenarios.   
 
Table 4:  
 Mean Likelihood of Retrenching 
Nuclear Scenarios vs. Humanitarian Scenarios 
 
   
 z p 
Retrench at first option 2.420 < 0.016 
Retrench at second option 2.041 <0.04 
Retrench at all 3.055 < 0.002 
   
 
 
 These results, however, cannot be taken entirely at face value, largely on the strength of 
the third test of Hypothesis 2.  Recall that the survey asked respondents not only to attach a 
number of U.S. lives to the benefits at stake and to make choices about retrenchment, but asked 
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 That the treatment conditions affected respondents' estimations of likely costs and the value of 
the benefits ascribed to the conflict objective renders it unsurprising that the treatment indicators were not 
significant in Model 3.   
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them also to explain why they made the choices that they did.  Review of these data reveals that 
the findings of the regression analysis and the comparison of treatment groups discussed above 
are surprisingly inconsistent with subjects' own explanations of the choice to retrench: of a total 
292 such decisions only 25% (72) had as the identified reason "The conflict has cost more U.S. 
lives than achieving the objective of [condition] is worth".  By contrast 60% (176) identified   
"The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than expected" as their reason for retrenchment.
30
   
 The disconnect between these sets of results cannot be explained as the product of a 
positive correlation between ex-ante cost-expectations and the value of the benefits at stake -- 
that is, it is not the case that those survey respondents who expected the conflict to be costly, and 
so had a greater tolerance for loss, also believed that the value of the benefits to be won was 
high, while those who established low cost-expectations also attached a low value to the benefits 
of succeeding.  The absence of a significant relationship between Ex-ante costs and Retrench in 
the regression models above indicate as much, while an additional test of Ex-ante costs and 
Benefits offers confirmation of the presence of no significant correlation (Pearson's R = -0.0816).   
 Thus the discontinuity between the regression output and subjects' self-reported 
reasons for retrenchment render the experimental results equivocal at best.  While the 
evidence produced cannot be interpreted as offering unqualified support for the theory, 
neither can they be interpreted as offering justification for its wholesale rejection. To present 
the study's results as affirmative of the expected utility paradigm weights more heavily the 
correlational evidence than respondents' own explanations of their choices.  While not an 
insupportable position, given that much of the statistical analysis does comport with the 
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 8 (3%) selected "The conflict has lasted longer than expected", and 36 (12%) " You no longer 
think the United States can achieve the objective of expelling the foreign military".   
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expected utility proposition, respondents' self-identified reasons for retrenchment seem to 
offer an object lesson as to why correlation ought not be misconstrued as causation.
31
  
 By the same token, to interpret the experimental results as supportive of my theory on 
the strength of respondents' explanations of their choices would be to disregard a sizable 
portion of the empirical evidence collected.  Doing so would be akin to asserting that the 
wind exists because people report having felt it, but without finding other evidence of its 
presence that we would expect -- rustling leaves, waving grass, and so forth.   
 It should also be noted that the experimental results might be the product of another 
explanation that can unify these seemingly disparate findings.  It may be the case, for 
example, that decision-makers undertake an implicit cost-benefit calculation without 
recognizing it as such; that is, they may be sensitive to cost-expectations because these 
access an intuitive and non-specific sense of what an objective is worth -- or, perhaps even 
establish what that objective is worth.  And, of course, it also is possible that these findings 
are an artifact of shortcomings in the experiment:  that the scenarios contain misleading cues 
or omit important pieces of information; that the survey questions are poorly worded or 
ordered; or that there are other problems with the way in which the experiment is designed or 
presented that produce bias.  
  
Summary 
 The results of the experiment are both discouraging and encouraging for the theory.  
Regression analysis of the experimental data does not reveal the expected relationship 
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 This is true even among those who indicated their reason for retrenchment was the violation of 
expectations:  67 such subjects had received a Humanitarian Scenario, while only 49 had received a 
Nuclear Scenario.  Similarly, among those who identified the cost-benefit ratio as the impetus for 
retrenchment, 27 were Humanitarian, 19 Nuclear.    
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between ex-ante cost-expectations and the likelihood of retrenchment at the same time that it 
does produces correlational evidence consistent with the expected utility prediction of an 
inverse relationship between cost tolerance and the value of the benefits to be won.   
 Nonetheless, the data also reveal that, as argued by the theory, subjects' cost-
expectations vary with their understanding of the power differential; moreover, among those 
subjects who chose to retrench a full 60% explained their behavior as being caused by the 
dynamics predicted:  they retrenched because the realized costs of conflict exceeded their ex-
ante expectations.  These results are strongly suggestive of the operation of the posited causal 
mechanism, indicating that decision-makers are attentive to the power differential; that the 
ex-ante cost-expectations they form on the basis of this differential operate as a reference 
point; and that it is the violation of this reference point that triggers the political choice to 
retrench.  Thus although the experimental results cannot reasonably be considered 
conclusive, they nonetheless offer support for the theory's most central claims, and suggest 
that the theory might go some distance in explaining individual instances of strong state loss.  
In the chapter that follows, I subject to scrutiny the theory's proposed explanation for the 
increasing frequency of such losses over time.   
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CHAPTER V:  TESTING THE STRUCTURAL HYPOTHESIS 
 
Large-N Analysis of the Relationship between  
Great Power Status, Polarity, and Asymmetric Conflict Loss 
 
 
*************** 
 
Chapter IV was devoted to testing the theory's bilateral hypotheses; this chapter turns to 
addressing the theory's claims about the relationship between great power status, system polarity, 
and asymmetric conflict loss: 
 
 
  
 
 
This is the structural hypothesis, and I argue that its logical derivation from my theory's 
central commitments means the theory not only can explain individual instances of strong-state 
loss, but also can explain the upward trend in a particular type of strong-state loss over time: 
great power loss.  In what follows below I provide a brief review of my theoretical argument 
before proceeding to subject Hypothesis 3 to quantitative analysis.    
 
The Systemic Distribution of Power and Great Power Loss 
Recall from Chapter III that the dissertation posits  that states are sensitive to the 
distribution of power, arguing that they undertake evaluations of potential opponents' capabilities 
H3:   The likelihood of asymmetric conflict loss should be higher for states that are 
great powers operating in a unipolar or bipolar system than for states that are great 
powers operating in a multipolar system.     
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-- with the capabilities of allies and the likelihood of their direct involvement, as well as 
anticipated indirect support in the form of material flows from these allies or otherwise 
sympathetic third parties factored in -- and on this basis establish expectations of just how costly 
it will be to best them in a fight.  This expectation of the likely cost of war, I argue, operates as a 
reference point, or that value against which all gains and losses are measured, and that it is the 
violation of  this reference point  that causes states to choose to retrench.   
The evaluative process that is the theory's jumping off point, however, does not happen in 
a vacuum; to the contrary, it happens within the broader context of the global distribution of 
power.  I contend, in other words, that states are aware not only of how well they match up 
against a particular opponent, but also of how well they match up against any opponent -- they 
are attuned to their standing in the global pecking order.  Indeed, the long tradition of realist 
theorizing indentifies this type of relative evaluation as the prime mover in international politics 
(e.g. Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Layne 1993; Copeland 2000; Mearsheimer 2003). The majority 
of these theories are devoted to explaining why and how this attentiveness to the distribution of 
power at the systemic level affects the likelihood, incidence, and outcome of great power war; I 
argue that attentiveness to this distribution also has implications for the outcomes of asymmetric 
conflicts, most specifically for changes in the frequency of great power loss over time.     
If it is the case that states are attuned both to their dyadic advantage and to their systemic 
advantage, then the logical corollary is that it will be those states living at the top of the food 
chain -- the great powers -- for which the dynamics proposed by the theory will be most likely to 
obtain.   Two offsetting dynamics lead to this conclusion:  the first is that the greater the state's 
power advantage, the lower its reference point is likely to be; the second is that, ceteris paribus, 
the lower the reference point, the more likely it is to be violated.  The theory is clear that a state's 
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perception of its power advantage is shaped, first, by the bilateral comparison between its own 
capabilities and those of the prospective opponent.  This is a relative measure, having to do not 
with how much power the state has in absolute terms, but rather with how it believes its assets 
stack up against those of another. States, however, enter into these bilateral evaluations with an 
understanding of where power resides in the system -- that is, with an understanding of whether 
it is concentrated or diffuse, and across which actors.  In particular, they understand whether they 
are, or are not, themselves a "great power".   
Importantly, my use of this term captures more than simply an accounting of material 
capabilities.  Rather, I conceive of this title as a matter of status, consistent with Modelski's 
(1958) notion:  "The status of Great Power is sometimes confused with the condition of being 
powerful.  The office, as it is known, did in fact evolve from the role played by the great military 
states in earlier periods...But the Great Power system institutionalizes the position of the 
powerful state in the web of rights and obligations" (p141).  Jack Levy (1982, p. 282) has offered 
further elaboration:   
 
A Great Power can be defined generally as a state which plays a major role in 
international politics with respect to security-related issues.  Operational 
indicators of Great Power status include the following:  possession of a high level 
of power capabilities, which provides for reasonable self-sufficiency in security 
matters and permits the conduct of offensive as well as defensive military 
operations; participation in international congresses and conferences; de facto 
identification as a Great Power by an international conference or organization; 
admission to a formal or informal organization of Powers; participation in Great 
Power guarantees, territorial compensation, or partitions; and, generally, 
treatment as a relative equal by other Great Powers (for example, protocol, 
alliances, negotiations, and so forth). 
 
Material capability, in other words, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
identification of a state as a great power; rather, these definitions identify as fundamental 
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possession of what we now identify as the "soft"  variants of power, and most especially the 
matter of recognition.  It is during periods in which the state is widely recognized as holding this 
status, then, that its perceived power advantage -- the product of both material and non-material 
endowments -- over the majority of states in the system should be the most pronounced.   This 
effect, moreover, should increase as the number of recognized great powers in the system 
decreases; the fewer the number of peer competitors, the greater the  "role in international 
politics with respect to security-related issues" the state will play.   
I use here the term "polarity" to capture the number of recognized great powers during a 
given period, rather than the more specific accountings of "concentration" -- which measures 
both the number of great powers and the balance(s) of power between and among them 
(Mansfield 1994) -- or "polarization", which accesses the extent to which states consolidate into 
blocs of  tight alliances (Bueno de Mesquita 1978).  These more nuanced concepts may be useful 
-- and indeed, some argue necessary -- for inquiry into the incidence of great power war, but they 
do not provide distinctions that are meaningful for the theory presented here.  Rather, because 
the study is interested in explaining why the particularly strong sometimes lose their asymmetric 
conflicts, what is needed is simply the ability to distinguish great powers from minor powers, 
and to identify how many great powers exist in the global system at any point in time.  It is, then, 
states that find themselves to be great powers in low-polarity systems -- that is, in bipolar or 
unipolar systems -- that the theory suggest should be most prone to perceiving themselves to 
have a significant advantage over most or all other states in the system.   
States' cognizance of the system's polarity may have an abstract, ambient effect on cost-
expectations by inflating the great powers' confidence in their capabilities in general, but it most 
certainly will inform specific bilateral comparisons in three ways.  First, when polarity is low -- 
 [64] 
 
when there are very few great powers -- by definition the gap between the haves and the have-
nots will be larger than when there are many.  Second,  when polarity is low, any single great 
power will be in possession of more hard and soft power in absolute and in relative terms than it 
would be under a more diffuse distribution.   And, third, states will be able more easily to 
recognize these facts; a large literature identifies uncertainty about power as the feature that 
distinguishes mulipolarity from lower-polarity structures (Waltz 1964; Deutsch and Singer, 
1964; Bueno de Mesquita 1975; Midlarsky and Hopf 1993; Mansfield 1993).  Although these 
works, too, focus their attentions primarily on the extent to which variation in polarity can 
explain the incidence or absence of great power war, the unifying premise nonetheless is that 
uncertainty about power is greater under multipolarity than under bipolarity and  unipolarity. As 
explained by Kenneth Waltz (2000, pp. 5-6): 
 
Significant changes take place when the number of great powers reduces to two 
or one...Competition in multipolar systems is more complicated than competition 
in bipolar ones because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states 
multiply as numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and 
strength of coalitions are hard to make.  
 
 
Bipolar and unipolar systems, in other words, are characterized by low levels of 
uncertainty about power differentials -- which, again, include assessment of the capabilities of 
allies or otherwise sympathetic third parties and the likelihood of their direct or indirect 
involvement -- as compared to multipolar systems.  Within the context of asymmetric war, this 
means that the great powers' assessments of their capabilities advantage should be higher in 
general, and so also in particular cases, when the majority of the power in the system is in the 
hands of few than when it is in the hands of many.  Because the theory argues that the greater the 
power advantage the lower the reference point, the implication, rather counterintuitively, is that 
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states should lose asymmetric conflicts more often  when they are more dominant.  Stated 
another way, loss should be both more frequent and more likely for states that are great powers 
operating in a low-polarity international environment -- these are the claims made by the theory's 
third hypothesis. 
 
The Data 
 To test Hypothesis 3 I take state conflict outcome as the unit of analysis; that is, the 
outcome of interest is how each state involved in an asymmetric conflict fares -- whether it wins 
or loses.  Because the unit of analysis is state outcome -- and not conflict outcome --  interstate 
conflicts are always represented in the data by more than one observation, while intra- and extra-
state conflicts are represented by more than one observation only where a third-party state was 
involved in/joined the conflict, on either side. Table 5 illustrates: 
 
Table 5:  
Illustration of Observations 
 
  
  
  
State Outcome State Participant Conflict Year War Type Variable n 
Win Prussia Second Schleswig-Holstein 1864 Interstate ... 
Win Austria-Hungary Second Schleswig-Holstein 1864 Interstate ... 
Loss Denmark Second Schleswig-Holstein 1864 Interstate ... 
Loss Russia First Chechen War 1994 Intrastate ... 
Win United Kingdom Mahdi (Sudanese) Uprising 1896 Extrastate ... 
Win France Mahdi (Sudanese) Uprising 1896 Extrastate ... 
  
  
  
 
 To acquire the necessary data I use four sources:  Arreguin-Toft's analysis of asymmetric 
conflict outcomes, "How the Weak Win Wars" (2001); the Correlates of War Project intra-, 
extra-, and inter-state datasets (Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, and Bremer 2004); the Military 
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Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS) Project (Sullivan and Koch 2008), which "provides 
detailed data on American, British, Chinese, French, and Russian uses of military force against 
both state and non-state targets between 1946 and 2003"; and the Polity III Project, which codes 
"the authority characteristics of states in the world system", accessed through EUGene.
32
  
Arreguin-Toft's work identifies a set of wars he classifies as asymmetric.  Although there is no 
accepted standard in the literature for asymmetry, Arreguin-Toft's operationalization has two 
advantages:  it relies upon objective measures, and it sets a high bar.
33
 These characteristics 
render the included cases "most likely" for my theory -- that is, those cases in which its dynamics 
should be most pronounced.  If confirmatory evidence is not produced through the testing of this 
set, therefore, there will be substantial justification for rejection of the structural hypothesis.    
 Arreguin-Toft's concrete definition also enables me to add conflicts from MIPS that meet 
both the identified criterion for asymmetry and the COW definition of war participation as the 
commitment of a minimum of 1,000 troops (n=30)
 34
.  This augmentation expands the sample to 
capture cases that do not meet the COW minimum of 1,000 battle casualties over 12 months, but 
that otherwise adhere to the standard of war.  These are cases for which exclusion would sit 
uncomfortably with our intuitions about what constitutes a serious militarized engagement -- the 
United States incursion into Panama in 1989, for example, did not produce the requisite number 
of casualties despite  involving the deployment of over 25,000 members of the U.S. armed 
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 EuGene:  http://www.eugenesoftware.org/ 
 
33
 Arreguin-Toft defines asymmetry as follows:  "the threshold of asymmetry that matters is ≥ 5:1 in 
favor of strong actors, where power is the halved product of a strong actor's armed forces and population 
at the start of conflict versus the simple product of the weak actor's armed forces and population" (p. 96).  
He confines his set to wars, that is, to disputes producing an average of 1,000 battle fatalities per year. 
 
34
 I opted to supplement Arreguin-Toft's identified set of wars with conflicts included in MIPS 
rather than in the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset because the former includes 
information about the number of troops committed to a conflict while the latter does not.   
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forces.  Adhering to the COW definition of conflict participation but not casualties thus allows 
me to exclude truly small-scale operations while capturing those for which the level of 
commitment is high enough that the sending state reasonably can be assumed to  expect to suffer 
some number of casualties.    
 This process produces a total of 213 asymmetric conflicts comprised of 342 participant-
state outcomes.
35
  For each participant state I match data from COW on conflict outcome and on 
country-year capabilities, and from the Polity III project I add country-year coding for level of 
democracy.  From these combined data I construct  two different sets for analysis.  The first set, 
the Full Set, contains all 342 observations.  The second set, the Great Power set (n=177), 
constrains observations to include only those states identified consistently in the literature as 
forming a structural pole during at least one period between the years 1816 and 2011:  the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire; France; Germany; Italy; Japan; the United Kingdom; USSR/Russia; 
and the United States (Levy 1982; Monteiro 2011).
36
  The list of observations in each set can be 
found in Appendix C.     
 
Testing Hypothesis 3 
  The first test of the hypothesis is a simple comparison of the frequency of great power 
losses across the two relevant time periods:  the period of multipolarity (1816-1945) and the 
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 94 of the conflicts identified are classified by COW as extra-state, and 40 as intra-state, the 
remaining 79 are interstate.   
 
36
 China is not included here as a Great Power; although some studies afford it this status there is no 
consistency in identification of the relevant time period(s). Levy (1982), for example, classifies China as a 
great power from 1949-1975; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) from 1950-1984; William Moul (2003) 
from 1950-1989; and Tessman and Chan (2004) consider china a "major state" -- one of "the handful or 
so most powerful members of the international system" -- from 1949-1995.  
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subsequent period of low-polarity (1946-present).   The results, displayed in Figure 4, are 
consistent with the predicted difference between multipolarity and bipolarity/unipolarity: 
 
 
Figure 4: 
Great Power Loss as % of Total Conflicts 
 
19%
50%
*   Polar powers:  Austria -Hungary; France; Germany; Italy; Japan; United Kingdom; Russia; United States (n = 119)
** Polar Powers:  Soviet Union; United States (n = 58)
**Multipolarity (1816-1945)* Bipolarity/Unipolarity (1816-1945)**
 
 
 The second test of the hypothesis that the likelihood of great power loss will be higher 
under low-polarity structures than under multipolarity is regression analysis, where the 
dependent variable is the likelihood of failure to achieve conflict objectives -- that is, the 
likelihood of state loss.  Both the COW and MIPS projects provide ordinal codings of conflict 
outcomes; the conversion of these to a dichotomous measure, Loss
37
, is fairly straightforward:  
states are credited with success (0) when COW identifies that state as having "won", and/or 
MIPS indicates that the state achieved its full set of conflict objectives; states are credited with a 
loss (1) when the COW and/or MIPS set identifies that state as having accepted any resolution 
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 Full Set:  mean = 0.40, SD = 0.5; Great Powers Set:  mean = 0.29, SD = 0.46 
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short of achieving its primary conflict objectives, including a loss
38
, a compromise settlement, or 
a stalemate.
39
   
As discussed above, I argue that states' belief that they can prosecute any given conflict at 
low cost should vary not only with the dyadic balance of power, but also with the distribution of 
power at the structural level.   That is, states' ex-ante cost-expectations should vary with their 
global power position -- great powers will have a larger power advantage relative to all other 
states in the system and, as a result, should in general establish lower cost-expectations when 
facing any prospective opponent than should minor powers.  This divergence should be more 
pronounced when there are few great powers rather than many.  Stated another way, the theory 
suggests that a state should have lower cost-expectations when it is one of only a very few great 
powers than when it is one of many, and so it is during these periods that it should be most likely 
to lose its asymmetric conflicts.  
This logic argues not simply for consideration of great power status and of system 
polarity as independent influences, but rather of the interaction between the two; these therefore 
comprise the study's explanatory variables of interest:  Great power
40
; Low polarity
41
; and Great 
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 Recall that a loss in the asymmetric context is not the same as the material defeat of the state; 
rather, it is an indication that the strong-state was unwilling to commit additional resources to prosecuting 
the fight.  Thus it is truly a "loss", and not a "defeat", and so is a political choice -- the phenomenon the 
theory seeks to explain. 
39
 This includes MIPS codings of 1, 2, or 4: “Withdrew: Intervening state withdrew its military 
forces unilaterally without attaining its primary political objective”; “Completed:  Intervening state 
completed a mission with a pre-determined end date without attaining an immediate, observable political 
objective”; “Negotiated:  Intervening state negotiated a settlement that did not result in full attainment of 
the state’s primary political objective” (MIPS Codebook, 2008); and COW codings of  loss (1, or 2), 
compromise (3), or stalemate (6).  
40
 Full Set:  mean = 0.40, SD = 0.5; Great Powers Set: mean = 0.76, SD = 0.42 
41
 Full Set:  mean = 0.56 , SD = 0.5; Great Powers Set:  mean = 0.67, SD = 0.47 
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power*Low polarity
42
.  Great power is a dichotomous variable capturing the state's great power 
status by year -- Italy, for example, is coded as a great power (1) from 1860-1943, and as a minor 
power (0) during all other periods.  The polarity of the system is represented in the dichotomous 
Low polarity variable, which is coded as multipolar (0) from 1816-1945, and as bipolar/unipolar 
(1) thereafter.  The interaction term is the product of the two: Great power*Low polarity 
The other independent variables included for analysis control for alternative explanations 
of asymmetric conflict outcome.  The proposition that there should be a positive correlation 
between relative state capability and the likelihood of success is captured by the COW National 
Capabilities Index (CINC score).  The CINC score is not an absolute measure, but rather 
captures each state's share of global power; the higher the score, the more power the state has 
relative to all others.
43
 It is included in the model as the variable Capabilities
44
. If the capabilities 
proposition is correct, then, it will be the case that high CINC scores are correlated with success 
in achieving conflict objectives. I also account for the nature of the war being fought extra- (0), 
intra- (.5), or inter-state (1) in the War type
45
 variable.   
Two additional explanations are tested; the first is Gil Merom's (2003) regime-type 
hypothesis.   According to Merom, strong democracies face constraints in the conduct of their 
conflicts that their autocratic counterparts do not.  Merom's central premise is that non-
                                                     
42
 Full Set:  mean = 0.34, SD = 0.47; Great Powers Set:  mean = 0.66, SD = 0.48 
43
 The precise definition:  "Annual values for the computed Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC) score...[are] generally computed by summing all observations on each of 6 capability components 
for a given year, converting each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and 
then averaging across the 6 components."  
44
 Full Set:  range = 0.000147 - 0.336089, mean = 0.76, SD = 0.087; Great Powers Set: range = 
0.009785-0.336089, mean = 0.13, SD = 0.89 
45
 Full Set:  mean = 0.63, SD = 0.45; Great Powers Set:  mean = 0.49, SD = 0.48 
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democracies benefit from the ability to maintain strict control over the information available to 
their populations and to silence dissent should any arise.  The extent of this control over society 
allows the state to mobilize its resources efficiently and minimizes the potential for, and 
consequences of, public disapproval of the rationale for war or of its execution. 
 Leaders of democratic states, by contrast, are argued by Merom to be constrained by their 
society’s judgment concerning the necessity of the war and the appropriateness of its conduct -- 
making military endeavors that either are, or at least can be argued to have the appearance of 
being imperial increasingly unsupportable over time and thus explaining the incidence of 
retrenchment.   For Merom, these domestic constraints are manifest both in the population’s 
willingness to bear the costs of conflict, and to impose them.  The contention thus is that 
democratic states are less likely to win their wars than are their autocratic counterparts; stated 
another way, Merom's hypothesis is that being a democracy decreases the likelihood of the state 
being able to prosecute its asymmetric wars in ways and for durations that enable it to achieve its 
full set of conflict objectives.  This proposition is incorporated into the models estimated here 
through the transformation of the Polity III ten-point measure of democracy into the 
dichotomous variable Democracy
46
; Polity III scores of 5 or less are coded as non-democracies 
(0), and scores of 6 or greater coded as democracies (1).   
 The second competing explanation is Arreguin-Toft's theory of strategic interaction.  
Stated briefly, Arreguin-Toft's argument is that it is the interaction between the military strategy  
of the strong and that of the weak that determines conflict outcomes.  According to Arreguin-
Toft, conflict participants choose between two types of strategy:  direct and indirect.  For the 
weaker side the choice is comparable but not identical, with the participant selecting either direct 
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 Full Set:  mean = 0.333, SD = 0.47; Great Powers set: mean = 0.48, SD = 0.50 
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conventional defense that is intended to blunt assaults on its cities, armed forces, and other 
military resources, or indirect guerrilla warfare that targets the enemy’s military assets, most 
especially its troops.
47
  This is included in the model via Arreguin-Toft's (2001) coding of the  
Strategic interaction variable.
48
   
   
Data Limitations 
 The data described above do have some limitations.  First, Arreguin-Toft's Strategic 
interaction variable is missing for a number of cases; as he explains, "Many civil and colonial 
wars recorded neither the quantity of forces committed nor the strategies employed" (2001, p. 
112), preventing him from making a supportable designation.
49
  This problem is compounded by 
the inclusion of cases from MIPS, for which I did not attempt to reproduce Arreguin-Toft's 
coding rules; this brings the total number of missing for Strategic interaction to 70 for the Full 
Set, and to 53 for the Great Powers Set.  As a result, my models likely  underestimate the effects 
of this alternative explanatory variable, most particularly for the post-World War II period.  
 Second, the inclusion of cases from the MIPS dataset increases sample size; but so too 
does it introduce some inconsistency in conflict characteristics across systemic structures.  The 
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 Arreguin-Toft acknowledges that these are not the only choices available to the combatants, 
noting that a “hearts-and-minds” approach, nonviolent resistance, or terrorism might also be chosen.  For 
a full description of strategic options see pp. 29-33. 
48
 Full Set:  mean = 0.11, SD = 0.31; Great Powers Set:  mean = 0.01, SD = 0.25.   
49
 Arreguin-Toft's codings include missing values for 45 observations.  No obvious non-random 
reason for this presents itself.  The most likely reasons for systematic non-coding would be time period or 
conflict type; it would be reasonable to presume that the more historical the conflict the less copious 
and/or detailed the available information, and that  intra- and extra-state wars -- as the purview of a single 
state or that state and its colonies -- would be less reliably historicized than interstate wars.  There is, 
however, no pattern over time -- the range of missing values extends from 1853-2003 -- nor is there 
inconsistency between the percent missing by conflict type and the percent of conflict type overall: 44% 
of the missing values are for extrastate conflicts; 13% for intrastate; and 42% for interstate wars;  32% of 
all conflicts included are extrastate; 16% intrastate; and 52% interstate.   
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majority of the observations analyzed come from Arreguin-Toft's study of wars occurring 
between 1816 and 1994. As described above, while Arreguin-Toft adheres to the COW 
definition of war in its entirety, I apply a somewhat lesser standard to the MIPS set, removing the 
requirement of 1,000 battle casualties over 12 months for those engagements in which the 
sending state committed at least 1,000 combat troops.
50
  Because MIPS is confined to the post-
World War II era, some number of conflicts from the period prior that would meet this standard 
are excluded.  This choice might therefore be argued to bias the sample by including only for 
low-polarity periods uses of force that the state might not take as seriously as those that COW 
categorizes as war -- conflicts, that is, that the state might be more willing to lose.  I control for 
this potential source of bias by analyzing both the Full Set and the Great Powers set both with 
and without the MIPS cases; their exclusion does not change the sign or significance of the 
explanatory variables.  The models, the full set of  results, and their implications are discussed 
below. 
 
The Models 
The dependent variable in this study, Loss, is limited, assuming values of either 0 or 1.  
This distribution requires a probabilistic interpretation of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables; one of a number of accepted alternative methods for 
estimation of qualitative dependent variables, the logit model -- linearization of the parameters 
through use of a log function -- is selected for use here.
51
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The minimum commitment in the cases represented is 4,500.   
51
 For an explanation of why OLS does not provide useful estimates of the parameters for 
dichotomous DVs see: Kennedy, Peter, A Guide to Econometrics, 5
th
 Edition, (Cambridge, MA:  MIT 
Press), 2003, pp. 259-260.   
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Two models, Base and Full, are estimated for the Full and for the Great Power data sets.  
The first model, the Base, is comprised only of control variables; the Full model contains all 
control variables, the two test variables, Great power and Low polarity, and the explanatory 
variable of interest, the interaction term Great power* Low polarity.  All models, for which the 
equations are provided below, are run with robust standard errors. 
 
Base Model: y(loss) = β0(constant)+β1(capabilities)+ β2(war type)+ β3(democracy)+  
  β4(strategic interaction)+ ε 
 
Full Model: y(loss) = β0(constant)+β1(capabilities)+ β2(war type)+ β3(democracy)+  
  β4(strategic interaction)+ β5(great power)+ β6(low polarity)+ 
  β7(greatpower*low polarity)+  ε 
 
 Hypothesis 3 makes two substantive predictions about the results of both Full Models.  
Recall that the inclusion of an interaction term means that the coefficients attached to the 
component variables -- in this case, Great power and Low polarity -- no longer represent the 
unique effect of each on the likelihood of state loss.  Rather, these coefficients must be 
interpreted as the effect produced by that component variable when the other is held at its lowest 
value (0).  Thus, the coefficient attached to Great power in the Full model will indicate the effect 
of being a great power when Low polarity is held at zero -- that is, when the system is multipolar.  
Hypothesis 3 therefore predicts that the coefficient for Great power in the Full Model will have a 
negative coefficient: the theory argues that states that are great powers should have a lower 
likelihood of losing their asymmetric conflicts when the system is multipolar than when it is 
bipolar or unipolar. 
 Conversely, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the interaction term, Great power*Low polarity, 
will have a positive coefficient:  loss will be more likely for a state that is a great power (Great 
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power = 1) operating in a bipolar or unipolar system (Low polarity = 1).  These predictions are 
presented in (Table 6). 
 
Table 6:    
Predicted Signs of Coefficients for Theoretically Substantive Variables in Full Models 
 
  
Variable Predicted Sign 
Great power (β5) - 
Great power*Low polarity (β7) + 
  
 
 
Results  
 Analysis of both the Full and the Great Powers dataset produces results that are consistent 
with these predictions, and so are supportive of Hypothesis 3.  For the Full Set of asymmetric 
conflict participants (Table 7) the inclusion of the test variables reduces error and both Great 
power  and the interaction term, Great power*Low polarity, move the dependent variable in the 
predicted directions.   
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Table 7
52
:    
Logit Analysis: All Asymmetric Conflict Participants (N=267)
53
 
 
       
  
BASE 
 
FULL 
  
PRE = 26% 
 
PRE = 40% 
       
 
Capabilities
54
 -3.29 (2.02) 
 
-0.97 (2.84) 
 
War  type 1.16 (0.39)*** 
 
0.71 (0.42) 
 
Democracy -0.08 (0.30) 
 
-0.21 (0.33) 
 
Strategic interaction 0.65 (0.45) 
 
0.52 (0.42) 
 
Great power -- -- 
 
-0.99 (0.49)** 
 
Low polarity -- -- 
 
0.23 (0.34) 
 
Great power*Low polarity -- -- 
 
1.88 (0.87)** 
 
_cons -0.93 (0.41) 
 
-0.58 (0.47) 
   
** p ≤ 0.05, ***p≤ 0.01 
    
  
  Similar results are produced through analysis of the Great Powers data set.  Here 
again,  the inclusion of the test variables improves the model's performance, and the predicted 
negative and positive coefficients are associated with Great power and the interaction term Great 
power* Low polarity, respectively (Table 8). 
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 I also account more specifically for the capabilities proposition through the use of a Capabilities 
ratio variable, where data are available.  To calculate this ratio I divide each participant's CINC score by 
that of its opponent; the need for both scores limits observations to the 50 interstate conflict participants.  
Estimating these same models revealed this variable to have no effect, and the sign of Great power and 
the interaction term unchanged.       
53
 The decrease in observations from 342-267 is caused by missing values for Arreguin-Toft's 
measure of strategic interaction.  Dropping this variable and estimating the model again does not change 
the results:  the coefficient for Great power is negative, and for Great power*Low polarity  it is positive; 
and the interaction term remains significant.  
 
54
 Capabilities  and Great power are, not surprisingly, correlated (Full Set:  0.72; Great Powers Set:  
0.47).  For the reasons discussed above, however, they are not theoretically interchangeable; nor are they 
statistically mutually substitutable.  Using as the interaction term Capabilities*Multipolarity produces no 
significant relationship.  Moreover, the exclusion of either variable produces no changes in sign or 
significance of the other.   
 [77] 
 
Table 8: 
Logit Analysis:  Great Power Asymmetric Conflict Participants (N=122
55
) 
      
  
BASE 
 
FULL 
 
  
PRE = 48% 
 
PRE = 57% 
 
        
 
Capabilities -1.54 (2.90) 
 
-2.65 (3.74) 
 
 
War type 1.12 (0.54)** 
 
0.35 (0.64) 
 
 
Democracy 0.76 (0.49) 
 
0.72 (0.57) 
 
 
Strategic interaction 0.11 (0.93) 
 
0.20 (0.90) 
 
 
Great power -- -- 
 
-16.27 (0.91)*** 
 
 
Low polarity -- -- 
 
-15.76 (1.02)*** 
 
 
Great power*Low polarity -- -- 
 
17.99 (1.34)*** 
 
 
_cons -1.73 (0.74) 
 
14.67 (1.01) 
 
     
** p ≤ 0.05, ***p≤ 0.01 
 
 
  
 In both sets, the relationship between the interaction term and the likelihood of state loss 
is significant; as predicted by the theory, in other words, the likelihood of loss is significantly 
higher for states that are great powers when the system is bipolar or unipolar as compared to 
when it is multipolar (Figure 5).   
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 The decrease in observations from 177-122 is caused by missing values for Arreguin-Toft's 
measure of strategic interaction.  Dropping this variable and estimating the model again does not change 
the results:  the coefficient for Great power is negative, and for Great power*Low polarity  it is positive; 
and the interaction term remains significant. 
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Figure 5: 
Predicted Probability of Loss for States that are Great Powers 
by System Type 
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Interpretation 
 The above results are encouraging for the theory of asymmetric conflict outcome 
forwarded here.  The comparison of the frequency of great power losses over time is supportive 
of the prediction of an upward trend as the system moves from being characterized by 
multipolarity to being characterized by bipolarity and unipolarity.  The assertion that the 
likelihood of asymmetric conflict loss should be greater for states that are great powers operating  
under low-polarity systems than under multipolarity similarly receives support, with the 
regression analyses above revealing a significant relationship in the posited direction.  That is, 
the results of the tests above are consistent with  the theory's prediction that the smaller the 
number of great powers, the greater their likelihood of losing an asymmetric conflict.   
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 This finding runs counter to conventional understandings of raw material power as the 
final arbiter of the resort to arms, which would expect that as the state's share of systemic power 
increases so too should its likelihood of victory increase. The most prominent alternative 
explanation in the literature, as discussed at length in Chapter II, focuses on the role of resolve -- 
the notion that the distribution of capabilities in a conflict produces a concomitant but inverse 
distribution of interests that favors the weak actor.  For the weak, that is, but not for the strong, 
the fight is existential, defined by the highly motivating desire to survive.  It is this disparity that 
would then  explain why it is not the weak, but rather the strong, that opt out.  Though this 
argument might explain individual cases of strong-state loss, it does not explain the increasing  
frequency of such events over time, nor can it explain why or how system polarity would affect 
relative levels of resolve.  The fight either is or is not existential for any given actor -- a great 
power's stakes do not become less existential as it becomes more powerful, or as the number of 
peer competitors declines. 
 One  possible way to square this circle might emerge from consideration of the 
reputational consequences of retrenchment across systemic structures.  The argument here would 
be that under multipolarity, the great powers operate in a world of many peer competitors and so 
are highly sensitive to the reputational consequences of behaviors that might indicate weakness.  
Under low polarity structures this pressure is absent, and so they will be less resolved -- more 
willing to opt out when a conflict is not going their way.  If the concern is opportunism by a peer 
competitor predicated on perceived weakness, however, then we should expect the great powers 
to be most sensitive to this possibility when they have only one peer rival -- who is by definition 
interested in, and able to be attentive to, taking advantage of missteps and the opportunities this 
creates.  This dynamic would lead to the prediction that a great power will retrench less during 
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periods of bipolarity than under either multipolarity or unipolarity.  The empirical record, 
however, demonstrates this not to be the case; disaggregating conflicts into a tripartite division of 
multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity does not produce the expected U-shape, but rather a 
consistently upward trajectory (Figure 6): 
 
 
Figure 6: 
Great Power Loss as % of Total Conflicts Disaggregating Bipolarity and Unipolarity 
Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity
18%
57%
67%
*
*   1816-1944, Polar powers:  Austria -Hungary; France; Germany; Italy; Japan; United Kingdom; Russia; United States
** 1945-1989, Polar Powers:  Soviet Union; United States
*** 1990 – 2007, Polar Power:  United States 
** ***
 
  
 Another alternative explanation for the finding that great powers are more likely to lose 
under bipolar and unipolar structures than under multipolarity is that these conditions make the 
great powers worse at selecting into conflicts in the first place.  Under bipolarity the proposition 
might be that intense global competition leads to intense local overreaction; and under 
unipolarity that the absence of the constraint imposed by a rival leads to capriciousness.  These 
periods, however, have had the United States occupying great power status, and so these notions 
bump up uncomfortably against work finding democracies in fact to be particularly good at 
selecting into only those wars they can win (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 1998; Reiter and Stam, 
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2002).  It is not clear, then, how selection-effects might explain the relationship between great 
power loss and system polarity identified here.   
 
Summary 
The above analysis offers direct evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 which argues that 
the likelihood of state loss should be greater for states that are great powers under bipolarity and 
unipolarity than under multipolarity.  These findings are consistent with the logic connecting the 
theory's propositions about state sensitivity to the power differential to the structure of the 
international environment.  They also fit comfortably with the experimental results described in 
Chapter IV, in which subjects' cost-expectations were found to vary directly with the power 
differential.  That is, if it is the case, as the experiment suggests, that high power differentials 
lead to the formulation of low reference points and, ceteris paribus, low reference points are 
more likely to be violated than high reference points, then we should see what in fact it is that we 
do see: the more preponderant the power, the more frequent and the more likely asymmetric 
conflict loss becomes.  These results thus not only offer a novel explanation for the upward trend 
in great power loss over time, but also increase the plausibility of the theory's central 
commitments.  Whether evidence derived from examination of real conflict events further 
increases the plausibility of the theory's proposed dynamics is the subject of Chapter VI.   
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CHAPTER VI:  ILLUSTRATING THE DYNAMICS 
 
U.S. Interventions in Panama, the Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia  
 
 
*************** 
 
 
 Chapters IV and V were devoted to subjecting the theory's hypotheses to scrutiny; this 
chapter is concerned with illustrating the operation of the theory's proposed dynamics in the real 
world.  Specifically, the theory leads us to expect that states will choose to maintain or to 
escalate their level of commitment to an ongoing conflict only so long as it is physically able and 
ex-ante cost-expectations have not been violated; and, conversely, that states will make the 
choice to decrease the level of commitment by scaling back objectives, circumscribing 
operational activity, reducing troop levels, or even effecting a full and rapid withdrawal when 
actual losses surpass the level of loss expected. Whether we see these behaviors in cases of real 
conflict is the question to be addressed here.  The intention is to provide neither definitive 
histories nor conclusive tests that might serve as a basis for confirmation or rejection of the 
theory's hypotheses, but rather to use the "straw in the wind" approach to focus attention on 
evidence that can increase, or decrease, the plausibility of the theory's key commitments (Collier 
2011).   
 In what follows below I focus on interventions undertaken within the systemic structures 
in which Chapter V suggests the theory's dynamics should be most pronounced:  bipolarity and 
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unipolarity.  Using the process-tracing method,
56
 I examine and describe three cases of 
militarized U.S.  interventions abroad.  The first case to be examined is the George H.W. Bush 
administration's successful action in Panama in late 1989, Operation JUST CAUSE.  The theory 
would explain this outcome as the result of the United States' ability to achieve its full set of 
conflict objectives before  the threshold between expected and realized costs was crossed.  The 
second case is the United States' ongoing engagement in the former Yugoslavia.  Here, there is 
not yet an outcome, and the theory contends that this is so because the United States neither has 
achieved its stated set of objectives, nor has suffered costs in excess of the level anticipated ex 
ante.  The third and final case to be considered is the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1993, 
in Operation RESTORE HOPE.  Although often identified as the "iconic" example of state loss 
being caused by domestic constraints, my theory offers an alternative explanation:  U.S. failure 
was the outcome of a capabilities comparison that led to the establishment of a low reference 
point; this reference point was violated; and so the United States chose to retrench.    
 In examining each of these cases, I attend specifically to three descriptive tasks:  
1. Seeking evidence that the United States undertook evaluation of its own 
capabilities as compared to those of the potential opponent, in the period before 
conflict initiation. 
 
2. Seeking evidence that the United States subsequently established an expectation 
of the likely cost of conflict in U.S. lives, in the period before conflict initiation.   
 
3. Seeking evidence that the sequence of casualties suffered and the  timing and 
direction of decisions to continue a conflict or to retrench from it are/are not 
consistent with those proposed by the theory. 
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 I argue that this process produces evidence consistent with the theory's proposed 
sequences of events, and so increases the plausibility of the theory.   
 
 
THE SUCCESSFUL U.S. INTERVENTION IN PANAMA 
(1989) 
 
 
 At the time of its execution in December 1989 the United States military intervention in 
Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE, was hailed as a swift, low-cost, and complete victory; the 
operation's chief planner, General Carl Stiner, is on record as considering the invasion to have 
gone so well, in fact, that "there were no lessons learned"
57
, and it received robust public support 
(Larson 1996). History, too, seems generally to have judged JUST CAUSE favorably; despite the 
revelation of flaws and errors in planning and in execution
58
 one recent chronicler has marveled 
that "Despite the fog and friction inherent in warfare, the stage for Operation JUST CAUSE had 
been so well set that the production was performed with comparatively few muffed lines" (Yates 
2008, p. 277).  A U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph has described the 
toll in U.S. lives in particular as, at 23, being "remarkably low" given the operation's "complexity 
and scale" (Preysler 1994, p. 21); indeed, U.S. officials entered Panama expecting "at least 50 
dead in the first phase" alone.
59
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 JUST CAUSE was the product of two years of dedicated planning by the U.S.Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM), and involved the deployment of 22,000 soldiers, 3,400 airmen, 900 
marines, and 700 sailors to face an estimated 16,000 members of the Panamanian Defense Forces 
(PDF).   The Bush administration undertook the intervention with only marginal interests at 
stake, and understanding that U.S. lives would be lost -- expecting, in fact, that as many as 50 
might die in the first phase of the invasion alone.  In the event, only hours after the invasion the 
bulk of U.S. objectives had been achieved and with the loss of 9 soldiers; the United States had 
not yet, however, achieved its most significant objective:  the capture of dictator Manuel 
Noriega.  The fact of Noriega's escape presented the Bush administration with a decision about 
how much, how far, and how long to pursue him, while the difficulties encountered transitioning 
from combat to nation-building raised the specter of a prolonged engagement and the possibility 
of additional casualties. The Bush administration chose to persist in both efforts, quickly 
increasing U.S. troop and personnel levels. Noriega was soon located and surrendered into U.S. 
custody; the U.S. servicemembers and officials involved in JUST CAUSE were withdrawn from 
Panama only two months after its initiation, and the loss of U.S. life numbered 23. 
 
Assessing the Power Differential 
 The United States action in Panama was a long time in the making.  Dictator Manuel 
Noriega had been a thorn in the side of the Reagan administration that persisted into Bush's term; 
by 1988 Noriega's involvement in the drug trade was difficult to ignore -- interdiction had by that 
time become an "urgent national issue" (Grant 1991, p.12 ) -- and his undemocratic bent was 
causing concern about the viability of the Panama Canal Treaty.  Thus the United States 
escalated the severity of its policy response.  Beginning with the "routine tactic of sending 
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signals to Noriega indicating U.S. displeasure" (Grant 1991, p. 11), and moving through his 
indictment on drug charges and the imposition of economic sanctions in 1988, by 1989 the Bush 
administration was deploying troops to protect U.S. personnel, approving covert action against 
Noriega, and publicly encouraging his overthrow (Grant 1991; Gilboa 1995-1996; Baker 1995).  
These assertive positions, according to a number of long-term officials, were reflective of the 
new group of policymakers' "more realistic attitude... toward the type of action that the United 
States might need to take, including the possibility of military intervention" (Grant 1991, p. 27).   
 This realism was matched by the military's preparedness; planning for a Panama 
contingency had been underway in earnest at SOUTHCOM since February 1988 (Cole 1995).   
The PDF were believed at the time to number around 14,000 men, at least a quarter of whom 
were well trained, professionally led, and equipped for combat.  They were expected to mount a 
substantial defense of PDF infrastructure: its headquarters in Panama City, bases in other 
strategic locations, and the city's international airport.  Moreover, PDF forces were assessed to be 
capable of sabotage, to which local U.S. military installations would be vulnerable, and of 
maintaining a guerilla campaign from the city's surrounding mountains and jungles (Cole 1995).  
In all, SOUTHCOM planners  had a healthy respect for the strength and quality of resistance 
U.S. forces might face; certainly they did not believe the PDF could best the U.S. military -- one 
Lt. Col. stated unequivocally that "in this one we knew from the start who was going to win" -- 
but they did not assume that the PDF would simply go quietly into the night.
60
 
 After a number of iterations, the supplanting of a commander perceived to have "gone 
native" with one more keen to be aggressive (Woodward 1991, p. 93; Scowcroft 1999), an 
augmented on-the-ground force, and a change in name from the uninspiring Operation BLUE 
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SPOON to the rather more grandiose Operation JUST CAUSE, the Pentagon, led by Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Colin Powell, had what 
they believed to be a workable plan (Yates 2008).   
 
Establishing Ex-ante Cost-expectations 
 In a meeting on December 17, 1989 Cheney and Powell assured President Bush that were 
the United States to proceed with the planned operation, its sophistication, and the size, skill, and 
readiness of already-deployed and to-be-deployed U.S. forces would bring the campaign to a 
rapid and successful conclusion. This confidence about the outcome, however, was not to be 
mistaken for sunny-eyed optimism about the conflict's course; although it was clear to all that 
"this was not going to be anything resembling a fair fight" (Woodward 1991, p. 165) , Powell 
impressed upon Bush that there was uncertainty about the likely intensity and duration of PDF 
resistance (Vertzberger 1998, pp. 200 - 208).  Thus although JUST CAUSE did not commit the 
United States to a prolonged occupation, neither was it a surgical strike.
61
  Bush should therefore 
be prepared for a commitment of weeks, at least, and for there to be U.S., PDF, and civilian 
casualties:   
"We will do everything we can to keep them at a minimum...We are going to hurt 
people..There will be loss of life and there will be chaos...Don't ask us in two days 
when we are coming home Mr. President...The PDF could surrender at the first 
landing and be out there with 'Welcome Yankee' signs, or there could be nasty 
firefights for weeks" (Powell as quoted in Woodward 1991, p. 169).  
 
In his own memoir Powell recalled impressing this expectation on top policymakers: 
"Brent [Scowcroft] hammered away at casualties.  Numbers, he wanted.  
Numbers.  I said I could not be specific. Obviously people were going to get hurt 
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and die, soldiers and civilians, I said.  A lot of real estate was going to be chewed 
up.  We could anticipate chaos, especially in the early stages...The President 
himself pushed me on casualties.  'Mr. President,' I said, 'I can't be more 
specific'" -- (Powell 1995, p.411) 
 
 In his own recounting of this discussion Secretary of State James Baker recalls that 
although Powell did not offer a precise number, he did give Bush a rough order of magnitude:  
"As always, the President was concerned about estimates of American deaths in a combat 
operation.  'There will be a few dozen casualties if we go,' Colin Powell estimated" (Baker 1995, 
p. 189).  This account is consistent with information emanating from the Pentagon, which was 
reported at the time to expect 50 killed during the operation's first phase.
62
   
 
Casualties and Decision Points  
 Although the administration made no attempt to hide its distaste for Noriega, neither did 
it have an obvious causus belli.
63
  U.S. interests in Panama were largely confined to the Canal 
and associated treaty process, and to protecting the U.S. servicemembers and civilians living in-
country -- interests, to be sure, but by no stretch "vital" national security interests. The United 
States similarly could claim an interest in Panamanian democracy, though its absence seemed 
more of a nuisance than a threat.  In the event, the Bush administration did not have to rely upon 
national interests as justification for military action:  in late 1989 the PDF assaulted a member of 
the U.S. Navy and harassed his wife, and in a separate incident shot and killed a U.S. Marine.   
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 Seizing the moment, Bush launched Operation JUST CAUSE in the early morning hours 
of December 20.  He announced the invasion to the American public at 7:00 a.m. EST, outlining 
a circumscribed set of military objectives -- the protection of U.S.lives and property, the capture 
of Panamanian President Manuel Noriega, and the neutralization of the PDF -- as part of the 
larger strategic political objectives of restoring representative government in Panama and 
restructuring Panama's defense apparatus to be consistent with democratic civil-military 
principles.
64
  The inclusion of the rather lofty and agreeable goals of restoring democracy in 
Panama notwithstanding, it was Noriega himself who was the target of the invasion, both for the 
administration he'd antagonized and for the U.S. public for whom he'd long been represented as a 
villain; in Scowcroft's words, "the goal of the thing was primarily to seize Noriega"
65
.  Thus the 
true barometer of success  was his capture or death.   
 Although "the operation unfolded smoothly...and the amount of resistance was less than 
anticipated" (Baker 1995, p. 191), at the time of the President's speech, nine U.S. 
servicemembers had been killed and Noreiga was still at large.  The administration chose to 
continue to pursue Noriega to capture. He surrendered himself into U.S. custody 15 days after 
the invasion, 10 of which were spent seeking refuge at the Vatican Embassy.  All told, the United 
States completed major military operations in five days, after which Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney remarked that "U.S. officials had expected the death toll to be higher"
66
, and achieved 
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the capture of Noriega in 15; by that time U.S. killed numbered a total of 23 -- only two of which 
occurred in the interim between day one of the invasion and Noriega's surrender (Larson 1996).   
 
Summary 
 The above sequence of events is consistent with that proposed by the theory.  The Bush 
administration had evaluated the strength of its Panamanian opponent, with the Pentagon 
assessing the PDF to be a credible force with the potential not to defeat the United States, but 
certainly to put up a real fight. A casualty estimate of "a few dozen" to be killed in the initial 
invasion alone was established, and when actual events proved otherwise the United States 
continued over the course of two months to seek to achieve its stated objectives of the capture of 
Noriega and the restoration of democracy.  Whether the latter was truly fulfilled has been 
disputed,  but not at the expense of the operation's being generally lauded as a complete success, 
not least because the loss of U.S. life, at 23, was at the time and has since continued to be 
considered unexpectedly low given the complexity and scale of the operation.  
 
 
THE ONGOING U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
(1995-Present)
67
 
 
 In December of 1990, Croatia and Slovenia announced plans to secede from Yugoslavia. 
Serb nationalists were not keen for the dissolution of the state, and expressed this preference with 
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incidents of violence that increased in frequency and intensity over the summer months. By the 
fall of that year the violence had escalated from isolated skirmishes to city sieges, and the West 
was starting to pay attention to the brutality of the growing conflict. By 1992, the scale of the 
political and humanitarian crisis had become fully appreciated in Washington, and debate about a 
military intervention began in earnest.  
 By the time Bill Clinton assumed office in January 1993 the situation had deteriorated 
badly, and credible journalists and observers were reporting Serb actions that were comparable in 
criminality and inhumanity to those  perpetrated by the Nazis. Calls for Western action 
intensified, and there was reason to think that the United States might comply: candidate Clinton 
had taken a tough line on Bosnia policy during the campaign, suggesting such measures as 
arming Bosnia's Muslim-led government and conducting airstrikes on Serb artillery; and,  in his 
first comment on the subject as Secretary of State, Warren Christopher announced earnestly that 
what was happening in Bosnia was a "dark period of terror" and that "our conscience revolts at 
the idea of passively accepting such brutality" (Halberstam 2001, p. 200).  Christopher had gone 
on to describe the U.S. interests in the former Yugoslavia as, "strategic", asserting that what was 
happening in Bosnia challenged "the principle that internationally recognized borders should not 
be altered by force", might produce a "river" of refugees into Western Europe, and had the 
potential to "become a greater Balkan war, like those that preceded World War 1".  As such, he 
concluded, 
 
 "This is an important moment for our nation's post-Cold War role in Europe and 
the world.  In the face of great suffering and the imperative of our own interest, 
we cannot afford to miss any further opportunities to help pursue a resolution of 
this conflict."
68
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 Despite the forward-leaning nature of this rhetoric, the administration struggled as it 
sought a course that balanced the competing pressures of a fragile NATO alliance; the need to 
"distinguish its policy toward the crisis in the former Yugoslavia from that of the Bush 
administration"
69
; a public it viewed as wanting the United States to "do more...in a prudent 
way"
70
; and its own reluctance to use force (Halberstam 2001, p. 199; Drew 1994, p. 145).  
Clinton ultimately settled on a policy option that addressed the first three tensions while kicking 
the can down the road on the fourth; in early February he signed on to the Vance-Owen plan.  
Under Vance-Owen, the United States would send a special envoy to join negotiations for peace; 
would apply pressure on Bosnian Serbs and Muslims to arrive at an agreement; and, in the event 
an agreement was reached, would offer as many as 25,000 American troops as part of a 
multinational military operation to enforce terms.  Importantly, this commitment was made 
before events in Somalia made clear the potential for disaster such missions carried attendant.       
 Vance-Owen, however, was moot, as the United States and its European allies continued 
to be unable to arrive at a mutually satisfactory means of applying pressure on the Bosnian Serbs 
and Muslims that was adequate to force them to the negotiating table; the Europeans were 
unwilling to bomb the Serbs to incentivize a settlement, and the United States was unwilling to 
send ground troops until a settlement was in place.  
 This impasse held, for the next two and a half years, until the siege of Sarajevo and the 
terrible events in Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 changed the dynamic.  New French president 
Jacques Chirac started to take a much more aggressive line on Bosnia and was pushing the 
United States to do the same (Halberstam 2001, pp. 303-304).  Concurrent with this renewed 
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international pressure, the Clinton White House was looking toward an election year, and there 
was the growing sense that continuing to stand by on the former Yugoslavia was an untenable 
position (Halberstam 2001, p. 311).  American casualties, however, remained an even more 
untenable position; the administration still considered the use of ground troops a "nonstarter" 
because "the fear of body bags was always there" (Drew 1994, p. 275; Halberstam 2001, pp. 
258-259).  
 Nonetheless, in August the Europeans and the Americans were able to arrive at a joint 
strategy, deciding to use airpower; the first major NATO bombing campaign against the Serbs 
took place at the end of the month.  Scholar Mark Peceny has characterized Clinton's decision to 
commit to carpet bombing Serb forces as being driven almost singularly by the need to avoid the 
other available options, all of which put at risk U.S. troops.
71
 According to Peceny, "Clinton used 
the air strikes not to defeat the Bosnian Serbs, but to pressure them to negotiate a peace 
settlement".  Clinton did this knowing that any peace settlement would involve the deployment 
of U.S. troops to serve in a peacekeeping capacity; still, he had "decided that the risks posed to 
U.S. troops as part of a peacekeeping force would be less than the risks posed by [other available 
policy options]" (Peceny 1998).
72
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 The NATO bombing campaign had the intended effect; battlefield, and so political, 
conditions deteriorated for Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, and military vulnerability in concert 
with considerable international pressure were together sufficient to draw him to the negotiating 
table (Daalder 2000, p. 135). The result, in November 1995, was the Dayton Agreement, which 
established the semi-independent Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serb Republic.  
The Dayton Agreement made good on the terms first outlined in Vance-Owen, calling for the 
United States to send 25,000 troops to Bosnia as part of NATO Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.   
The United States thus would not be inserting its forces into an ongoing civil war, but this did 
not mean it would not have to contend with "vengeful soldiers, and Islamic militants"
73
 -- 
capable, and dangerous, resistance forces.   
 
Assessing the Power Differential 
 The U.S. military's high-ranking officials had long been wary of any involvement in the 
former Yugoslavia, though their concern was not borne of a fear of military failure.
74
  To the 
contrary, even in the absence of a preceding peace agreement, senior officials were "confident of 
the initial success of any American military moves" and comfortable that even "a direct 
confrontation with the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army would be no problem" 
(Halberstam 2001, pp. 34-35).  The worry thus was not that those agitating for intervention, most 
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notably in the State Department
75
, were overestimating the likelihood of U.S. success, but rather 
that they were underestimating how much achieving it would cost.  
 Specifically, there was the sense in the Pentagon that the toughness and resilience of Serb 
fighters -- long storied successfully to have resisted Germany's attempted incursions into the 
Yugoslav mountains during WWII, and now fighting a "blood war of survival" (Halberstam 
2001, p. 36) -- was being discounted.
76
  These factors seemed to have been recognized by 
military planners and analysts at the time; news reports quoted Pentagon sources as describing 
Serb fighters as "grimly determined militiamen able to disappear into the countryside"
77
, and as 
understanding clearly that the terrain facing ground troops would be highly unfavorable -- the 
area was described by one Pentagon analyst as being "ribbed by successive lines of mountains 
that look like crumpled foil...a 'no go' for armor"
78
.  Adding to these sources of pessimism was a 
1993 CIA  assessment (NIE 93-23/II) that U.S. involvement might in fact embolden the Bosnian 
Serbs, rather than weaken their resolve (Daalder 2000, p. 83).  These factors were reflected in the 
Pentagon's troop estimates for a full-fledged invasion -- these, invariably, never fell below 
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200,000 (Halberstam 2001, p. 36).
79
  Indeed, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
Colin Powell is on record placing the number at 500,000.
80
 
 For Powell in particular, interventionists were overlooking these realities and so were 
neglecting to address the "what ifs" which, importantly, included "What if there were American 
casualties" produced by Serbs that, rather than simply "folding their hand" after suffering losses 
in battle "broke their forces down into smaller guerrilla-like units, and used the harsh terrain to 
their advantage and continued to attack" (Halberstam 2001, p. 35).  Keeping these "what ifs" 
readily at hand, Powell thus remained "immune to most of the pleas for aggressive U.S. action... 
To him the interventionists were talking a policy based on hope rather than reality, a hope that 
things could be affected with a minimum, casualty-free application of military power" (p. 141).   
Overall, then, there was within the military and intelligence apparatus the pervasive sense that 
U.S. and allied troops on the ground would face an historically tenacious, dangerous, and skilled 
resistance that was advantaged by terrain that effectively neutralized the United States' favored 
heavy armor.  Thus although the Serb opposition would not be capable of defeating the U.S. and 
allied forces, it certainly would be capable of inflicting casualties. 
   
Establishing Ex-ante Cost-expectations 
 The administration acknowledged publicly that a U.S. deployment to the former 
Yugoslavia would entail risk, and likely cost U.S. lives. In a December 1995 briefing to the 
House International Relations Committee, Powell's replacement as CJCS, General John 
Shalikashvili, made clear that "the mission will be tough and there's no doubt about it, and we 
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have to be prepared for casualties"
81
.  Clinton made a similar pronouncement while maintaining 
his conviction that "the size of the NATO-led force, the high quality of American and NATO 
troops and equipment, and the rules of engagement" created "conditions that would offer the 
minimum possible risks" to U.S. soldiers.
82
  Moreover, U.S. troops would leave Bosnia after 12 
months,
83
 a duration judged adequate to allow the objectives of the mission to be achieved:  
implementing the basic military aspects of the peace agreement; and allowing "an internal 
balance of power among the remaining military forces" to obtain (Daalder 2000, p. 150-151).
84
  
In fact, the military believed the tasks involved in guaranteeing the implementation of the peace 
agreement could be completed in six months, but "offered to do so in twelve just to be on the 
safe side" (Daalder 2000, p. 150).  Deployment began in early December of 1995, with over 
24,000 U.S. soldiers in place by Valentine's Day (Phillips 2005).    
 While the administration did make clear that the deployment put U.S. soldiers at risk, 
they provided nothing resembling an estimate of just how many U.S. lives might be lost.  In a 
nine-page letter to Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich about the Dayton 
Agreement, Clinton stated that "it is not possible to make meaningful casualty predictions", and 
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in a briefing later that month when asked "What's a minimal amount of casualties that you 
estimate that we can get away with", White House spokesman Mike McCurry responded by 
saying  
"...that is not something you define in numbers. You define in what the nature of 
the mission is and what the perceived risk is, and how you minimize that risk and 
ensure that commanders have the right type of rules of engagement to respond to 
any perceived threat...in any event, the planning that goes into that type of work is 
something that is done within the province of the military."
85
  
 
 McCurry seems to have been correct at least on the latter count as, in hearings two weeks 
later, CJCS Shalikashvili told the House Committee on International Relations and the House 
Committee on National Security that  "casualties would be no greater than those suffered by 
U.N. peacekeepers in the former Yugoslav republic in the past 3 1/2 years"; at the time, total 
combat deaths numbered 80.
86
  In a hearing shortly thereafter with the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Shalikashvili revised this estimate downward, stating that based on "past 
peacekeeping operations" he would anticipate that "there could be about 50 deaths in a year".
87
  
Applied to the 12-month commitment to the former Yugoslavia, Shalikashvili's estimate 
indicates the administration expected the loss of up to 50 U.S. servicemembers during the one-
year course of JOINT ENDEAVOR.   
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Casualties and Decision Points 
 Shalikashvili's ex-ante casualty estimate was not realized; between 20 December 1995 
and 20 December 1996,  the total toll in U.S. lives was 8, and none of these servicemembers died 
as a result of hostile action.
88
  Gideon Rose (1998) has pointed out that the 30,000 American 
troops were "actually...safer in Bosnia than they would have been conducting routine training 
exercises" a fact, he says, of which the administration took advantage to "bolster the case for a 
longer deployment" (pp. 65-66).  The U.S. presence in the former Yugoslavia was extended first 
for 18 months, and then indefinitely, though it did, in 1997, reduce the size of its forces.
89
  This 
half-measure was explained as being the product, simultaneously, of initial operational success 
and of the need to continue to pursue the mission's full set of objectives
90
:     
 
"Our initial security goals in Bosnia have been achieved.  We have ended the 
fighting, separated the forces, and improved confidence...Reconstruction is 
underway and economic growth has resumed.  But 18 months after Dayton it is 
not enough to say that the war is over.  Too much remains undone... Our goal is 
to ensure that when our forces depart Bosnia, they can do so without the fear that 
renewed violence threatening our interests might one day require them to return" 
-- Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
91
 
 
6,700 U.S. troops remained to conduct operations in Bosnia and its environs into 1999, when  
another region of the former Yugoslavia moved from being a potential to an actual flashpoint.   
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 In 1997 the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a previously under-organized group with 
secessionist ambitions, formed into a meaningful social and military force and began to effect 
guerrilla-style strikes on Serb units. The Serbs fought back, and by the end of the year the 
conflict was going on in the open, and in earnest.  In the spring of 1998 Washington started to 
pay attention, most especially Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who moved relatively 
quickly to considering the use of force in support of the Kosovars (Halberstam 2001, p. 378).  
The bulk of the administration, however, did not go with her, and so a veritable replay of the 
early debate about Bosnia began anew.   
 The administration's equivocation did, at least, this time progress more rapidly, as 
General Wesley Clark, at the time the Supreme Commander in Europe (SACEUR), took a more 
hawkish position than had the military's top brass earlier in the decade.  Just as in Bosnia, it was 
clear that the United States would not insert ground troops into an ongoing conflict.  But, at 
Clark's urging, in late 1998 Washington and its NATO allies were able to agree to communicate 
to Milosevic that, unless he curtailed Serb violence in Kosovo, the consequences would be air 
strikes. Despite stark warnings Milosevic played coy into early 1999, and Serb violence 
continued.   
   On March 24, 1999, NATO moved forward with the threatened bombing of Serb forces 
in Kosovo, a campaign that lasted until Milosevic's signing of a peace proposal on 4 June.  The 
agreement provided  for the withdrawal of all Serb forces from Kosovo, and the introduction of a 
peacekeeping force under the authority of NATO.  The United States contributed 7,000 troops to 
Operation JOINT GUARDIAN  and  the Clinton administration made clear both that the Kosovo 
operation was a continuation of  U.S. efforts in Bosnia and that the U.S. servicemembers 
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deployed there would once again be at risk
92
.  The Army's Chief of Staff, General Eric K. 
Shinseki pronounced that "the risk of casualties in Kosovo is high"
93
, while in his own address to 
the country about the United States' ongoing engagement in the former Yugoslavia Clinton 
emphasized that "this next phase also will be dangerous.  Bitter memories will still be fresh and 
there may well be casualties."
94
 These statements seem to indicate that the cost estimate arrived 
at prior to the initiation of U.S. involvement in the former Yugoslavia was unlikely to have been 
revised downward.  Indeed, well-regarded scholar of military strategy and doctrine Barry Posen 
(2000) suggests that, if anything, the Serb army had in fact improved its capabilities during the 
preceding four years:   
 
The Serb army...has depth and can take a beating and still retain combat power.  
The combat forces in the field expect to operate in a dispersed fashion against 
greatly superior forces, and thus must be adept at all the time-honored tactics 
necessary to facilitate lengthy resistance against a superior foe -- camouflage, 
cover, concealment, deception, and mobility.  The military infrastructure of the 
Serb armed forces -- its bases, fuel dumps, depots, and the like -- is hardened, 
camouflaged, and dispersed.  The Serb military is supported by a national 
scientific, engineering, and industrial base.  Although it is by no means capable of 
autonomously producing the full range of modern weaponry, it produces many 
basic items such as army weaponry and ammunition, and can adapt and repair 
more sophisticated items of equipment...In Bosnia, Serb soldiers had both shot 
down NATO aircraft and evaded their attacks.  In the Bosnia endgame, many 
experienced sustained NATO air attacks and, at least around Sarajevo, did not 
crack. The British government has revealed that the Serbs benefited from 
extensive conversations with the Iraqi military about...military issues during the 
six months prior to the war." (Posen pp. 55-56) 
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 Despite these rather dire assessments, during the subsequent 13 years the United States 
has not lost a single servicemember to hostile action as it has maintained its presence in the 
former Yugoslavia to "achieve long-standing U.S. goals" and in the interest of "finishing the 
job".
95
  During his term, George W. Bush explained the ongoing commitment as necessary to 
achieve the intervention's objectives, with now-Secretary of State Colin Powell noting the United 
States' commitment to peace in the Balkans, and making clear that short of achieving this goal 
the United States might reduce troop levels if conditioned stabilized, but that it would not "cut 
and run"
96
.   Troop levels subsequently declined concurrent with the U.S. actions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, but without the United States indicating its mission in the former Yugoslavia had been 
completed.  To the contrary, violent incidents in northern Kosovo in 2011 have been cited as 
justification for a continued U.S. combat presence in pursuit of the objective established in 1995 
of establishing a stable and self-sustaining peace.
97
   
 
Summary 
 The characteristics of the U.S. intervention in the former Yugoslavia are consistent with 
the dynamics posted by the theory.  U.S. decision-makers undertook evaluation of the strength of 
the Serb opponent, and established ex-ante cost-expectations.  When these expectations were not 
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violated, the timeline for intervention was extended.  Still, the absence of specificity of the 
theory's key explanatory variable at the second decision point of the intervention -- ex-ante 
expectations of the costs of engaging in peacekeeping in Kosovo -- weakens the theory's position 
somewhat.  Although Clinton, Shinseki, and other officials warned publicly that the use of 
ground troops in Kosovo would be difficult, dangerous, and potentially costly, others argued that 
the Kosovo operation might present less risk than that in Bosnia, under the premise that Serb 
fighters might leave the region for fear of retribution.
98
 These conflicting views and the absence 
of a definitive statement by any member of the administration leaves ambiguous the extent to 
which decision-makers' expectations were maintained from 1995 or modified in light of more 
recent events.   
 It must also be noted that the dimensions of the case are not inconsistent with the 
expected utility proposition, which would explain the ongoing presence of U.S. troops in the 
former Yugoslavia as an indication that the costs of the intervention have not yet come to equal 
or to exceed the anticipated value of the benefits of achieving the operation's full set of 
objectives.  While the process-tracing undertaken here cannot arbitrate fully between these 
explanations, my theory does at least offer the important advantage of being predictive.  That is, 
my theory identifies 50 casualties over the twelve month period judged necessary to achieve the 
intervention's objectives as being the reference point established prior to the United States' 
intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1995.  In the absence of information that indicates this 
expectation has changed, the theory predicts that the United States should be willing to maintain 
a troop presence, operating with the mission of achieving its conflict objectives, until that 
threshold is reached.  Thus the theory will be falsified if:  the death of less than 50 U.S. troops 
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precipitates retrenchment; or, the death of more than 50 U.S. troops does not precipitate 
retrenchment.  By comparison, it is not obvious how the expected utility paradigm might offer a 
similar view on the future -- what cost would equal the benefits of fulfilling the intervention's 
objectives?  
 
 
THE FAILED U.S. INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 
(1992-1993) 
 
 
 The events of the early 1990s in Somalia loom large in the recent history of U.S. military 
engagements abroad.  Despite its considerable success in providing much-needed sustenance to 
hundreds of thousands of Somalis, Operation RESTORE HOPE is widely considered to have been 
a military failure for the United States.  Indeed, it is most remembered for the manner in which 
18 soldiers lost their lives in the Black Hawk incident of October 1993; the U.S. withdrawal that 
followed; and Somalia’s subsequent and ongoing stagnation as a failing, if not failed, state.   
 At the time of the intervention and in its immediate aftermath much was made of the 
failure's implications for humanitarian assistance, for multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping 
operations, for nation-building, and for the United States’ role in the “new world order” (Clarke 
and Herbst 1996).
99
  So too did Somalia quickly become what has since been described as an 
“iconic example of ‘casualty phobia’” (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009, p. 37), the assertion that 
the American public is highly intolerant of combat casualties and that this intolerance constrains 
decision-making both before and during conflict.  From this perspective, the United States’ 
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inability to achieve its objectives in Somalia was caused not by the depletion of its ability to 
continue the mission, but instead by leaders’ responsiveness to a public that was at the time 
unfavorably disposed to doing so.   
 My theory offers an alternative explanation: the Bush administration entered Somalia 
understanding it would face a weak, poorly organized, ill-trained, and underequipped opposition 
force.  It therefore believed that U.S. goals there could be achieved on the cheap: at a cost of less 
than 20 American lives. These expectations were not scrutinized by the incoming Clinton 
administration, and so were not updated despite changing conditions on the ground, including the 
loss of U.S. soldiers to hostile action.  Thus when the new administration faced the very public 
and very gruesome deaths of 18 soldiers in a single event in October 1993, a toll not only severe 
in itself but one that also pushed total U.S. combat casualties to 29, it chose to retrench.     
 
 
*************** 
 
 
 Mired in civil strife since the late 1980s, it was the 1991 overthrow of dictator Siad Barre 
that ushered Somalia into a period of pronounced chaos; clan warfare exacerbated ongoing 
famine, with disastrous consequences for the Somali population. The United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) responded by authorizing United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), 
tasked with the combined missions of providing humanitarian aid, peacemaking, peacekeeping, 
and state-building.   
By the middle of 1992 it was clear that UNOSOM I was having limited success at best, 
and the humanitarian crisis continued unabated.  Members of the Bush administration were not 
only increasingly galvanized by the scale of human suffering in Somalia, but also were receiving 
with increasing frequency and intensity calls from the international community for  a more 
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robust U.S. role in mitigating the disaster.  Indeed, the Bush administration was facing mounting 
criticism for its inaction not only in Somalia but also in Bosnia; no less an international figure 
than General Secretary of the United Nations (UN) Boutros Boutros-Ghali had informed 
President Bush in May 1992 that Muslims were "aroused by...the failure to protect their 
coreligionists" in both countries, and asked President Bush if he couldn't at least "do something 
about Somalia" (Oberdorfer 1992; Hirsch and Oakley 1995).    
The Bush administration, too, was sensitive to the simultaneity of the humanitarian crises 
in Somalia and in Bosnia. Though the administration was, initially, reticent to turn to a military 
solution for the former, it was even more so for the latter.  In the Balkans, the complexity of the 
civil war and the "toughness" of Serb aggressors were fully appreciated by high-level decision-
makers, and military estimates of the costs of combat consistently high -- figures outlining the 
necessary troop commitment never fell below 200,000 (Halberstam 2001, p. 36).  By 
comparison, a Somalia operation seemed manageable, able to be executed rapidly, at low cost, 
and with a very high probability of success. Thus by the end of 1992 the military option was put 
fully on the table.  
 
Assessing the Power Differential 
  In a November Deputy-level meeting, then-Vice Chairman of the JCS Admiral David 
Jeremiah stated unequivocally that were they to be activated, U.S.military forces would be able 
to take control of the environment in Somalia such that much-needed aid could be distributed 
safely and efficiently (Cusimano 1995, p. 9).  This assertion reflected the Pentagon’s conclusion 
that local terrain was conducive to U.S. operations and assets, and its concurrence with CIA 
assessments of clan forces as being underequipped, “poorly organized and trained, [with] 
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inconsistent morale and motivation” (Cusimano 1995 p. 8).  Indeed, in a press briefing on 4 
December 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that U.S. forces would not be going in 
expecting to "be engaged in heavy combat against well-armed, hostile forces...they are not that 
well organized.  You do not have a coordinated military force...There should be no doubt about 
who would prevail in the event there are hostilities."
100
 The military’s confidence was such that 
one official is quoted as saying that an intervention “would not be terribly hard…” (Menkhaus 
and Ortmayer 1995, pp. 7-8).
101
   
Administration statements also made clear that they did not believe the Somali resistance 
was particularly resolved.  One official dismissed the gunmen in Somalia as being prepared to 
"steal blankets at feeding centers" but not to oppose "an organized force of well-armed troops", 
and General Powell described the environment not as a civil war but rather "just general 
lawlessness...there are some armed groups belonging to different faction leaders, but there is also 
a large number of, frankly, youngsters who are armed with weapons, so there is a degree of 
lawlessness, and I think that degree of lawlessness can be dealt with by sizable forces...being 
there and looking like they can handle anything that comes their way."
 102
  The expectation, in 
other words, was that the simple fact of the United States' obvious military superiority would 
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cause the Somali opposition to fold, allowing for the resumption of aid and, ultimately, a full 
handoff of responsibility from U.S. forces to the United Nations.
103
   
 
Establishing Ex-ante Cost Expectations 
The plan that emerged was, in the words of Powell, to be “like the cavalry coming to the 
rescue, straightening things out for a while and then letting the marshals come back in to keep 
things under control,” (Cusimano 1995, p. 11).  In December an initial marine landing was to 
secure Mogadishu’s port and airfield in advance of the arrival of 31,000 troops, which would 
then be dispatched quickly to secure supply routes and major aid centers.  Once these areas were 
well in hand, the operation would be transferred to a multinational force under UN command, 
with only a small contingent of U.S. forces remaining at its disposal.    
White House officials claimed that this could be achieved over the course of weeks, 
suggesting that the operation might be over by the time Bush was to leave office in January.
104
 
The President himself “told House and Senate leaders that the Pentagon anticipates little serious 
resistance, that commanders have broad leeway to defend themselves if threatened, and that the 
costs of the operation will be offset, at least in part, by foreign donations”.105 The Pentagon’s 
estimates were more cautious – logistics alone would extend that timeline to somewhere between 
three and six months – and Powell acknowledged that the removal of troops would be contingent 
upon the extent to which conditions in Somalia were under the control of the incoming UN 
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forces.
106
 In an interview with scholar Matthew A. Baum, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) General 
Joseph Hoar, the Commander of U.S. Central Command before and during the Somalia 
operation, stated that in a briefing he gave to President Bush on the military's concept of 
operations for RESTORE HOPE,  he "estimated the likely number of U.S. fatalities at about 20" 
(Baum 2004, p. 199).   
Some more serious notes of caution were raised; most notably, Ambassador to Kenya, 
Smith Hempstone, was widely credited with the wry one-liner, "if you liked Beirut, you'll love 
Mogadishu", and warned gravely that "Somalis...are natural-born guerrillas...they will not be 
able to stop the convoys from getting through.  But they will inflict -- and take -- casualties".
107
 
Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger responded by noting that the administration had 
"considered" these views, but "decided that [Hempstone] probably exaggerated things 
substantially and we were going to go ahead".
108
 For Eagleburger, Somalia was "a tragedy of 
massive proportions, and, underline this, one that we could do something about"
109
, a notion 
seconded by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who considered the intervention "very 
limited, doable" (Baum 2004, p. 198-199).  Indeed, these sentiments  were widespread 
throughout the administration, which generally believed that American troops would have little 
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difficulty protecting themselves, and that the intervention would be limited, controlled, and 
contained (Halberstam 2001, pp 251-252).   
 
Casualties and Decision Points 
 On 4 December, 1992, President Bush announced U.S.command over a multinational 
United Task Force (UNITAF) that would be used to create the conditions necessary for 
humanitarian aid to reach its intended recipients.  37,000 US troops were to be deployed, with 
the expectation that other nations would contribute some number of their own forces in support 
of the mission.   
In the interim between the RESTORE HOPE landing in December 1992 and the 
presidential transition during the early months of 1993, events in Somalia received little high-
level attention.  The incoming Clinton team, which had been supportive and apprised of the 
decision to intervene, accepted the outgoing administration's optimistic assessments of the course 
of the engagement, and so it turned  its attention to other matters (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, pp. 
151-152).
110
  During this time UNITAF did achieve initial success, and that May the transition to 
the follow-on UN command, UNOSOM II, began.  14,000 international troops remained in 
Somalia, 4,000 of which were American.   
As the summer progressed, however, conditions in-country degraded as UNOSOM II’s 
efforts to empower a transitional government met with resistance from clan warlords.  Violence 
escalated and, in June, 24 Pakistani UN troops on patrol in Mogadishu were killed at the behest 
of one of them, Mohammed Farrah Aidid.  In response, President Clinton, with input from CJCS 
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Powell, authorized the use of U.S. forces to pursue Aidid.  This policy shift was preceded by "no 
detailed discussions of how [it] would change U.S. military operations on the ground (Dobbins et 
al. 2008, p. 47), and there is no evidence that it occasioned an update in the number of U.S. 
casualties expected;  it did, however, produce an uptick in the casualties actually incurred.    
In August, ten U.S. soldiers were killed and in September there were three more U.S. 
deaths; together, this amounted to a tripling of total U.S. casualties in the span of only two 
months.  The total of 13, however, remained below the ex-ante expectation of 20, and the Clinton 
administration remained resolute in its intention to continue the U.S. action in Somalia -- it did 
not want to remove U.S. forces. To the contrary, the Clinton team tried actively to keep Congress 
from ordering a withdrawal (Drew 1994, p. 281), with administration officials arguing a need to 
continue to pursue the objectives established by Bush, and asserting that "U.S. troops must 
remain in Somalia until Aideed and his forces are subdued or else the country would return to the 
state of anarchy and widespread hunger and misery" that had occasioned the intervention in the 
first place.
111
  This position did not change through August and September; it did in October. 
The White House during this period has been described as having not "adequately 
understood that the Somalia operation had been for several months...a high-risk military 
endeavor" (Woods 1997, p. 165); indeed, upon assuming office the new group "held no formal 
policy review...[and] top level decision-making remained informal" (Dobbins et. Al, 2008, pp. 
46-47), and as late as June 1993 was describing the Somalia policy to Congress as "one that 
could be carried out without serious repercussions" (Johnston and Dagne 1997, p. 199).  But on 
October 3, 1993,  the hunt for Aidid resulted in the now-infamous downing of a Black Hawk 
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helicopter and the very public loss of 18 U.S. soldiers, bringing total U.S. combat deaths to 29.  
Upon being notified of the Blackhawk incident President Clinton expressed surprise and anger.  
As described by veteran Washington observer Elizabeth Drew, "Clinton was very upset.  'How 
could this happen?' he demanded of his advisers...he complained that [his] administration hadn't 
been given a 'realistic assessment'...of 'what we were up against'.  He said, 'No one told me about 
the downside'" (Drew 1994, p. 317).   
After a short period of deliberation Clinton announced that the United States would first 
commit an additional 1,300 troops to Somalia before withdrawing the entire force by three 
months later.
112
  One set of chroniclers has characterized the principal mission of U.S. and U.N. 
troops during those months as “ensuring their own security…The deployment of additional 
forces for six months was, therefore, little more than a face-saving gesture intended to cover a 
U.S. exit strategy” (Menkhaus and Ortmayer 1995, p. 21).  General Hoar, a participant in a 
number of the strategy meetings that occurred in the aftermath of the downed Black Hawk, 
recalled that the tenor of the meetings that produced this policy was that "...they got burned [and] 
the trick was to ... put out the fire, finish it and get out of town as quickly as possible" (Baum, p. 
219).  Redeployment to the United States began in earnest in December, with all troops removed 
before the stated March 31 deadline (Dobbins et al. 2008, p. 47).   
 
Alternative Explanations 
 My theory argues that Clinton decided to retrench from Somalia because the expected 
costs of intervention had been exceeded -- instead of the maximum of 20 casualties anticipated, 
                                                     
112
 “Remarks by President Clinton on the Situation in Somalia,” October 7 1993.   
 [113] 
 
the events of early October brought the total cost in U.S. lives to 29.  Two alternative 
explanations, however, merit consideration here.   
 The first is the argument that Clinton's decision to retrench was caused by the rapid and 
severe decline in public support that followed the Black Hawk incident.  Available evidence, 
however, does not support this claim.  To the contrary, the timing of the drop in public support 
for the Somalia intervention does not fit:  “Data…show that public support for the presence of 
U.S. troops in Somalia dropped from 74 percent in December 1992, at the start of the 
humanitarian relief operation, to 43 percent in mid-September, before the Black Hawk was 
downed in October” (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009, p. 38).  Indeed, James Burk finds that "on 
balance it is difficult to find strong support for the casualties hypothesis in the data for Somalia.  
That is striking, as this case is often supposed to provide clear-cut evidence in favor of the 
hypotheses...[but] it is difficult to conclude that changing public opinion had the predicted effect 
on political decisions to suspend the peacekeeping mission" (Burk 1998, pp. 68-69).   
 The second alternative explanation is that derived from the expected utility paradigm:  
that the loss of the 18 Rangers in October tipped the cost-benefit ratio in the wrong direction.  
Clinton alludes to this calculation in his own recollection of this period:     
 
“If getting [Aidid] was worth eighteen dead and eighty-four wounded Americans, 
wasn’t it worth finishing the job?  The problem with that line of reasoning was 
that if we went back in and nabbed Aidid, dead or alive, then we, not the UN 
would own Somalia and there was no guarantee that we could put it together 
politically any better than the UN had…Moreover, there was no support in 
Congress for a larger military role in Somalia…I didn’t mind taking Congress on, 
but I had to consider the consequences of any action that could make it even 
harder to get congressional support for sending American troops to Bosnia and 
Haiti, where we had far greater interests at stake…the value of the prize was not 
worth the risk of significant casualties and the certain consequences of changing 
the nature of our mission in the eyes of both Somalis and Americans…I didn’t 
believe the emotional, political, or strategic benefits of catching or killing Aidid 
justified further loss of life on either side, or a greater shifting of responsibility 
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for Somalia’s future from the UN to the United States” (Clinton 2004, pp. 550 - 
554). 
 
  
 Clinton's narrative seems to emphasize the factors incorporated into the expected utility 
paradigm -- costs; probability of success; and the value of succeeding.  Yet it is notable that  
Clinton here defines the value of winning -- the “prize” -- much more narrowly than he and 
others in his administration did at the time.  Not two months before the Blackhawk incident U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright described the stakes in Somalia as follows:   
 
"Success is important not only for the Somalis...but also because anarchy may 
produce refugees, uncontrolled arms peddling and targets of opportunity for 
terrorists and their state sponsors...The decision we must make is whether to pull 
of stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or to stay the course and 
help lift the country and its people from the category of a failed state into that of 
an emerging democracy.  For Somalia's sake, and our own, we must 
persevere".
113
  
 
Even beyond these practical justifications, the administration had taken pains to cast the 
potential gains of persistence in terms of the United States’ credibility and its designs for a "new 
age" – pursuing the mission, it was argued, would solidify the United States’ reputation for being 
willing to use force in response to humanitarian crises; affirm its commitment to multilateralism; 
promote democracy; and underscore American global leadership (Menkhaus and Ortmayer 1995, 
pp. 19-20).  Indeed, President Clinton himself described Somalia as providing an "important 
chapter in the international annals of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance".
114
 These rather 
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expansive descriptions of the value of the Somalia mission seem unlikely to be overmatched by 
the loss of 29 U.S. lives.   
Finally, it is worth noting that both the decision to withdraw from Somalia and Clinton's 
expressed reasons for doing so run counter to prospect theory's propositions about decision-
maker behavior in the domain of losses.  Specifically, Clinton's recounting of the decision-
making process evidences no inclination to  “gamble for resurrection” – although already 
operating in the domain of losses, he evidenced a cognizance of the likelihood of continued 
action generating not recovery from initial setbacks, but rather the imposition of additional 
losses.   
 
Summary 
The historical record makes clear that upon assuming office the Clinton Administration 
undertook no formal assessment of the Somalia intervention, and did not update the expectations 
about the engagement's course initially established by the Bush team in late 1992: the U.S. 
military could execute missions in Somalia essentially at will, and at little to no risk to its 
soldiers. The Black Hawk incident violated these expectations, producing in one, very gruesome 
and very public stroke, casualties close to Hoar's ex-ante estimate of 20. Thus though the United 
States certainly materially was able to do more – and indeed, some argued, could have done 
more to its own benefit – its leadership proved unwilling to do so. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The weight of the above evidence is supportive of the theory of asymmetric conflict 
forwarded here.  In each of the three cases the United States undertook evaluation of its own 
capabilities as compared to those of the potential opponent; established an expectation of the 
likely cost of conflict in U.S. lives; and made decisions to continue or retrench in the predicted 
directions.  In Panama, a healthy respect for opposition forces led to ex-ante expectations of a 
minimum of 50 combat casualties; these expectations were not met and the United States was 
willing and able to achieve its stated objectives before this reference point was violated. In the 
former Yugoslavia, decisionmakers understood that the strength and resilience of Serb fighters 
might cost the United States 50 lives over the course of one year.  Instead, not one U.S. combat 
death occurred.  Decisionmakers dispensed with the timeline for withdrawal, and the United 
States continues to this day to pursue the intervention  objectives of "establish[ing] and 
maintain[ing] a secure environment" in the former Yugoslavia.
115
 And in Somalia the opponent 
was judged weak, ill-trained, and ill-equipped, and so ex-ante cost-expectations were limited to 
20.  When U.S. casualties exceeded this expectation, ultimately numbering 29, policymakers 
chose to retrench.  These data are summarized in Table 9 below.    
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Table 9: 
 Data Gathered through Process Tracing 
 
    
 
OPPONENT 
STRENGTH 
EX-ANTE COST-
EXPECTATION 
ACTUAL 
COST OUTCOME 
Panama Moderate > 50 23 Success 
Somalia Low < 20 29 Failure 
Former Yugoslavia  Moderate < 50/year 0 Ongoing 
     
 
 
Although this evidence cannot be considered confirmatory, it nonetheless is encouraging for the 
theory, increasing its plausibility and thus providing a substantial basis for further inquiry.    
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CHAPTER VII:  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Findings, Extensions, and Implications 
 
 
*************** 
 
 
 The preceding chapters introduced and tested empirically a new theory to explain 
asymmetric conflict outcome -- to explain why it is that materially preponderant states 
sometimes choose to retrench from an ongoing armed intervention in the absence of the actual or 
prospective destruction of their ability to fight.  The theory offers a framework that is grounded 
in rationality but that accounts also for cognitive influences, positing that the fact and the timing 
of decisions to opt-out are precipitated by the violation of states' ex-ante cost-expectations.  
Specifically, the theory argues:  
1. that states use the power differential to establish cost-expectations prior to entering 
conflict; 
2. that these expectations operate as a reference point around which the actual costs of 
fighting are then evaluated; and 
3.  that the decision to retrench occurs because, and when, the actual costs of fighting have 
come to equal or to exceed the level anticipated.   
 These propositions generate three testable hypotheses, two that access directly the 
proposed causal mechanism, and one that addresses the logical implications of the theory as they 
operate at the systemic level of analysis.  The results of the empirical analysis undertaken here 
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offer encouraging, albeit mixed, support for the former, affirm the latter, and demonstrate the 
theory itself to be plausible.   
 
Findings 
 Chapter IV presented experimental evidence that, as proposed by the theory, decision-
makers do form ex-ante cost-expectations about a prospective conflict and that those 
expectations vary with the strength of the potential opponent.  Consistent with the theory, 
subjects facing a strong opponent anticipated incurring greater costs than did their counterparts 
facing a weak opponent, and a full 60% of all subjects who chose to retrench identified that 
decision as having been precipitated by the violation of expectations.  These results are 
promising both for the theory as an independent line of research, and for the larger prospect 
paradigm of which it is a part. Covariation between cost-expectations and the strength of the 
opponent affirms the theory's notion of how the reference point is formed -- in this case, around 
the power differential -- while the fact that subjects first established cost-expectations and then 
responded to their violation bolsters the prospect paradigm's identification of the reference point 
as decisive.   
 The study's implications for the prospect theory proposition about behavior in the 
"domain of losses", however, is not equally as sanguine. Consistent with the theory's challenge to 
this component of the prospect paradigm, 68% of all respondents chose to retrench -- 
considerable  prima facie evidence that decision-makers are not nearly so likely to become 
addicted to conflict, or to "gamble for resurrection", as the domain of losses proposition 
supposes. Moreover, among the 114 subjects who did not choose to retrench, only 28 offered 
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reasons suggestive of these impulses, giving as rationale a desire for troops not to have "died in 
vain", or that, once committed to conflict, the United States needed to "see it through to the end".   
 The experimental findings thus offer important support for my theory's most central 
features; this support, however, is not unqualified.  Although the theory's prediction that subjects 
facing a strong opponent would form a higher reference point than would those facing a weak 
opponent was borne out, it was not the case that this higher reference point led subjects to 
retrench later and/or with lesser frequency, as my theory would expect.  Moreover, analysis 
revealed a significant negative correlation between the value ascribed to the benefits of 
succeeding in achieving the conflict objective and the likelihood of retrenchment -- the greater 
the perceived benefits, the less likely retrenchment became. There is thus a marked discontinuity 
between the experiment's statistical output and subjects' self-reported reasons for retrenchment.  
This somewhat confounding result and the absence of direct support for the theory's ancillary 
propositions are problematic, and suggests a need for additional research.  
 Large-n analysis of two datasets  across four logit models in Chapter V, by contrast, 
produces rather substantial support for the theory's implications at the systemic level.  The 
comparison of the frequency of great power losses over time is supportive of Hypothesis 3's 
prediction of an upward trend as the system moves from being characterized by multipolarity to 
being characterized by bipolarity and unipolarity.  The assertion that the likelihood of loss should 
be greater for states that are great powers operating under low-polarity systems than under 
mulitpolar systems similarly receives support.  For both datasets analysis revealed a significant 
relationship, in the posited direction, between the probability of loss, great power status, and 
system polarity:  the likelihood of asymmetric conflict loss is greater for states that are great 
powers operating in a low-polarity international environment than for those that are great powers 
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operating in a multipolar international environment.  This finding, which is consistent with the 
logic of the theory developed here, is not well-explained by extant theories of conflict, or of 
conflict termination.   
 Finally, the process tracing undertaken in Chapter VI affirms the plausibility of the 
theory's key commitments.  In Panama, the United States' ex-ante cost-expectations of dozens of 
casualties caused a realized casualty count of 23 U.S. servicemembers to be perceived as 
remarkably low, and so the United States persisted in prosecuting the conflict until it had 
achieved its stated objectives, most importantly the capture of dictator Manuel Noriega.  In 
Somalia, the equation was inverted:  the expectation of very low costs was disappointed and so a 
total of 29 U.S. killed led to rapid withdrawal.  And in the former Yugoslavia, the expectation of 
as many as 50 U.S. casualties over the course the one-year needed to achieve the United States' 
objectives did not materialize, allowing first the Clinton administration, and then those 
subsequent, to maintain a U.S. presence long beyond the initial 12 month commitment -- indeed, 
U.S. combat troops remain, conducting operations, in the former Yugoslavia to this day.  
 The summation of the empirical evidence collected and evaluated in this study thus is 
encouraging for the theory's most central contentions:  that states are attentive to the power 
differential; that the ex-ante cost-expectations they form on the basis of this differential operate 
as a reference point; and that it is the violation of this reference point that triggers the political 
choice to retrench. Although the study's findings cannot be considered confirmatory, they do 
suggest that additional research in this vein is both merited and potentially productive.  Indeed, a 
number of interesting extensions present themselves.  
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Extension:  Other U.S. Conflicts 
 The first and most apparent course would be to undertake examination of other cases of 
great power intervention during periods of bipolarity and unipolarity to further assess the 
plausibility of the theory's core claims.  Some prima facie evidence from other of the United 
States' most prominent such engagements indicates this pursuit may be fruitful.    
 The United States' engagement in Korea in 1950, for example, was premised upon the 
Truman administration's edict that the 38th parallel not be crossed.  This limitation was imposed 
to preclude Chinese and Soviet engagement, and so to ensure the fight would be against only the 
North Korean military, the strength and skill of which was largely discounted.  The United States 
thus entered Korea believing the war would be brought to a rapid and successful close, and at 
relatively low cost (Halberstam 2007, pp. 139-140; Reiter 2009, p. 78).  In October, of course, 
after the parallel had been crossed China did get involved, and the number of U.S. casualties 
climbed upward.  Shortly thereafter Truman began the process of retrenchment, scaling back 
U.S. objectives behind closed doors by taking further "military action beyond the 38th 
parallel...essentially off the table" (Reiter 2009, p. 81).   
 A similar progression characterized the United States' next notable militarized 
engagement abroad, this time in Vietnam.  Much as did Truman, President Lyndon Johnson 
elected to scale back the United States' conflict objectives far prior to the war's actual 
termination.  It was in fact in late 1965 that Johnson first sought a negotiated settlement -- this at 
a time when U.S. killed in action remained below 10,000 (Ferguson 2004, p. 99), and long before 
public opinion turned so markedly and vociferously against the intervention.   
 More recently, the contrast between the outcomes of the U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf 
(1991) and Iraq (2003) is particularly suggestive of the theory's dynamics.  In the former, the 
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United States anticipated that expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait would be quite costly; in 
actuality, pre-war casualty estimates exceeded by a great margin those that actually occurred.  
The United States  not only achieved its original objectives, but in fact considered expanding its 
war aims. In 2003, by contrast, the United States entered Iraq anticipating that the short-term 
goals of removing Saddam Hussein and eliminating Iraq's WMD capabilities, and the long-term 
objective of building "a new Iraq that is prosperous and free", also could be achieved easily.
116
 
Military analyst and defense expert Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, using "leaked 
Pentagon war plans from the summer of 2002", in fact estimated that "the United States and any 
other foreign militaries that ultimately participate in a war to change regimes in Baghdad could 
together lose anywhere from about 100 to 5,000 personnel...The upper ranges appear relatively 
unlikely to occur but cannot be dismissed [emphasis added]" (O'Hanlon 2003).  By the end of 
2005 the number of soldiers killed in combat for the United States alone numbered 2,181
117
, and 
the administration had scaled back its objectives to "an attainable form of success even if it did 
not match the initial lofty goals"(Metz 2010, p. 9; Desch 2011, p. 186, p. 187)
118
.    
 Moreover, although commentators differ about its outcome, they nonetheless generally 
agree that the 2007 "surge" of additional U.S. troops into Iraq was not a redoubling of effort to 
achieve success as originally envisioned, but rather as a means of avoiding complete failure 
(Ricks 2009; Metz 2010; Feaver 2011; Desch 2011).  Whatever its effects, the surge did not 
prevent the U.S. casualty count from increasing, and as this number continued to move upward 
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U.S. objectives and troop levels were revised downward, culminating in the announcement on 11 
October, 2011 of a full withdrawal.  U.S. casualties at that time numbered 4,478.
119
 
 
Extension:  Other Great Powers 
 Extension of analysis to other great powers is another necessary step.  Here again a 
superficial probe of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan produces evidence that is promising.  
Armed with post-Cold War access to a growing body of primary source documents, scholars 
have begun to reconstruct key moments in the Soviet decision-making process.  Oft remarked 
upon is the Soviet leadership's ex-ante expectation that their conflict objectives in Afghanistan 
could be achieved quickly and at low cost.  One scholar states simply that "Soviet leaders did not 
expect a protracted and costly involvement in Afghanistan when they approved the Soviet 
military intervention in December 1979" (Kalinovsky  2009, p. 51), while another  notes more 
wryly that: 
 
On the military side, the goal appears to have been not to destroy the opposition 
but to reduce its activities substantially, make the main cities and highways safe 
and seal the frontier with Pakistan.  Improbable as it may seem in retrospect, the 
Soviet leadership appears to have operated with a time scale of some months or at 
most a year or two for all this to be achieved.  The central belief of the Soviet 
leadership was that these goals could be met by the 'limited' Soviet contingent 
(Halliday 1999, pp. 679-680).   
 
 
 This expectation, however "improbable" in retrospect, likely seemed far less so at the 
time given the Soviets' recent experiences in Hungary and in Czechosolvakia where it suffered a 
total of 669 and 96 killed, respectively (Grau and Yahya, 1995).  These accounts go on to 
describe the  Soviet leadership as nonetheless coming rather quickly to recognize that there 
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"could not, as originally intended, be a quick military victory" and that the "cost was much 
higher than originally anticipated" (Halliday 1999, p. 680).
120
  In 1981 the Politburo approved a 
proposal to pursue UN mediation of the conflict, and high level consideration of withdrawal had 
begun by 1983 (Kalinovsky pp. 61-69, 2011), at which time the Soviet Army had suffered 6,262 
killed (Grau and Yahya, 1995).  Whether these pieces of evidence can be connected in a causal 
chain of course cannot be determined without further research, but their juxtaposition is 
suggestive. 
 
Extension:  Public Opinion 
 In addition to the above lines of inquiry, the theory may have implications for the study 
of public opinion about conflict.  Specifically, if further testing of the theory provides support for 
the claim that state leaders establish and respond to cost-expectations, then it may also be the 
case that these expectations are transmitted to the electorate.  This explanation is outwardly 
consistent with the pattern of U.S. public opinion about the Korean war: "The pattern of opinion 
on the war was fairly straightforward, with very high support for the war at the outset...followed 
by a steep drop in support after Chinese intervention, and from then on support that maintained 
roughly the same moderate level until the end of the war, even in the face of escalating 
casualties" (Reiter 2009, p. 87).  That is, the theory implies that the public became less 
responsive to increases in casualties in Korea because ex-ante expectations of the costs of 
conflict had already been violated – the imposition of costs subsequent to that point would not 
have a similarly deleterious effect.  If there is support for this extension of the theory, it will 
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mean that, contrary to assertions that "casualty phobia" plagues democracies, it may be the 
violation of a specific and identifiable reference point that explains the public's tolerance, or lack 
thereof, for a given intervention. 
 
 
Implications 
   
 Strong states sometimes lose wars against considerably weaker opponents.  The literature 
to date offers a number of thoughtful and compelling theories to explain this phenomenon; but, 
to a one, these explanations rely explicitly or implicitly upon the assumptions of the expected 
utility model of decisionmaking. This dissertation offers an alternative explanation, based upon 
an alternative model that recognizes policymakers as rational actors who nonetheless are subject 
to cognitive influences.  In its most spare form, the argument is that these cognitive influences 
are systematic -- they are understandable, predictable, and avoidable.   
 The tests undertaken here are suggestive, and offer justification for continued research.  If 
my theory receives additional empirical support, it will have made a novel and exciting 
contribution to the academic study of international relations:  it will have operationalized the 
nebulous concept of "cost tolerance"; forwarded a new  explanation for asymmetric conflict 
outcome; demonstrated itself to be capable of explaining outcomes that are consistent with 
expected utility theories, but also outcomes that are anomalous for it (Lakatos and Musgrave 
1970); and advanced the prospect paradigm by taking on successfully the "critical task" of 
determining "how actors identify their reference points" (Levy 2003, p. 271) in an important 
class of international political events.  
 In practical terms, the theory offers a cautionary tale for great powers -- and most 
especially for the United States as today's lone superpower.  A measure of confidence in its 
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material capabilities may be rational and warranted, and given its current advantages the United 
States may be unable to avoid succumbing to some measure of overconfidence.  What will 
matter, then, is the ability of its policymakers to distinguish between the expectations borne of its 
preponderant power and  the value of the objectives at stake -- such an appreciation might help 
the United States to make decisions about whether and when to retrench based not on beliefs 
about what winning should cost, but rather on beliefs about what winning actually is worth.    
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Mean Indices 
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1. Benefits 
 Mean = 0.46, Standard Deviatio0.27 
 Alpha = 0.89 
 405 
 
 General Benefits Mean = 0.55 SD = 0.26 
 The benefits of succeeding in [condition]are:  
  N % 
 Very small 23 5.7 
 Small 64 15.8 
 Moderate 166 41.0 
 Large 108 26.7 
 Very large 44 10.9 
 
 Specific  Benefits Mean = 0.37 SD = 0.36 
 The benefits of succeeding in [condition]are worth:  
  N % 
 Less than 1,000 U.S. lives 152 37.5 
 More than 1,000 U.S. lives but less than 
3,000 U.S. lives 
68 16.8 
 More than 3,000 U.S. lives but less than 
6,500 U.S. lives 
75 18.5 
 More than 6,500 U.S. lives but less than 
10,000 U.S. lives 
62 15.3 
 Very More than 10,000 U.S. lives 48 11.8 
 
2. Cost expectations 
 Mean = 0.51, Standard Deviation = 0.30 
 Alpha = 0.88 
 405 
  
 General Cost Mean = 0.60 SD = 0.35 
 How much do you think it will cost in U.S. lives to achieve the 
objective of [Condition]? 
 
  N % 
 Very little  65 16.05 
 A moderate amount  195 48.15 
 A lot 145 35.80 
 
 Specific  Cost Mean = 0.42 SD = 0.34 
 How many U.S. lives do you think it will cost to achieve the 
objective of [Condition]? 
 
  N % 
 Less than 1,000 lives 111 27.41 
 More than 1,000 U.S. lives but less than 
2,500 U.S. lives 
117 28.89 
 More than 2,500 U.S. lives but less than 
5,000 U.S. lives 
110 27.16 
 More than 5,000 U.S. lives 67 16.54 
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2. Time  expectations 
 Mean = 0.61, Standard Deviation = 0.30 
 Alpha = 0.92 
 405 
 
 General Time Mean = 0.57 SD = 0.33 
 How much time do you think it will take the United States to 
achieve the objective of [Condition]? 
 
  N % 
 Very little time 64 15.80 
 A moderate amount of time 220 54.32 
 A long time 121 29.90 
 
 
 Specific  Time Mean = 0.65 SD = 0.33 
 How long do you think it will take the United States to achieve the 
objective of [Condition]? 
 
  N % 
 Less than 1 month 34 8.40 
 More than 1 month but less than 3 months 62 15.31 
 More than 3 months but less than 6 
months 
73 18.02 
 More than 6 months but less than 1 year 99 24.44 
 More than 1 year 137 33.83 
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Randomization Test Statistics  
y(scenario) = β0(constant)+β1(gender)+ β2(age)+ β3(military)+ β4(degree)+ 
β5(political affiliation)+  ε 
 
 Prob > F 
Gender 0.82 
Age 0.44 
Military 0.32 
Highest Degree Attained 0.10 
Political Affiliation 0.16 
 
 
 
You Will 1 Mean = 0.64 SD = 0.35 
You will:  
 N % 
Continue the operation with the U.S. troop commitment as -is 71 17.53 
Continue the operation and send additional troops 146 38.83 
Continue the operation but begin to withdraw some U.S. troops 40 9.88 
Begin to withdraw all U.S. troops 52 12.84 
Scale back the objective from [condition] to [condition] 96 23.70 
 
 
Not Retrench Reason 1 Mean = 0.69 SD = 0.34 
The primary reason why you will not scale back the objective or withdraw U.S. 
troops is: 
 
 N % 
You do not want U.S. troops to have died in vain 70 32.36 
3,000 U.S. lives lost is within expected levels 24 11.06 
Your credibility as a leader is at stake 21 9.68 
The benefits of achieving the objective of [condition] outweigh 
3,000 U.S. lives lost 
102 47 
 
 
Retrench Reason 1 Mean = 0.36 SD = 0.45 
The primary reason why you have decided to withdraw U.S. troops or to scale back 
the objective is: 
 
 N % 
The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than expected 110 58.51 
The conflict has lasted longer than expected 6 3.19 
The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than achieving the 
objective of [condition] is worth 
55 29.26 
You no longer think the United States can achieve the objective 
of [condition] 
17 9.04 
 
 
You Will 2 Mean = 0.67 SD = 0.31 
You will:  
 N % 
Continue the operation with the U.S. troop commitment as -is 37 17.05 
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Continue the operation and send additional troops 76 35.02 
Continue the operation but begin to withdraw some U.S. troops 29 13.36 
Begin to withdraw all U.S. troops 13 5.99 
Scale back the objective from [condition] to [condition] 62 28.57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Retrench Reason 2 Mean = 0.78 SD = 0.30 
The primary reason why you will not scale back the objective or withdraw U.S. 
troops is: 
 
 N % 
You do not want U.S. troops to have died in vain 28 24.76 
3,000 U.S. lives lost is within expected levels 6 5.31 
Your credibility as a leader is at stake 11 9.73 
The benefits of achieving the objective of [condition] outweigh 
3,000 U.S. lives lost 
68 60.18 
 
 
Retrench Reason 2 Mean = 0.28 SD = 0.39 
The primary reason why you have decided to withdraw U.S. troops or to scale back 
the objective is: 
 
 N % 
The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than expected 66 63.46 
The conflict has lasted longer than expected 2 1.92 
The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than achieving the objective 
of [condition] is worth 
17 16.35 
You no longer think the United States can achieve the objective 
of [condition] 
19 18.27 
 
Why Fail Mean = 0.71 SD = 0.29 
The primary reason why you believe the United States cannot achieve the objective 
of [condition] is: 
 
 N % 
You now believe the foreign military will defeat the U.S. military 3 4.69 
You now believe that achieving the objective of [condition] will 
cost more in U.S. lives than you are willing to pay. 
31 48.44 
You now believe that achieving the objective of [condition] will 
cost more in U.S. lives than the U.S. public is willing to pay. 
30 46.88 
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Age   
 N % 
18-29 182 44.94 
30-39 124 30.62 
40-59 76 18.77 
>59 23 5.68 
 
Gender   
 N % 
Female 166 41.00 
Male 239 60.00 
 
Military Service   
 N % 
No 367 90.62 
Yes 38 9.38 
 
 
Federal Govt.  Service   
 N % 
No 319 78.77 
Yes 86 21.24 
 
 
Education   
 N % 
4-Year college 84 20.74 
MA 230 56.79 
PhD 59 14.57 
Professional 32 7.90 
 
 
Political Affiliation   
 N % 
Democrat 203 52.45 
Independent 105 27.13 
Republican 35 9.04 
Other 12 3.10 
None 32 8.27 
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1.  MEAN VALUE OF BENEFITS 
HUMANITARIAN VS NUCLEAR 
z = -4.357, p = 0.000 
    
Nuke N Rank Sum Expected 
0 200 35517 40600 
1 205 46698 41615 
 
 
2.  MEAN VALUE OF RETRENCHMENT AT FIRST OPTION 
HUMANITARIAN VS NUCLEAR: 
z = 2.420, p = 0.0155 
    
Retrench1 N Rank Sum Expected 
0 200 43062.5 40600 
1 205 39152.5 41615 
 
 
 
3.  MEAN VALUE OF RETRENCHMENT AT SECOND OPTION 
HUMANITARIAN VS NUCLEAR: 
z = 2.041, p = 0.041 
    
Retrench2 N Rank Sum Expected 
0 95 11165.5 10355 
1 122 12487.5 13298 
 
 
4.  MEAN VALUE OF RETRENCHMENT OVERALL 
HUMANITARIAN VS NUCLEAR: 
z = 3.055, p = 0.0023 
    
Retrencht N Rank Sum Expected 
0 200 43395 40600 
1 205 38820 41615 
 
 
5.  MEAN VALUE OF COST EXPECTATIONS 
STRONG VS WEAK: 
z = -7.381, p = 0.0000 
    
Cost-expectations N Rank Sum Expected 
0 210 33543.5 42630 
1 195 48671.5 39585 
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6.  MEAN VALUE OF RETRENCHMENT AT FIRST OPTION  
STRONG VS WEAK:  
z = 1.099, p = 0.2717 
    
Retrench1 N Rank Sum Expected 
0 210 43747.5     42630 
1 195 38467.5 39585 
 
 
7.  MEAN VALUE OF RETRENCHMENT AT SECOND OPTION  
STRONG VS WEAK:  
z = 0.195, p = 0.8454 
    
Retrench2 N Rank Sum Expected 
0 107 11741 11663 
1 110 11912 11990 
 
 
8.  MEAN VALUE OF RETRENCHMENT OVERALL  
STRONG VS WEAK:  
z = 0.796, p = 0.4263 
    
Retrencht N Rank Sum Expected 
0 210 43357.5 42630 
1 195 38857.5 39585 
 
 
 
 
 
WILL RETRENCH  
N= 405 
 
     
  
Pseudo R2 = 0.3592 
 
     
     
 
Benefits -6.77 (0.93)*** 
 
 
Cost-expectations -0.86 (0.61) 
 
 
Time-expectations 1.40 (0.60)** 
 
 
Nuclear, Strong 0.17 (0.45) 
 
 
Nuclear Weak -0.23 (0.41) 
 
 
Humanitarian Strong -0.21 (0.42) 
 
     
 
_cons 4.30 0.71 
 
 
** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
   
9.  LOGIT REGRESSION: Total Incidence of Retrenchment 
DV: Overall retrenchment 
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 This appendix provides each of the four experimental conditions, and a generic rendering of the 
associated survey questions.  I have excluded the various logics involved in the survey's online 
presentation; no content has been eliminated, but the progression through the survey as determined by 
alternate responses is omitted.   
CONSENT 
You are being asked to participate in a study about war.  Your participation in this study is completely 
voluntary; you may choose not to participate, or you may choose to withdraw at any time.        If you 
choose to participate, you will be asked to read a short scenario about war, and to answer a series of 
approximately 15 questions.  You will also be asked to provide some basic information about yourself.  
You will not be asked for any personally identifying information, and your participation and responses 
will be completely anonymous.      
By selecting "yes" below, you affirm that you have been informed about this study and that your 
participation is voluntary. 
 Yes  
 No  
 
 
CONDITION 1:  STRONG, HUMANITARIAN 
 
You are President of the United States.  The government of a foreign country has responded with force to 
an ethnic uprising in its northern territories.  Out of the 194 countries in the world the United States ranks 
1st in military power; the foreign country ranks 6th.   
 
The Secretary of Defense has presented a military option that he is confident can prevent a humanitarian 
disaster.  The proposed operation would use the U.S. military to expel the foreign government's forces.  It 
would begin with a massive air assault, followed by a ground campaign involving 575,000 U.S. troops.  
The Secretary reports that intelligence estimates place the foreign country's forces at approximately 
320,000 troops, and describes them as being well-equipped and professionally led.  The fighting would 
therefore be difficult, and you should expect U.S. killed, though everything possible would be done to 
keep this number at a minimum.  Nonetheless, the sophistication and skill of the U.S. military lead him to 
expect the operation to be able to achieve the objective of expelling the foreign country's forces rapidly 
and decisively -- he cannot give you a specific timeline, but he guarantees it would not result in a 
prolonged occupation.  
 
You have decided to proceed with the military operation as described by the Secretary. 
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CONDITION 2:  WEAK, HUMANITARIAN 
You are President of the United States.  The government of a foreign country has responded militarily to 
an ethnic uprising in its northern territories.  Out of the 194 countries in the world the United States ranks 
1st in military power; the foreign country ranks 102nd.   
The Secretary of Defense has presented a military option that he is confident can prevent a humanitarian 
disaster.    The proposed operation would have the U.S. military expel the foreign government's forces 
using a total of 24,000 U.S. ground troops against the opponent's estimated 16,000.  The Secretary 
explains that the plan takes advantage of the United States' superior personnel and equipment, night 
capability, and strategic surprise.  This is not a surgical strike, however, and so the Secretary tells you to 
expect that there would be U.S. troops killed, though everything possible would be done to keep this 
number at a minimum.   He expects the operation to be able to achieve the objective of expelling the 
foreign country's forces rapidly and decisively -- he cannot give you a specific timeline, but he guarantees 
it would not result in a prolonged occupation.  
You have decided to proceed with the military operation as described by the Secretary. 
 
 
CONDITION 3:  STRONG, NUCLEAR 
You are President of the United States.  The intelligence community has informed you that the 
government of a foreign country is close to achieving nuclear capability. Out of the 194 countries in the 
world the United States ranks 1st in conventional military power; the foreign country ranks 6th.   
The Secretary of Defense has presented a military option that he is confident can successfully destroy the 
foreign country's nuclear program. The proposed operation would begin with a massive air assault, 
followed by a ground campaign involving 575,000 U.S. troops.  The Secretary reports that intelligence 
estimates place the foreign country's forces at approximately 320,000 troops, and describes them as being 
well-equipped and professionally led.  The fighting would therefore be difficult, and you should expect 
U.S. killed, though everything possible would be done to keep this number at a minimum.  Nonetheless, 
the sophistication and skill of the U.S. military lead him to expect the operation to be able to achieve the 
objective of destroying the foreign country's nuclear program rapidly and decisively -- he cannot give you 
a specific timeline, but he guarantees it would not result in a prolonged occupation.   
You have decided to proceed with the military operation as described by the Secretary. 
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CONDITION 4:  WEAK, NUCLEAR 
You are President of the United States.  The intelligence community has informed you that the 
government of a foreign country is close to achieving nuclear capability. Out of the 194 countries in the 
world the United States ranks 1st in conventional military power; the foreign country ranks 102nd.  
The Secretary of Defense has presented a military option that he is confident can successfully destroy the 
foreign country's nuclear program.    The proposed operation uses a total of 24,000 U.S. ground troops 
against the opponent's estimated 16,000, and takes advantage of the United States' superior personnel and 
equipment, night capability, and strategic surprise.  This is not a surgical strike, however, and so the 
Secretary tells you to expect that there would be U.S. troops killed, though everything possible would be 
done to keep this number at a minimum.  He expects the operation to be able to achieve the objective of 
destroying the foreign country's nuclear program rapidly and decisively -- he cannot give you a specific 
timeline, but he guarantees it would not result in a prolonged occupation. 
You have decided to proceed with the military operation as described by the Secretary.  
 
SURVEY 
How much time do you think it will take the United States to achieve the objective of [condition]? 
 Very little time 
 A moderate amount of time 
 A long time 
How long do you think it will take the United States to achieve the objective of [condition]? 
 Less than 1 month 
 More than 1 month but less than 3 months 
 More than 3 months but less than 6 months 
 More than 6 months but less than 1 year 
 More than 1 year 
How much do you think it will cost in U.S. lives to achieve the objective of [condition]? 
 Very little 
 A moderate amount 
 A lot 
How many U.S. lives do you think it will cost to achieve the objective of [condition]? 
 Less than 1,000 U.S. lives 
 More than 1,000 U.S. lives but less than 2,500 U.S. lives 
 More than 2,500 U.S. lives but less than 5,000 U.S. lives 
 More than 5,000 U.S. lives 
The U.S. effort to [condition] has been underway for four months, and the United States has not yet 
succeeded.  3,000 U.S. troops have been killed.    
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You will: 
 Continue the operation with the U.S. troop commitment as-is 
 Continue the operation and send additional troops 
 Continue the operation but begin to withdraw some U.S. troops 
 Begin to withdraw all U.S. troops 
 Scale back the objective from [condition] to [condition]. 
 
Option to scale back for the Nuclear Scenarios:  "Scale back the objective from destroying the nuclear 
program to damaging the nuclear program. 
 
Option to scale back for the Humanitarian Scenarios:  Scale back the objective from expelling the foreign 
government's forces to negotiating a cease-fire. 
The primary reason why you have decided to withdraw U.S. troops or to scale back the objective is: 
 The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than expected 
 The conflict has lasted longer than expected 
 The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than achieving the objective of [condition] is worth 
 You no longer think the United States can achieve the objective of [condition] 
 Other 
(If Other):  What is the primary reason why you will withdraw U.S. troops or scale back the objective? 
(If not retrenching):  The primary reason why you will not scale back the objective or withdraw U.S. 
troops is: 
 You do not want U.S. troops to have died in vain 
 3,000 U.S. lives lost is within expected levels 
 Your credibility as a leader is at stake 
 The benefits of achieving the objective of [condition]outweigh 3,000 U.S. lives lost 
 Other 
(If Other):  What is the primary reason why you will not scale back the objective or withdraw U.S. 
troops? 
The U.S. effort to [condition]has been underway for seven months, and the United States has not yet 
succeeded.  6,500 U.S. troops have been killed. 
You will: 
 Continue the operation with the U.S. troop commitment as-is 
 Continue the operation and send additional troops 
 Continue the operation but begin to withdraw some U.S. troops 
 Begin to withdraw all U.S. troops 
 Scale back the objective from [condition]to [condition] 
The primary reason why you have decided to withdraw U.S. troops or to scale back the objective is: 
 The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than expected 
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 The conflict has lasted longer than you expected 
 The conflict has cost more U.S. lives than achieving the objective of [condition] is worth 
 You no longer think the United States can achieve the objective of [condition] 
 Other 
(If Other):  What is the primary reason why you will withdraw U.S. troops or scale back the objective? 
(If not retrenching):  The primary reason why you will not scale back the objective or withdraw U.S. 
troops is: 
 The benefits of achieving the objective of [condition]outweigh 6,500 U.S. lives lost 
 6,500 U.S. lives lost is within expected levels 
 You do not want U.S. troops to have died in vain 
 Your credibility as a leader is at stake 
 Other 
(If Other):  What is the primary reason why you will not scale back the objective or withdraw U.S. 
troops? 
 (If selected "You do not want U.S. troops to have died in vain):  Is there a number of U.S. killed that 
would lead you to scale back the objective or withdraw troops? 
 Yes 
 No 
(If No):  What is the primary reason why there is not  a number of U.S. killed that would lead you to scale 
back the objective or withdraw troops? 
(If Yes):  What is the number of U.S. killed that would lead you to scale back the objective or withdraw 
troops? 
(If selected "You no longer think the U.S. can succeed"):  The primary reason why you believe the United 
States cannot achieve the objective of [condition]is: 
 You now believe the foreign military will defeat the U.S. military. 
 You now believe that [condition]will cost more in U.S. lives than you are willing to pay. 
 You now believe that succeeding in [condition]will cost more in U.S. lives than the U.S. public is 
willing to pay. 
 Other 
(If Other):  What is the primary reason why you believe the United States cannot achieve the objective of 
[condition]? 
The benefits of succeeding in [condition]are: 
 Very small 
 Small 
 Moderate 
 Large 
 Very large 
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The benefits of succeeding in [condition]are worth: 
 Less than 1,000 U.S. lives 
 More than 1,000 U.S. lives but less than 3,000 U.S. lives 
 More than 3,000 U.S. lives but less than 6,500 U.S. lives 
 More than 6,500 U.S. lives but less than 10,000 U.S. lives 
 More than 10,000 U.S. lives 
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Conflict State 
Start 
Year 
Multipolar 
System Outcome 
1 Russia vs. Georgians RUS 1816 Yes Win 
2 British-Kandyan UKG 1817 Yes Win 
3 British-Maratha UKG 1817 Yes Win 
4 First Caucasus RUS 1818 Yes Win 
5 First British-Burmese UKG 1823 Yes Win 
6 First British-Ashanti UKG 1824 Yes Win 
7 British-Bharatpuran UKG 1825 Yes Win 
8 Dutch-Javanese NTH 1825 Yes Win 
9 Russia vs. Circasians RUS 1829 Yes Win 
10 First Murid War RUS 1830 Yes Win 
11 Netherlands vs. Belgians FRN 1830 Yes Loss 
12 Netherlands vs. Belgians NTH 1830 Yes Loss 
13 Netherlands vs. Belgians UKG 1830 Yes Loss 
14 Ottoman Empire vs. Albanians TUR 1830 Yes Win 
15 First Polish RUS 1831 Yes Win 
16 Ottoman Empire vs. Egyptians (First Syrian) TUR 1831 Yes Loss 
17 Mexico vs. Texans MEX 1835 Yes Loss 
18 British-Afghan of 1838 UKG 1838 Yes Win 
19 First British-Zulu UKG 1838 Yes Loss 
20 First British-Afghan UKG 1839 Yes Loss 
21 First Franco-Algerian FRN 1839 Yes Win 
22 Ottoman Empire vs. Bosnians of 1841 TUR 1841 Yes Win 
23 British-Sind UKG 1843 Yes Win 
24 Franco-Moroccan FRN 1844 Yes Win 
25 First British-Sikh UKG 1845 Yes Win 
26 Cracow Revolt AUH 1846 Yes Win 
27 Cracow Revolt GMY 1846 Yes Win 
28 First British-Xhosa UKG 1846 Yes Win 
29 Austro-Sardinian AUH 1848 Yes Win 
30 Austro-Sardinian ITA 1848 Yes Loss 
31 Austro-Sardinian MOD 1848 Yes Loss 
32 Austro-Sardinian TUS 1848 Yes Loss 
33 First Schleswig-Holstein GMY 1848 Yes Win 
34 First Schleswig-Holstein DEN 1848 Yes Loss 
35 Second British-Sikh UKG 1848 Yes Win 
36 Roman Republic AUH 1849 Yes Win 
37 Roman Republic FRN 1849 Yes Win 
38 Roman Republic SIC 1849 Yes Win 
39 Roman Republic PAP 1849 Yes Loss 
40 Hungarian RUS 1849 Yes Win 
41 Second British-Xhosa UKG 1850 Yes Win 
42 La Plata BRA 1851 Yes Win 
43 La Plata ARG 1851 Yes Loss 
44 Ottoman Empire vs. Montenegrins of 1852 TUR 1852 Yes Loss 
45 Second British-Burmese UKG 1852 Yes Win 
46 Crimean RUS 1853 Yes Loss 
47 Crimean FRN 1854 Yes Win 
48 Crimean UKG 1854 Yes Win 
49 French-Tukulor War FRN 1854 Yes Loss 
50 Crimean ITA 1855 Yes Win 
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51 Anglo-Persian UKG 1856 Yes Win 
52 Anglo-Persian IRN 1856 Yes Loss 
53 French Conquest of Kabylia FRN 1856 Yes Win 
54 Second Opium FRN 1856 Yes Win 
55 Second Opium UKG 1856 Yes Win 
57 (Tukulor) Franco-Senegalese of 1857 FRN 1857 Yes Win 
58 First Franco-Vietnamese FRN 1858 Yes Win 
59 Spanish-Moroccan SPN 1859 Yes Win 
60 Spanish-Moroccan MOR 1859 Yes Loss 
61 Italo-Roman ITA 1860 Yes Win 
62 Italo-Roman PAP 1860 Yes Loss 
63 China vs. Niens CHN 1860 Yes Win 
64 China vs. Taipings CHN 1860 Yes Win 
65 Franco-Mexican MEX 1862 Yes Win 
66 Franco-Mexican FRN 1862 Yes Loss 
67 China vs. Taipings UKG 1862 Yes Win 
68 Second Polish RUS 1863 Yes Win 
69 British-Maori UKG 1863 Yes Win 
70 Spanish-Santo Dominican SPN 1863 Yes Loss 
71 Lopez BRA 1864 Yes Win 
72 Lopez PAR 1864 Yes Loss 
73 Second Schleswig-Holstein AUH 1864 Yes Win 
74 Second Schleswig-Holstein GMY 1864 Yes Win 
75 Second Schleswig-Holstein DEN 1864 Yes Loss 
76 Lopez ARG 1865 Yes Win 
77 Spanish-Chilean CHL 1865 Yes Win 
78 Spanish-Chilean SPN 1865 Yes Loss 
79 British-Bhutanese UKG 1865 Yes Win 
80 Seven Weeks GMY 1866 Yes Win 
81 Seven Weeks ITA 1866 Yes Win 
82 Spanish-Chilean PER 1866 Yes Win 
83 Ottoman Empire vs. Cretans of 1866 TUR 1866 Yes Win 
84 (Ten Years) Spanish-Cuban of 1868 SPN 1868 Yes Win 
85 Second Franco-Algerian FRN 1871 Yes Win 
86 Dutch-Achinese NTH 1873 Yes Win 
87 Franco-Tonkin FRN 1873 Yes Win 
88 Second British-Ashanti UKG 1873 Yes Win 
89 Second Russo-Turkish RUS 1877 Yes Win 
90 Third British-Xhosa UKG 1877 Yes Win 
91 Russo-Turkoman RUS 1878 Yes Win 
92 Second British-Afghan UKG 1878 Yes Win 
93 Second British-Zulu UKG 1879 Yes Win 
94 First Boer War UKG 1880 Yes Loss 
95 Boer War of 1880 UKG 1880 Yes Win 
96 Gun War UKG 1880 Yes Win 
97 First British-Mahdi UKG 1881 Yes Loss 
98 Franco-Tunisian FRN 1881 Yes Win 
99 Third Franco-Vietnamese FRN 1882 Yes Loss 
100 First Franco-Madagascan FRN 1883 Yes Win 
101 Sino-French FRN 1884 Yes Loss 
102 Sino-French CHN 1884 Yes Loss 
103 French-Mandinka FRN 1885 Yes Win 
104 Russo-Afghan RUS 1885 Yes Loss 
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105 Third British-Burmese UKG 1885 Yes Win 
106 First Italian-Ethiopian ITA 1887 Yes Loss 
107 Ottoman Empire vs. Cretans of 1888 TUR 1888 Yes Win 
108 Franco-Dahomeyan FRN 1889 Yes Win 
109 First Franco-Dahomeyan FRN 1890 Yes Win 
110 Belgian-Congolese BEL 1892 Yes Win 
111 Second Franco-Dahomeyan FRN 1892 Yes Win 
112 Franco-Thai FRN 1893 Yes Win 
113 Franco-Thai THI 1893 Yes Loss 
114 Third British-Ashanti UKG 1893 Yes Win 
115 Sino-Japanese JPN 1894 Yes Win 
116 Sino-Japanese CHN 1894 Yes Loss 
117 Dutch-Balian NTH 1894 Yes Win 
118 Second Franco-Madagascan FRN 1894 Yes Win 
119 Japan-Taiwanese JPN 1895 Yes Win 
120 Second Italian-Ethiopian ITA 1895 Yes Loss 
121 Spanish-Cuban of 1895 SPN 1895 Yes Loss 
122 Ottoman Empire vs. Cretans of 1896 TUR 1896 Yes Win 
123 Ottoman Empire vs. Druze TUR 1896 Yes Win 
124 (Sudanese War) Mahdi Uprising FRN 1896 Yes Win 
125 (Sudanese War) Mahdi Uprising UKG 1896 Yes Win 
126 Spanish-Philippino of 1896 SPN 1896 Yes Win 
127 Greco-Turkish TUR 1897 Yes Win 
128 Greco-Turkish GRC 1897 Yes Loss 
129 British-South Nigerian UKG 1897 Yes Win 
130 Indian Muslim UKG 1897 Yes Win 
131 Hut Tax UKG 1898 Yes Win 
132 American-Philippino USA 1899 Yes Win 
133 Second Boer War UKG 1899 Yes Win 
134 Somali Rebellion UKG 1899 Yes Win 
135 Sino-Russian RUS 1900 Yes Win 
136 Sino-Russian CHN 1900 Yes Loss 
137 Somali Rebellion UKG 1901 Yes Win 
138 
Ottoman Empire vs. VMRO Rebels 
(Ilinden) TUR 1903 Yes Win 
139 Russo-Japanese JPN 1904 Yes Win 
140 Russo-Japanese RUS 1904 Yes Loss 
141 South West African Revolt GMY 1904 Yes Win 
142 Maji-Maji Revolt GMY 1905 Yes Win 
143 Third British-Zulu UKG 1906 Yes Win 
144 Spanish-Moroccan SPN 1909 Yes Win 
145 Spanish-Moroccan MOR 1909 Yes Loss 
146 First Moroccan FRN 1911 Yes Win 
147 First Moroccan SPN 1911 Yes Win 
148 First Balkan BUL 1912 Yes Win 
149 First Balkan GRC 1912 Yes Win 
150 First Balkan YUG 1912 Yes Win 
151 First Balkan TUR 1912 Yes Loss 
152 Sino-Tibetan of 1912 CHN 1912 Yes Loss 
153 Second Moroccan FRN 1916 Yes Win 
154 Second Moroccan SPN 1916 Yes Win 
155 China vs. Yunnan Rebels CHN 1917 Yes Win 
156 Sino-Tibetan of 1918 CHN 1918 Yes Loss 
157 Franco-Turkish FRN 1919 Yes Loss 
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158 Franco-Turkish TUR 1919 Yes Win 
159 Hungarian-Allies CZE 1919 Yes Win 
160 Hungarian-Allies RUM 1919 Yes Win 
161 Hungarian-Allies HUN 1919 Yes Loss 
162 Russo-Polish POL 1919 Yes Win 
163 Russo-Polish RUS 1919 Yes Loss 
164 Third British-Afghan UKG 1919 Yes Loss 
165 Lithuanian-Polish POL 1920 Yes Win 
166 Lithuanian-Polish LIT 1920 Yes Loss 
167 (Sanusi) Italo-Libyan ITA 1920 Yes Win 
168 Franco-Syrian FRN 1920 Yes Win 
169 Iraqi-British UKG 1920 Yes Win 
170 Riff Rebellion SPN 1921 Yes Win 
171 Italian-Sanusi ITA 1923 Yes Win 
172 Franco-Druze FRN 1925 Yes Win 
173 Rif Rebellion FRN 1925 Yes Win 
174 China vs. Muslims of 1928 CHN 1928 Yes Win 
175 China vs. Communists of 1930 CHN 1930 Yes Win 
176 Manchurian JPN 1931 Yes Win 
177 Manchurian CHN 1931 Yes Loss 
178 Russia vs. Central Asian Rebels RUS 1931 Yes Win 
179 Italo-Ethiopian ITA 1935 Yes Win 
180 Italo-Ethiopian ETH 1935 Yes Loss 
181 Third Sino-Japanese CHN 1937 Yes Loss 
182 Third Sino-Japanese JPN 1937 Yes Win 
183 Changkufeng RUS 1938 Yes Win 
184 Changkufeng JPN 1938 Yes Loss 
185 Nomonhan RUS 1939 Yes Win 
186 Nomonhan JPN 1939 Yes Loss 
187 Russo-Finnish RUS 1939 Yes Win 
188 Franco-Thai THI 1940 Yes Win 
189 Franco-Thai FRN 1940 Yes Loss 
190 Re-occupy Vietnam post-WWII FRN 1945 Yes Win 
191 Indonesian UKG 1945 Yes Loss 
192 French-Indochina FRN 1946 No Loss 
193 Re-claim Laos post-WWII FRN 1946 No Win 
194 Third Franco-Madagascan FRN 1947 No Win 
195 First Kashmir IND 1948 No Win 
196 First Kashmir PAK 1948 No Win 
197 Palestine ISR 1948 No Win 
198 Palestine EGY 1948 No Loss 
199 Palestine IRQ 1948 No Loss 
200 Palestine JOR 1948 No Loss 
201 Palestine LEB 1948 No Loss 
202 Palestine SYR 1948 No Loss 
203 Indo-Hyderabad IND 1948 No Win 
204 Malayan Rebellion UKG 1948 No Win 
205 Korean AUL 1950 No Loss 
206 Korean CAN 1950 No Loss 
207 Korean PHI 1950 No Loss 
208 Korean ROK 1950 No Loss 
209 Korean TUR 1950 No Loss 
210 Korean CHN 1950 No Win 
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211 Korean PRK 1950 No Win 
212 Korean UKG 1950 No Loss 
213 Korean USA 1950 No Loss 
214 Philippines vs. Huks PHI 1950 No Win 
215 Sino-Tibetan of 1950 CHN 1950 No Win 
216 Korean BEL 1951 No Loss 
217 Korean COL 1951 No Loss 
218 Korean ETH 1951 No Loss 
219 Korean GRC 1951 No Loss 
220 Korean NTH 1951 No Loss 
221 Korean THI 1951 No Loss 
222 Korean FRN 1951 No Loss 
223 British-Mau Mau UKG 1952 No Win 
224 Franco-Tunisian FRN 1952 No Loss 
225 Intervention in Guyana UKG 1953 No Loss 
226 Moroccan Independence SPN 1953 No Loss 
227 Moroccan Independence FRN 1953 No Loss 
228 Third Franco-Algerian FRN 1954 No Loss 
229 Resist Enosis Campaign UKG 1955 No Loss 
230 Cameroon UKG 1955 No Loss 
231 Bahrain riots UKG 1956 No Win 
232 Russo-Hungarian RUS 1956 No Win 
233 Russo-Hungarian HUN 1956 No Loss 
234 Sinai FRN 1956 No Win 
235 Sinai ISR 1956 No Win 
236 Sinai UKG 1956 No Win 
237 Sinai EGY 1956 No Loss 
238 Suez Crisis 1956 (Sinai War) UKG 1956 No Loss 
239 China vs. Tibetans CHN 1956 No Win 
240 Cameroun Independence FRN 1957 No Win 
241 Operation Blue Bat USA 1958 No Win 
242 Protect Hussein/ Nasserism UKG 1958 No Win 
243 Cuba vs. Castroites CUB 1958 No Loss 
244 Republic of Vietnam vs. NLF RVN 1960 No Loss 
245 Zaire vs. Katanga & Leftists (Congo) BEL 1960 No Win 
246 Zaire vs. Katanga & Leftists (Congo) ZAI 1960 No Win 
247 Cameroun Independence II FRN 1960 No Win 
248 Battle of Bizerte FRN 1961 No Loss 
249 Iraq vs. Kurds of 1961 IRQ 1961 No Win 
250 Republic of Vietnam vs. NLF USA 1961 No Loss 
251 Angolan-Portugese POR 1961 No Loss 
252 Brunei Rebellion UKG 1962 No Win 
253 Guinean-Portugese POR 1962 No Loss 
254 Cypriot Civil War UKG 1963 No Loss 
255 Mozambique-Portugese POR 1964 No Loss 
256 Operation Power Pack USA 1965 No Win 
257 Second Kashmir PAK 1965 No Win 
258 Second Kashmir IND 1965 No Loss 
259 Vietnam War, Phase 2 USA 1965 No Loss 
260 Vietnamese DRV 1965 No Win 
261 Vietnamese AUL 1965 No Loss 
262 Vietnamese ROK 1965 No Loss 
263 Vietnamese RVN 1965 No Loss 
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264 Vietnamese PHI 1966 No Loss 
265 Six Day ISR 1967 No Win 
266 Six Day EGY 1967 No Loss 
267 Six Day JOR 1967 No Loss 
268 Six Day SYR 1967 No Loss 
269 Vietnamese THI 1967 No Loss 
270 Prague Spring RUS 1968 No Loss 
271 Israeli-Egyptian ISR 1969 No Win 
272 Israeli-Egyptian EGY 1969 No Loss 
273 Vietnamese CAM 1970 No Loss 
274 Bangladesh IND 1971 No Win 
275 Bangladesh PAK 1971 No Loss 
276 Sudanese Civil War RUS 1971 No Loss 
277 Philippines vs. Moros PHI 1972 No Win 
278 Kurdish Rebellion 1974-1975 RUS 1973 No Win 
279 Kurdish Rebellion 1974-1975 RUS 1973 No Win 
280 Yom Kippur ISR 1973 No Win 
281 Yom Kippur EGY 1973 No Loss 
282 Yom Kippur IRQ 1973 No Loss 
283 Yom Kippur JOR 1973 No Loss 
284 Yom Kippur SAU 1973 No Loss 
285 Yom Kippur SYR 1973 No Loss 
286 Turco-Cypriot TUR 1974 No Win 
287 Turco-Cypriot CYP 1974 No Loss 
288 Ethiopia vs. Eritrean Rebels ETH 1974 No Loss 
289 Iraq vs. Kurds of 1974 IRN 1974 No Win 
290 Iraq vs. Kurds of 1974 IRQ 1974 No Win 
291 Vietnamese-Cambodian DRV 1975 No Win 
292 Vietnamese-Cambodian CAM 1975 No Loss 
293 East Timorese INS 1975 No Win 
294 Ethiopia vs. Eritrean Rebels CUB 1976 No Loss 
295 Assert Presence UKG 1977 No Win 
296 Ethiopian-Somalian CUB 1977 No Win 
297 Ethiopian-Somalian ETH 1977 No Win 
298 Ethiopian-Somalian SOM 1977 No Loss 
299 Operation Tacaud FRN 1978 No Win 
300 Afghanistan vs. Mujahedin AFG 1978 No Loss 
301 Operation Barracuda FRN 1979 No Win 
302 Sino-Vietnamese CHN 1979 No Win 
303 Sino-Vietnamese DRV 1979 No Loss 
304 Afghanistan vs. Mujahedin RUS 1979 No Loss 
305 Soviet Quagmire RUS 1980 No Loss 
306 Lebanese Civil War Involvement USA 1982 No Loss 
307 Peru vs. Shining Path PER 1982 No Win 
308 Operation Urgent Fury USA 1983 No Win 
309 Support Habre/Operation Manta FRN 1983 No Loss 
310 Sri Lanka vs. Tamils SRI 1983 No Loss 
311 Support Habre/ Operation Epervier FRN 1986 No Win 
312 Sino-Vietnamese CHN 1987 No Loss 
313 Sino-Vietnamese DRV 1987 No Win 
314 Sri Lanka vs. Tamils IND 1987 No Loss 
315 Operation Just Cause USA 1989 No Win 
316 Gulf War KUW 1990 No Win 
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317 Gulf War IRQ 1990 No Loss 
318 Gulf War CAN 1991 No Win 
319 Gulf War EGY 1991 No Win 
320 Gulf War FRN 1991 No Win 
321 Gulf War ITA 1991 No Win 
322 Gulf War MOR 1991 No Win 
323 Gulf War OMA 1991 No Win 
324 Gulf War QAT 1991 No Win 
325 Gulf War SAU 1991 No Win 
326 Gulf War SYR 1991 No Win 
327 Gulf War UAE 1991 No Win 
328 Gulf War UKG 1991 No Win 
329 Gulf War USA 1991 No Win 
330 Operation Epervier II FRN 1991 No Win 
331 Turkey vs. Kurds TUR 1991 No Win 
332 Yugoslavia/Serbia vs. Croatians YUG 1991 No Loss 
333 Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) USA 1992 No Loss 
334 Operation Continue Hope (UNOSOM) USA 1993 No Loss 
335 First Chechnya RUS 1994 No Loss 
336 Russia vs. Chechens RUS 1994 No Win 
337 Comoros Coup II FRN 1995 No Win 
338 Invasion of Afghanistan FRN 2001 No Loss 
339 Invasion of Afghanistan UKG 2001 No Loss 
340 Invasion of Afghanistan USA 2001 No Loss 
341 Invasion of Iraq UKG 2003 No Loss 
342 Invasion of Iraq USA 2003 No Loss 
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 Conflict State Start Year 
Multipolar 
System Outcome 
1 Russia vs. Georgians RUS 1816 Yes Win 
2 British-Kandyan UKG 1817 Yes Win 
3 British-Maratha UKG 1817 Yes Win 
4 First Caucasus RUS 1818 Yes Win 
5 First British-Burmese UKG 1823 Yes Win 
6 First British-Ashanti UKG 1824 Yes Win 
7 British-Bharatpuran UKG 1825 Yes Win 
8 Russia vs. Circasians RUS 1829 Yes Win 
9 First Murid War RUS 1830 Yes Win 
10 Netherlands vs. Belgians FRN 1830 Yes Loss 
11 Netherlands vs. Belgians UKG 1830 Yes Loss 
12 First Polish RUS 1831 Yes Win 
13 British-Afghan of 1838 UKG 1838 Yes Win 
14 First British-Zulu UKG 1838 Yes Loss 
15 First British-Afghan UKG 1839 Yes Loss 
16 First Franco-Algerian FRN 1839 Yes Win 
17 British-Sind UKG 1843 Yes Win 
18 Franco-Moroccan FRN 1844 Yes Win 
19 First British-Sikh UKG 1845 Yes Win 
20 Cracow Revolt AUH 1846 Yes Win 
21 Cracow Revolt GMY 1846 Yes Win 
22 First British-Xhosa UKG 1846 Yes Win 
23 Austro-Sardinian AUH 1848 Yes Win 
24 Austro-Sardinian ITA 1848 Yes Loss 
25 First Schleswig-Holstein GMY 1848 Yes Win 
26 Second British-Sikh UKG 1848 Yes Win 
27 Roman Republic AUH 1849 Yes Win 
28 Roman Republic FRN 1849 Yes Win 
29 Hungarian RUS 1849 Yes Win 
30 Second British-Xhosa UKG 1850 Yes Win 
31 Second British-Burmese UKG 1852 Yes Win 
32 Crimean RUS 1853 Yes Loss 
33 Crimean FRN 1854 Yes Win 
34 Crimean UKG 1854 Yes Win 
35 French-Tukulor War FRN 1854 Yes Loss 
36 Crimean ITA 1855 Yes Win 
37 Anglo-Persian UKG 1856 Yes Win 
38 French Conquest of Kabylia FRN 1856 Yes Win 
39 Second Opium FRN 1856 Yes Win 
40 Second Opium UKG 1856 Yes Win 
42 (Tukulor) Franco-Senegalese of 1857 FRN 1857 Yes Win 
43 First Franco-Vietnamese FRN 1858 Yes Win 
44 Italo-Roman ITA 1860 Yes Win 
45 Franco-Mexican FRN 1862 Yes Loss 
46 China vs. Taipings UKG 1862 Yes Win 
47 Second Polish RUS 1863 Yes Win 
48 British-Maori UKG 1863 Yes Win 
49 Second Schleswig-Holstein AUH 1864 Yes Win 
50 Second Schleswig-Holstein GMY 1864 Yes Win 
51 British-Bhutanese UKG 1865 Yes Win 
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52 Seven Weeks GMY 1866 Yes Win 
53 Seven Weeks ITA 1866 Yes Win 
54 Second Franco-Algerian FRN 1871 Yes Win 
55 Franco-Tonkin FRN 1873 Yes Win 
56 Second British-Ashanti UKG 1873 Yes Win 
57 Second Russo-Turkish RUS 1877 Yes Win 
58 Third British-Xhosa UKG 1877 Yes Win 
59 Russo-Turkoman RUS 1878 Yes Win 
60 Second British-Afghan UKG 1878 Yes Win 
61 Second British-Zulu UKG 1879 Yes Win 
62 First Boer War UKG 1880 Yes Loss 
63 Boer War of 1880 UKG 1880 Yes Win 
64 Gun War UKG 1880 Yes Win 
65 First British-Mahdi UKG 1881 Yes Loss 
66 Franco-Tunisian FRN 1881 Yes Win 
67 Third Franco-Vietnamese FRN 1882 Yes Loss 
68 First Franco-Madagascan FRN 1883 Yes Win 
69 Sino-French FRN 1884 Yes Loss 
70 French-Mandinka FRN 1885 Yes Win 
71 Russo-Afghan RUS 1885 Yes Loss 
72 Third British-Burmese UKG 1885 Yes Win 
73 First Italian-Ethiopian ITA 1887 Yes Loss 
74 Franco-Dahomeyan FRN 1889 Yes Win 
75 First Franco-Dahomeyan FRN 1890 Yes Win 
76 Second Franco-Dahomeyan FRN 1892 Yes Win 
77 Franco-Thai FRN 1893 Yes Win 
78 Third British-Ashanti UKG 1893 Yes Win 
79 Sino-Japanese JPN 1894 Yes Win 
80 Second Franco-Madagascan FRN 1894 Yes Win 
81 Japan-Taiwanese JPN 1895 Yes Win 
82 Second Italian-Ethiopian ITA 1895 Yes Loss 
83 (Sudanese War) Mahdi Uprising FRN 1896 Yes Win 
84 (Sudanese War) Mahdi Uprising UKG 1896 Yes Win 
85 British-South Nigerian UKG 1897 Yes Win 
86 Indian Muslim UKG 1897 Yes Win 
87 Hut Tax UKG 1898 Yes Win 
88 American-Philippino USA 1899 Yes Win 
89 Second Boer War UKG 1899 Yes Win 
90 Somali Rebellion UKG 1899 Yes Win 
91 Sino-Russian RUS 1900 Yes Win 
92 Somali Rebellion UKG 1901 Yes Win 
93 Russo-Japanese JPN 1904 Yes Win 
94 Russo-Japanese RUS 1904 Yes Loss 
95 South West African Revolt GMY 1904 Yes Win 
96 Maji-Maji Revolt GMY 1905 Yes Win 
97 Third British-Zulu UKG 1906 Yes Win 
98 First Moroccan FRN 1911 Yes Win 
99 Second Moroccan FRN 1916 Yes Win 
100 Franco-Turkish FRN 1919 Yes Loss 
101 Russo-Polish RUS 1919 Yes Loss 
102 Third British-Afghan UKG 1919 Yes Loss 
103 (Sanusi) Italo-Libyan ITA 1920 Yes Win 
104 Franco-Syrian FRN 1920 Yes Win 
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105 Iraqi-British UKG 1920 Yes Win 
106 Franco-Druze FRN 1925 Yes Win 
107 Rif Rebellion FRN 1925 Yes Win 
108 Manchurian JPN 1931 Yes Win 
109 Russia vs. Central Asian Rebels RUS 1931 Yes Win 
110 Italo-Ethiopian ITA 1935 Yes Win 
111 Third Sino-Japanese JPN 1937 Yes Win 
112 Changkufeng RUS 1938 Yes Win 
113 Changkufeng JPN 1938 Yes Loss 
114 Nomonhan RUS 1939 Yes Win 
115 Nomonhan JPN 1939 Yes Loss 
116 Russo-Finnish RUS 1939 Yes Win 
117 Franco-Thai FRN 1940 Yes Loss 
118 Re-occupy Vietnam post-WWII FRN 1945 Yes Win 
119 Indonesian UKG 1945 Yes Loss 
120 French-Indochina FRN 1946 No Loss 
121 Re-claim Laos post-WWII FRN 1946 No Win 
122 Third Franco-Madagascan FRN 1947 No Win 
123 Malayan Rebellion UKG 1948 No Win 
124 Korean UKG 1950 No Loss 
125 Korean USA 1950 No Loss 
126 Korean FRN 1951 No Loss 
127 British-Mau Mau UKG 1952 No Win 
128 Franco-Tunisian FRN 1952 No Loss 
129 Intervention in Guyana UKG 1953 No Loss 
130 Moroccan Independence FRN 1953 No Loss 
131 Third Franco-Algerian FRN 1954 No Loss 
132 Resist Enosis Campaign UKG 1955 No Loss 
133 Cameroon UKG 1955 No Loss 
134 Bahrain riots UKG 1956 No Win 
135 Russo-Hungarian RUS 1956 No Win 
136 Sinai FRN 1956 No Win 
137 Sinai UKG 1956 No Win 
138 Suez Crisis 1956 (Sinai War) UKG 1956 No Loss 
139 Cameroun Independence FRN 1957 No Win 
140 Operation Blue Bat USA 1958 No Win 
141 Protect Hussein/ Nasserism UKG 1958 No Win 
142 Cameroun Independence II FRN 1960 No Win 
143 Battle of Bizerte FRN 1961 No Loss 
144 Republic of Vietnam vs. NLF USA 1961 No Loss 
145 Brunei Rebellion UKG 1962 No Win 
146 Cypriot Civil War UKG 1963 No Loss 
147 Operation Power Pack USA 1965 No Win 
148 Vietnam War, Phase 2 USA 1965 No Loss 
149 Prague Spring RUS 1968 No Loss 
150 Sudanese Civil War RUS 1971 No Loss 
151 Kurdish Rebellion 1974-1975 RUS 1973 No Win 
152 Kurdish Rebellion 1974-1975 RUS 1973 No Win 
153 Assert Presence UKG 1977 No Win 
154 Operation Tacaud FRN 1978 No Win 
155 Operation Barracuda FRN 1979 No Win 
156 Afghanistan vs. Mujahedin RUS 1979 No Loss 
157 Soviet Quagmire RUS 1980 No Loss 
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158 Lebanese Civil War Involvement USA 1982 No Loss 
159 Operation Urgent Fury USA 1983 No Win 
160 Support Habre/Operation Manta FRN 1983 No Loss 
161 Support Habre/ Operation Epervier FRN 1986 No Win 
162 Operation Just Cause USA 1989 No Win 
163 Gulf War FRN 1991 No Win 
164 Gulf War ITA 1991 No Win 
165 Gulf War UKG 1991 No Win 
166 Gulf War USA 1991 No Win 
167 Operation Epervier II FRN 1991 No Win 
168 Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) USA 1992 No Loss 
169 Operation Continue Hope (UNOSOM) USA 1993 No Loss 
170 First Chechnya RUS 1994 No Loss 
171 Russia vs. Chechens RUS 1994 No Win 
172 Comoros Coup II FRN 1995 No Win 
173 Invasion of Afghanistan FRN 2001 No Loss 
174 Invasion of Afghanistan UKG 2001 No Loss 
175 Invasion of Afghanistan USA 2001 No Loss 
176 Invasion of Iraq UKG 2003 No Loss 
177 Invasion of Iraq USA 2003 No Loss 
 
 
